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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, ) 
) 
Petitioner/ Appellant, ) 
) 
V. ) 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department 
of Water Resources, and THE IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER 
RESOURCES, 









A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY ) 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER ) 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, AMERICAN ) 
FALLS RESERVOIR DISTRICT #2, ) 
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, ) 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY and ) 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY, ) 




IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION ) 
FOR PERMIT NO. 27-12261 ) 
) 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. ) 
) 
Supreme Court 
Docket No. 44207 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham, reassigned to the 
Honorable Eric J. Wildman 
of the Fifth Judicial District1• 
APPEARANCES 
Garrett H. Sandow, 220 N. Meridian, Blackfoot, Idaho, 83221, appearing for 
Petitioner-Appellant, City of Blackfoot 
Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew Rawlings, Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo 
PLLC, 1000 Riverwalk Dr., Suite 200, PO Box 50130, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83405, 
appearing for Petitioner-Appellant, City of Blackfoot. 
Garrick L. Baxter, Deputy Attorney General, Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho,83720-0098, appearing for Respondents/ 
Respondents, IDWR and Gary Spackman. 
Paul L. Arrington, Travis L. Thompson, and John K. Simpson, Barker 
Rosholt & Simpson LLP, 163 2nd Ave W, PO Box 63, Twin Falls, Idaho, 
83301-0063, appearing for Intervenors I Respondents, A&B Irrigation District, 
Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company 
and Twin Falls Canal Company. 
W. Kent Fletcher, Fletcher Law Office, 1200 Overland Ave., PO Box 248, 
Burley, Idaho, 83318-0248, appearing for Intervenors I Respondents, Minidoka 
Irrigation District and American Falls Reservoir District #2. 
1 
This matter was reassigned to this Court on October 26, 2015, by the Clerk of the Court for Bingham County, 
pursuant to Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order, dated December 9, 2009. 
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Garrett H. Sandow, ISB # 5215 
220 N. Meridian 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
Telephone: (208) 785-9300 
Facsimile: (208) 785-0595 
Robert L. Harris, JSB #7018 
Luke H. Marchant, ISB #7944 
D. Andrew Rawlings, ISB #9569 
HdC 1 ,; 
2lJ!50CT 16 PM l: 28 
!(.,r_~ ......•.. 
BY __ ~ ... '. .,, 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
ldaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208)523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for the City of Blaclifoot 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICA TJON FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
Case No. CV - 8) 0 I 5 - / LP. i I 
Fee Category L.3.a-$221.00 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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Petitioner, the City of Blackfoot, by and through its above-listed counsel of record files 
this Notice of Appeal and Petition for Judicial Review of Final Agency Action challenging a 
decision by the Idaho Department of Water Resources issued by its director, pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 42-1701 A( 4), 67-5270, and 67-5279. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
l. This is a civil action pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 42-l 701A(4), 67-5270, and 
67-5279 seeking judicial review of the Order Addressing Exceptions and Denying Application 
for Permit, issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources, Gary Spackman, 
("Director") on September 22, 2015. 
2. To aid in the construction of Interstate 15, the City of Blackfoot (the "City") 
allowed the Federal Highway Administration to relocate a portion of the Snake River to avoid 
construction of certain bridges. This created a gravel pit, known as Jensen's Grove, in the 
former location of a portion of the Snake River channel. 
3. Decades later, with federal assistance, the City was able to purchase a water right, 
Water Right No. 01-181 C (hereinafter, simply "O 1-181 C"), in order to turn Jensen's Grove into a 
recreation area with a 73-acre lake that is filled with water beginning in the spring of each year. 
4. In 2005, the City filed a transfer application, administratively numbered as 
Transfer No. 72385 (hereinafter, simply "72385"), to amend 01-181C. A group of canal 
companies and irrigation districts known as the Surface Water Coalition (the "Coalition") 
protested. In June 2006, the City and the Coalition agreed to resolve the Coalition's protest 
pursuant to a Settlement Agreement, IDWR Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, June 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND 
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2006 (the "Agreement"). In February 2007, the Department of Water Resources approved 
72385, incorporating the Agreement into the approval. 
5. In relevant part, 01-18] C allows the City to divert a total of 2,266.8 AF for 
recreation storage. Of that total amount, l, I 00 AF is stored in Jensen's Grove during its season 
of use (which must be refilled before each season of use), 980.8 AF accounts for seepage losses 
during the season of use, and 186 AF makes up for losses from evaporation during the season of 
use. 
6. Thus, the City contends that a total of 2,080.8 AF enters the aquifer as ground 
water recharge annually--comprised of the 980.8 AF of seepage during the season of use and 
1,100 AF that fills Jensen's Grove but seeps into the aquifer in the months after each season of 
use. 
7. On September 12, 2013, the City submitted an application for permit to the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources (the "Department") which was administratively numbered as 
27-12261 (hereinafter, simply ("27-12661"). The application was amended on September 2, 
2014, and January 27, 2015. By submitting 27-12261, the City is seeking a water right permit to 
develop 9.71 cfs of ground water for the irrigation of 524.2 acres by relying on the mitigation 
provided by the 2,080.8 AF of ground water recharge described above. 
8. The Coalition protested 27-12261. 
9. The Department's Hearing Officer conducted a hearing on April 21, 2015. 
Thereafter, the Hearing Officer allowed post-hearing briefs on the question of whether there was 
a legal impediment to using water right O 1-181 C in a mitigation plan for the proposed permit. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND 
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10. On June 30, 2015, the Hearing Officer issued a Preliminary Order Issuing Permit, 
which issued the permit, 27-12261, with certain restrictions (the "Preliminary Order"). In 
reaching that conclusion, the Hearing Officer considered O 1-181 C, as amended, and the 
Agreement. The Hearing Officer approved the issuance of a permit for O 1-181 C, but also 
required that the City file a transfer application to amend O 1-181 C to allow for it to be used for 
ground water recharge. 
11. The City filed exceptions to the Preliminary Order on July 14, 2015 with the 
Director. The City challenged two of the Preliminary Order's Findings of Fact, several points of 
Evaluation Criteria/ Analysis, and the Conclusions of Law. The Coaltion responded on July 28, 
2015. 
12. On September 22, 2015, the Director issued the Order Addressing Exceptions and 
Denying Application for Permit (the "Final Order"). The Final Order reversed the Preliminary 
Order by denying issuance of a permit for 27-12261, and surprisingly, did not consider or 
interpret the Agreement at all. 
13. The Final Order is the subject of this Notice of Appeal and Petition for Judicial 
Review of Fina! Agency Action. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
14. This petition is authorized by Idaho Code§§ 42-l 701A(4), 67-5270, and 67-5279. 
15. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 42-
I 701A(4) and 67-5272. 
16. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5272 because the City of 
Blackfoot is located in and does business in Bingham County, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND 
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17. Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's Administrative Order issued on December 
9, 2009, "all petitions for judicial review of any decision regarding administration of water rights 
from the Depa11ment of Water Resources shall be assigned to the presiding judge of the Snake 
River Basin Adjudication District -Court of the Fifth Judicial District." The Snake River Basin 
Adjudication District Court's procedures instruct the clerk of the district court in which the 
petition is filed to issue a Notice of Reassignment. Blackfoot has attached a copy of the Snake 
River Basin Adjudication District Court's Notice of Reassignment form for the convenience of 
the clerk. 
18. The Director's Order Addressing Exceptions and Denying Application for Permit, 
dated September 22, 2015, is a final agency action subject to judicial review pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 67-5270(3). 
PARTIES 
19. Petitioner, City of Blackfoot, is an incorporated city, located in Bingham County, 
Idaho, provides water to its residents, and is the applicant for Permit No. 27-12261. 
20. Respondent, Gary Spackman, is the Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and a resident of Ada County, Idaho. 
21. Respondent, Idaho Depaitment of Water Resources, is an executive department 
existing under the laws of the state of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-170 I, et seq., with its 
state office located at 322 E. Front Street, Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
STATEMENT OF INITIAL ISSUES 
22. Petitioner intends to asse11 the following initial issues on judicial review: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND 
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a. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by 
failing to consider the Settlement Agreement, IDWR Transfer of Water Right, 
Tran.ifer No. 72385, June 2006, as an element of Water Right No. OJ-181C. 
b. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) 
by not engaging in contractual interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, 
IDWR Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, June 2006. 
c. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by 
concluding that "[n)othing in Transfer No. 72[3]85 [sic] or the Partial Decree 
issued by the Snake River Basin Adjudication indicate Right 01-181C can be 
used for ground water recharge." Final Order at 2. Stated another way, 
whether the City gave away its ability to use O 1-181 C to mitigate for 27-
1226 l when it entered into the Settlement Agreement, IDWR Transfer of 
Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, June 2006. 
d. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) by 
concluding that the City must file a transfer if it wants to use O 1-181 C for mitigation 
purposes. Final Order at 2. 
e. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) 
by determining that "any recharge to the aquifer achieved by diversion and 
use under Right O 1-181 C, is merely incidental recharge [ under Idaho Code § 
42-234(5)] and cannot be 'used as a basis for claim of a separate or expanded 
water right.'" 
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f. Whether questions of injury to the Coalition's water rights were already addressed in 
the contested case, and therefore, under principles of res judicata, the City should not 
be required to file a transfer application to permit the Coalition to have a second 
opportunity to raise injury arguments. 
g. Whether the Director's actions prejudiced a substantial right of the City. 
AGENCY RECORD 
23. Judicial Review is sought of the Director's Order Addressing Exceptions and 
Denying Applicationfor Permit, dated September 22, 2015. 
24. The Department held a hearing in this matter on April 21, 2015, which was 
recorded, and the recording should be made a part of the agency record in this matter. The 
person who has a digital copy of the hearing is Sharla Cox, Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, 900 North Skyline Drive, Suite A, Idaho Falls, ID 83402-1718, Telephone: (208) 
525-7161, Facsimile: (208) 525-7177, Email: sharla.cox@,idwr.idaho.gov. Counsel for the City 
hereby certifies that the City contacted Ms. Cox to verify that she has the recording. In 
accordance with LR.C.P. 84(g), the City has contacted M&M Court Reporting at the direction of 
the agency clerk to obtain an estimate of the cost to prepare the transcript. The estimated cost is 
Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), and the City certifies that a check has been sent to M&M Court 
Reporting, 101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 503, Boise, ID 83702 on October 16, 2015, as the 
estimated cost for preparing the transcript in this matter, and will pay the actual cost of the 
transcript if it is determined to be more than the estimated cost. 
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25. Petitioner anticipates it can reach a stipulation regarding the agency record with 
the Respondents and any intervenors, and will pay its necessary share of the fee for preparation 
of the record at such time. 
26. Service of this Petition for .Judicial Review has been made on the Respondents as 
they exist at the time of the filing of this Petition. 
Datedthis /(p dayof0ctober2015. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
Garrett Sandow 
· for City of Blackfoot 
Robert L. Harris 
Holden, KidweII, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below, by the method indicated, a true and 
correct copy thereof on this --'-Lt.- day of October 2015. 
Document Served: NOTICE OF APPEAL AND PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
Attorneys and/or Individuals Served: 
Paul L. Arrington 
BARKER, ROSHOLT & SIMPSON, LLP 
195 River Vista Place, Suite 204 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301-3027 
pla(a) idahowaters.com 
W. Kent Fletcher 
FLETCHER LAW OFFICE 
P.O. Box 248 
Burley, Idaho 83318-0248 
wkf@pmt.org 
Courtesy Copy: 
Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court 
of the Fifth Judicial District 
P.O. Box 2707 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-2707 
( X") Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile, (208) 735-2444 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( )c) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile, (208) 878-2548 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( )C) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Garrett Sandow 
Attorney for City of Blackfoot 
G:\WPDATA\RLHI_ Temp Client Files\_Blackfoot\Notice of Appeal.docx 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 









GARY SP ACKMAN, in his capacity as ) 
Director of the Idaho Department of Water' ) 
Resources, and THE IDAHO ) 




) ______________ ) 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION 
FOR PERMIT NO. 27-12261 







Case No. CV-2015-1687 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, PAMELA W. ECKHARDT, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham, do hereby certify I served a true copy of the 
this Court's file in the above-entitled case on the person(s) listed below in the manner indicated: 
Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court 
Fifth Judicial District 
PO Box 2707 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-2707 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
102115-BC 




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court 
at Blackfoot, Idaho, this 2)} 'S +-day of October 2015. 
PAMELA W. ECKHARDT, 
Clerk of the District Court '''""'"''' ,,,'\'\t"lH JUb1/'',, 
~ .. e;; ............. ?t, ~ .... .,_, • •o ~A, ... . ,~.l .• ca,.;, ... ~. "\ ~ ... ... ~. -;;.-
\~~(an omm.1~~(-llf111~);§ 
eputy Clerk -:. ~ \ : : 
I ~. , ..... ~"(?··.. ··~.::-,, •... . .... ~ ' .... , 1/1' ...... ti~~ ,, ,,,, ,,GHAV. ,,,, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
''''"""''' 
I hereby certify that on the~kay of October, 2015, I served a true copy of the foregoing 
document to the person(s) listed below in the manner indicated: 
PAULL. ARRINGTON, ESQ. 
BARKER, ROSHOLT & SIMPSON. LLP 
195 RJVER VISTA PLACE, SUITE 204 
TWIN FALLS, ID 83301-3027 
W. KENT FLETCHER, ESQ. 
FLETCHER LAW OFFICE 
POBOX248 
BURLEY, ID 83318-0248 
ROBERT L. HARRIS, ESQ. 
LUKE H. MARCHANT, ESQ. 
D. ANDREW RAWLINGS, ESQ. 
0U.S.Mail 
~ Email: pla@idahowaters.com 
D U.S. Mail 
~ Email: wkf@)pmt.org 
0U.S.Mail 
HOLDEN. KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO. P.L.L.C. 
POBOX248 
~ Email: rharris(a),holdenlegal.com; 
Imarchant@holdenlegal.com; 
arawlings@lholdenlegal.com 
BURLEY, ID 83318-0248 
GARRETT H. SANDOW, ESQ. 
220 N. MERJDIAN 
BLACKFOOT, IDAHO 83221 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
102115-BC 
D U.S. Mail 
~ Designated Courthouse Box 
PAMELA W. ECKHARDT, 
Clerk of the Court 
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District Court • SABA 
Fifth Judicial District 
In Re: Administrative Appeals 
County of Twin Falls • State of Idaho 
OCT 2 6 2015 
0 TRICT COURT 
JUOIC!i',[ DCffi 
2[H5 OCT 21 PM 4: 32 
,,. 
BY~--
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondent. 
IN THE MA TIER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 
ln the name of the City of Blackfoot. 
Case No. 
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT 
WHEREAS Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order dated December 9, 2009, 
declares that all petitions for judicial review made pursuant to LC. § 42-170 IA of any decision 
from the Department of Water Resources be assigned to the presiding judge of the Snake River 
Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, and 
WHEREAS Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order dated December 9, 2009, vests 
in the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court the authority to adopt procedural rules 
necessary to implement said Order, and 
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WHEREAS on July l, 2010, the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court issued an 
Administrative Order regarding the Rule of Procedure Governing Petitions for Judicial Review 
or Actions for Declaratory Relief of Decisions from the Idaho Department of Water Resources. 
THEREFORE THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The above-matter is hereby assigned to the presiding judge of the Snake River 
Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for disposition and further 
proceedings. 
2. All further documents filed or otherwise submitted in this matter, and all further 
filing foes filed or otherwise submitted in this matter, shall be filed with the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District at P.O. Box 2707, Twin Falls, Idaho 
83303-2707, provided that checks representing further filing fees shall be made payable to the 
county where the original petition for judicial review or action for declaratory judgment was 
filed. 
DATED thisAls+ day of October 2015. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF 
REASSIQNMENT on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below, by the method indicated, on 
this ~day of October 2015. 
Paul L. Arrington 
BARKER, ROSHOLT & SIMPSON, LLP 
195 River Vista Place, Suite 204 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301-3027 
pla<@idahowaters.com 
W. Kent Fletcher 
FLETCHER LAW OFFICE 
P.O. Box 248 
Burley, Idaho 833 I 8-0248 
wkt[c4pmt.org 
Robert L. Harris 
Luke H. Marchant 
D. Andrew Rawlings 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 248 
Burley, Idaho 83318-0248 
rbarris<@holdenlegal.com 
Im archant@holden legal .com 
arawlin2.s@holdenlegal.com 
Garrett H. Sandow, ISB # 52 I 5 
220 N. Meridian 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
Telephone: (208) 785-9300 
Facsimile: (208) 785-0595 
Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court 
of the Fifth Judicial District 
P.O. Box 2707 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-2707 
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT 3 
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( ) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
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.(.:::::~") i;.acsirnile, (208) 785-0595 
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( ) Hand Delivery 
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Di.strict Court • SABA 
Fifth Judicial District 
In Re: Administrative Appeals 
County of Twin Falls • State of Idaho 
OCT 2 7 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his official capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES 
Respondents. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. 
) Case No. CV-2015-1687 
) 
) PROCEDURALORDER 
) GOVERNING JUDICIAL 
) REVIEW OF FINAL ORDER OF 















A Petition for Judicial Review was filed in the above-entitled district court seeking 
judicial review of a final order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources ("Department" or '"agency"). This Order, together with Rule 84, Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, (LR.C.P.), applicable statutes and the Administrative Order Adopting Procedures for 
the Implementation of the Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order Dated December 9, 20091 
issued by this Court on July 1, 2010, govern all proceedings before the Court. 
1 A copy is attached to this Order. 
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THEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Petition for Judicial Review and Reassignment of Case: The Petition for 
Judicial Review was filed on October 16, 2015. The case was reassigned by the clerk of the 
court to this Court on October 21, 2015. 
2. Cross Petitions, Filing Fees, and all Subsequent Filings: All further 
documents, including cross petitions, filed, lodged or otherwise submitted, and all further filing 
fees filed or otherwise submitted, shall be filed with the Snake River Basin Adjudication District 
Court of the Fifth Judicial District at P.O. Box 2707, Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-2707, provided 
that checks representing further filing fees shall be made payable to the county where the 
original petition for judicial review or action for declaratory judgment was filed. 
3. Appearances by persons or entities who were a party to the underlying 
administrative proceeding but who were not made a named party in the Petition for 
Judicial Review: Where a person or entity who was a party to the underlying administrative 
proceeding is not made a named party in the Petition for Judicial Review, and is not otherwise a 
Petitioner, such person or entity may file a Notice of Appearance in this matter within fourteen 
(14) days from the issuance of this Procedural Order. This Court will treat the Notice of 
Appearance as a Motion to Intervene and will treat the party filing the Notice of Appearance as 
an Intervenor. 2 Under such circumstances, the Court will automatically issue an order granting 
the Motion to Intervene unless one or more parties to the action files an opposition to the Motion 
within 10 days of the filing of the Notice of Appearance. A person or entity not a party to the 
underlying administrative proceeding who desires to participate in this action, and is not 
otherwise a Petitioner, must proceed in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 7.1. 
4. Assigned Case Number and Document Footers: All documents filed, lodged or 
submitted shall be under the above-captioned case number and county of origin appearing in 
caption. All documents filed, lodged or otherwise submitted, including attachments shall include 
a footer at the bottom of the document describing said document. 
5. Stays: Unless provided for by statute, the filing of a petition or cross petition 
does not automatically stay the proceedings and enforcement of the action before the 
Department. LC.§ 67-5274. Any application or motion for stay must be made in accordance 
with I.R.C.P. 84(m). 
6. Form of Review: Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(e)(l), when judicial review is 
authorized by statute, judicial review shall be based upon the record created before the 
Department rather than as a trial de novo, unless the statute or the law provides for the procedure 
or standard. If the statute provides that the district court may take additional evidence upon 
judicial review, it may order the same on its own motion or the motion of any party. If the 
2 The parties should note that in such instances the Court will treat the Notice of Appearance as a Motion to 
Intervene for housekeeping purposes. In doing so, it is the Court's intent to have the record in this matter clearly 
reflect which persons and/or entities are participants in this action. It is also the Court's intent to have the caption of 
this matter properly reflect all those parties who are participating in this action and to identify in what capacity those 
parties are participating (i.e., Petitioner, Respondent, or Intervenor). 
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statute provides that review is de novo, the appeal shall be tried in the district court on any and 
all issues, on a new record. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(e)(2), the scope ofreview on petition from 
the Department to the district court shall be as provided by statute. 
7. Preparation of Agency Record; Payment of Fees: Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(f), 
when the statute provides what shall be contained in the official record of the agency upon 
judicial review, the Department shall prepare the record as provided by statute. Otherwise, the 
documents listed in paragraph (3) of l.R.C.P. 84(f) shall constitute the agency record for review. 
Petitioner (and cross-petitioner) shall pay all fees as required for preparation of the agency record 
in accordance with I.R.C.P. 84(f)(4). The clerk of the Department shall lodge the record with 
the Department within 14 days of the entry of this Order, or no later than November 10, 
2015. Any extension in time for preparation of the agency record shall be applied for by the 
agency to the district court. 
8. Preparation of Transcript; Payment of Fee: The Court requires the provision 
of a written transcript prepared from the recorded or reported proceedings. It is the responsibility 
of the petitioner ( or cross-petitioner as the case may be) to timely arrange and pay for preparation 
of all portions of the transcript reasonably necessary for review. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(g), the 
responsible party shall contact the agency clerk to determine the estimated cost of the transcript, 
and pay the estimated cost in accordance with I.R.C.P. 84(g)(l)(A) or (2)(A) as the case may be. 
The transcript shall be lodged with the Department within 14 days of the entry of this 
Order, or no later than November 10, 2015. The transcriber may apply to the district court for 
an extension of time, for good cause shown. 
9. Settlement of Transcript and Record: Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(j), and unless 
otherwise provided by statute, upon receipt of the transcript and upon completion of the record, 
the Department shall mail or deliver notice of lodging of transcript and record to all attorneys of 
record or parties appearing in person and to the district court. The parties shall have 14 days 
from the date of mailing of the notice to pick up a copy of the transcript and agency record and to 
object to the transcript or record. All fees for the preparation of the transcript and record shall be 
paid by the responsible party at or before the pick-up of the agency record and transcript. Any 
objection to the record shall be determined by the Department within 14 days of the receipt of 
the objection and the decision on the objection shall be included in the record on petition for 
review. Upon the failure of the party to object within 14 days, the transcript and record shall be 
deemed settled. The settled record and transcript shall be lodged with the district court no later 
than December 8, 2015. 
10. Lodging of Transcript and Record in Electronic Format: In addition to 
lodging the settled transcript and agency record in paper format, the Department shall also lodge 
the transcript and agency record in electronic format (pdf version ocr 8) on CD-ROM. (In the 
event of an appeal from the district court it is the intent that the electronic version of the 
transcript and clerk's record be provided to the Idaho Supreme Court in lieu of paper format). 
11. Augmentation of the Record - Additional Evidence Presented to District 
Court- Remand to Agency to Take Additional Evidence: Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(1) the 
agency record and/or transcript on review may be augmented upon motion to this court by a 
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party within 21 days of the filing of the settled transcript and record in the manner prescribed by 
Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 30. The taking of additional evidence by the district court and/or 
agency on remand shall be governed by statute or I.R.C.P. 84(1). 
12. Briefs and Memoranda: The petitioner's brief shall be filed with the clerk of the 
court within 35 days after lodging of the transcript and record. The respondent's (and cross-
petitioner's brief) shall be filed within 28 days after service of petitioner's brief. Any reply brief 
shall be filed within 21 days after service of respondent's brief. The organization and content of 
briefs shall be governed by I.A.R. 35 and 36. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(p) only one (1) original 
signed brief may be filed with the court and copies shall be served on all parties. 
13. Extension of Time: Motions to extend the time for filing a brief or modify order 
of briefing shall be submitted in conformity with I.A.R. 34(e). All other requests for extension 
of time shall be submitted in conformity with LA.R. 46. 
14. Motions: All motions shall be submitted in conformity with I.R.C.P. 84(0) and 
shall be heard without oral argument unless ordered by the Court. 
15. Oral Argument, Telephonic and Video Teleconferencing: Oral argument will 
be heard March 10, 2016, at 1:30 p.m. (Mountain Time) at the Snake River Basin adjudication 
District Court, 253 3rd Avenue North, Twin Falls, Idaho. Telephone participation will be 
available by dialing 1-720-279-0026 and entering 786692# when prompted. However, no cell 
phones or speaker phones will be permitted as they interfere with our sound system 
making the proceeding difficult to accurately record. Video teleconferencing ("VTC") will 
also be available by appearing at either ( 1) the Idaho Department of Water Resources, Idaho 
Water Center, 322 E. Front St., Conference Rm. B, Boise, Idaho, or (2) the Idaho Department of 
Water Resources, Eastern Regional Office, 900 N. Skyline Drive, Ste. A, Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Parties should refer to the Administrative Order Adopting Procedures for the Implementation of 
the Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order Dated December 9, 2009 regarding protocol for 
telephone and VTC participation. The form and order of argument shall be governed by I.A.R. 
37. 
16. Judgment or Decision: The Court's decision will be by written memorandum as 
required by I.R.C.P. 84(t)(l). In compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(a), as amended effective July 1, 
2010, a separate judgment will also issue contemporaneously therewith. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
84(t)(2), if no petition for rehearing is filed the time for appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court shall 
begin to run after the date of the filing stamp of the clerk of the court appearing on the judgment. 
If a petition for rehearing is filed, the time for appeal shall begin to run after the date of the filing 
stamp of the clerk of the court appearing on either an order denying rehearing or on any modified 
judgment. 
17. Petitions for Rehearing: Petitions for rehearing shall be governed by the time 
standards and procedures of I.A.R. 42. If rehearing is granted, the Court will issue an order 
granting same and setting forth a briefing schedule for responsive briefing, a reply, and oral 
argument. Unless otherwise ordered, the brief filed in support of rehearing will be treated as the 
opening brief. Scenario 
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18. Remittitur: If no notice of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court is filed within 
forty-two (42) days after filing of the Court's written decision, the clerk shall issue a remittitur 
remanding the matter to the agency as provided in I.R.C.P. 84(t)(4). The Court will then notify 
the clerk of the district court where the petition was originally filed regarding completion of the 
case. 
19. Failure to Comply: Failure by either party to timely comply with the 
requirement of this Order or applicable provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or 
Idaho Appellate Rules, if applicable, shall be grounds for imposition of sanctions, including, but 
not limited to the allowance of attorney's fees, striking of briefs, or dismissal of the appeal 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 and 84(n) and I.AR. 11.1 and 21. 
PROCEDURAL ORDER 
ERIC J. WILDMAN 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN F 
RE:RULESOFPROCEDURE 
GOVERNING PETITIONS FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OR ACTIONS 
FOR DELCARATORY JUDGMENT 
OF DECISIONS FROM THE IDAHO 











WHEREAS Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order dated December 9, 2009, 
declares that all petitions for judicial review made pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-1701 A of any 
decision from the Department of Water Resources be assigned to the presiding judge of the 
Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, and 
WHEREAS Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order dated December 9, 2009, vests 
in the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District the authority to 
adopt procedural rules necessary to implement said Order. 
THEREFORE THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Filing of Petition for Judicial Review or Declaratory Judgment Action. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5272(1), any party filing a petition for judicial review pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 42-1701A, or an action for declaratory judgment, of any decision from the 
Department of Water Resources shall file the same, together with applicable filing fees, in the 
district court of the county in which: 
(a) the hearing was held; or 
(b) the final agency action was taken; or 
(c) the aggrieved party resides or operates its principal place of business in Idaho; or 
(d) the real property or personal property that was the subject of the agency decision 
is located. 
The filing party shall also serve a courtesy copy of the petition for judicial review 
or action for declaratory judgment with the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the 
Fifth Judicial District at P.O. Box 2707, Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-2707. Upon receipt by the 
Department of Water Resources of a petition for judicial review or action for declaratory 
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judgment, the Department shall review the certificate of mailing and in the event it does not 
show that a courtesy copy of the same was filed with the Snake River Basin Adjudication 
District Court, then the Department shall forthwith forward a copy of the petition or action for 
declaratory judgment to the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District at P.O. Box 2707, Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-2707. 
2. Reassignment. Upon the filing of a petition for judicial review pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 42-1701 A, or an action for declaratory judgment, of any decision from the Department of 
Water Resources, the clerk of the district court where the action is filed shall forthwith issue, file, 
and concurrently serve upon the Department of Water Resources and all other parties to the 
proceeding before the Department of Water Resources, an Notice of Reassignment ( copy 
attached hereto), assigning the matter to the presiding judge of the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for disposition and further proceedings. 
Also upon issuance of the Notice of Reassignment, the clerk of the district court 
where the action is filed shall forward a copy of the file to the clerk of the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District at P.O. Box 2707, Twin Falls, Idaho 
83303-2707. 
3. Case Number. All cases assigned to the Snake River Basin Adjudication District 
Court of the Fifth Judicial District as described herein shall retain the case number and caption 
assigned to them by the district court where the petition for judicial review or action for 
declaratory judgment is originally filed. 
4. Subsequent Filings. Following the issuance of the Notice of Reassignment, all 
further documents filed or otherwise submitted, and all further filing fees filed or otherwise 
submitted, shall be filed with the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth 
Judicial District at P.O. Box 2707, Twin Falls, Idaho 83303·2707, provided that checks 
representing further filing fees shall be made payable to the county where the original petition 
for judicial review or action for declaratory judgment was filed. 
5. Lodging of Transcript and Record. Following the preparation and settlement of 
the agency transcript and record, the Department of Water Resources shall transmit the settled 
transcript and record, in both paper and electronic form on CD ROM, to the clerk of the Snake 
River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District at P.O. Box 2707, Twin 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER -2-
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Falls, Idaho 83303-2707 within forty-two (42) days of the service of the petition for judicial 
review or action for declaratory judgment. 
6. Participation in Hearings by Telephone and Video Teleconferencing (VTC). 
Unless otherwise ordered by the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth 
Judicial District, telephone participation and/or VTC will be allowed in all hearings, except as 
follows: 
(a) The court may require in person or VTC attendance as circumstances may 
require. 
(b) The court's notice setting hearing will specify participation restrictions, telephone 
conferencing numbers and participant codes and/or location of regional VTC facilities. 
( c) Speakerphones and cell phones often pick up background noise and/or cause 
interference with sensitive courtroom equipment. Therefore, the use of speak:erphones and cell 
phones are discouraged. 
(d) Place your call to the court a few minutes prior to the scheduled start of your 
hearing so that the clerk of the court may identify who is participating by telephone. 
7. Resolution. This court will notify the clerk of the district court where the petition 
for judicial review or action for declaratory judgment was originally filed of the completion of 
the case upon the happening of either: 
(a) the expiration of the time to appeal any decision of this court if no appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court is filed; or 
(b) the filing of the remittitur from the Idaho Supreme Court or Idaho Court of 
Appeals with this court in the event that an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court is timely filed 
following a decision of this court. 
8. Other Procedural Rules. Any procedure for judicial review not specified or 
covered by this Order shall be in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 to the extent 
the same is not contrary to this Order. 
DATED this_/_ day of __ J_"-' ...... J---
Presiding Judge 
Snake River Basin Adjudication 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER - 3. 
000027
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ---
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ------
RE: PETITIONS FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OR ACTIONS FOR 
DECLARATORY RELIEF OF 
DECISIONS FROM THE IDAHO 










NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT 
WHEREAS Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order dated December 9, 2009, 
declares that all petitions for judicial review made pursuant to LC. § 42-170 I A of any decision 
from the Department of Water Resources be assigned to the presiding judge of the Snake River 
Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, and 
WHEREAS Idaho Supreme Court Administrative Order dated December 9, 2009, vests 
in the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court the authority to adopt procedural rules 
necessary to implement said Order, and 
WHEREAS on July 1, 2010, the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court issued an 
Administrative Order regarding the Rule of Procedure Governing Petitions for Judicial Review 
or Actions for Declaratory Relief of Decisions from the Idaho Department of Water Resources. 
THEREFORE THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The above-matter is hereby assigned to the presiding judge of the Snake River 
Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for disposition and further 
proceedings. 
2. All further documents filed or otherwise submitted in this matter, and all further 
filing fees filed or otherwise submitted in this matter, shall be filed with the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District at P.O. Box 2707, Twin Falls, Idaho 
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT - 1 -
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83303-2707, provided that checks representing further filing fees shall be made payable to the 
county where the original petition for judicial review or action for declaratory judgment was 
filed. 
DATED this_ day of _____ , 2010. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT - 2 -
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
IN THE :MATTER OF THE APPOINTMENT OF ) 
THE SRBA DISTRICT COURT TO HEAR ALL ) 
PETITIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW FROM THE) ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES ) 
INVOL YING ADMINISTRATION OF WATER ) 
RIGHTS ) 
WHEREAS pursuant to I.C. § 42-l 70IA any person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order of the 
Director of the Department of Water Resources is entitled to judicial review, and 
WHEREAS there is a need for consistency and uniformity in judicial decisions regarding the 
administration of water rights, and 
WHEREAS the Idaho Supreme Court has a constitutional responsibility to administer and supervise the 
work of the district courts pursuant to Art. V, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution, and 
WHEREAS the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District has 
particular expertise in the area of water right adjudication, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all petitions for judicial review of any decision regarding the. 
administration of water rights from the Department of Water Resources shall be assigned to the presiding judge 
of the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District. Review shall be held in 
accord with Title 67, Chapter 52 of the Idaho Code, except that, once filed, all petitions for judicial review shall 
be forwarded to the clerk of the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court of the Fifth Judicial District. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERD that the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court is authorized to 
develop the procedural rules necessary to implement this order. 
IT IS FURTIIBR ORDERED that this order shall be effective the 1st day of July, 2010. 
DATED this 9 day of December 2009. 
ATIEST: 
£Yi~ It'.'.~ 
Stephen W. Kenyon, cF 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
Dame T. Eismann, ief Justice 
I, Stephen W. Kenyon, Clark of the Supreme Court 
of the State of Idaho, do hereby ceftlfy that the 
above ii a true ancl correct copy of lhe Ord,ev: 
entered in the above entitled cause and now on 
record In my office. 
WITNESS mv hand and the Saal of Illa Coult 12./10/ " 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the PROCEDURAL 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINAL ORDER OF DIRECTOR OF 
IDWR was mailed on October 27, 2015, with sufficient first-class 
postage to the following: 
IDWR AND GARY SPACKMAN IN HIS 
Represented by: 
GARRICK L BAXTER 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO - IDWR 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0098 
Phone: 208-287-4800 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT 
Represented by: 
LUKE H MARCHANT 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
1000 RIVERWALK DR STE 200 
PO BOX 50130 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405 
Phone: 208-523-0620 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT 
Represented by: 
RAWLINGS, D ANDREW 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
1000 RIVERWALK DR STE 200 
PO BOX 50130 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405 
Phone: 208-523-0620 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT 
Represented by: 
ROBERT L HARRIS 
1000 RIVERWALK DR, STE 200 
PO BOX 50130 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405-0130 
Phone: 208-523-0620 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT 
Represented by: 
SANDOW, GARRETT H 
220 N MERIDIAN 
BLACKFOOT, ID 83221 
Phone: 208-785-9300 
ORDER 
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John K. Simpson, ISB #4242 
Travis L. Thompson, ISB #6168 
Paul L. Arrington, ISB #7198 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
195 River Vista Place, Suite 204 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301-3029 
Telephone: (208) 733-0700 
Facsimile: (208) 735-2444 
Attorneys for A&B Irrigation District, 
Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation 
District, North Side Canal Company, and 
Twin Falls Canal Company 
Attorneys for American Falls Reservoir 
District #2 and Minidoka Irrigation 
District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 




) Case No. CV-2015-1687 
) 
) SURFACE WATER COALITION'S 
) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) 















TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND TO ALL COUNSEL OF 
RECORD 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT the Barker Rosholt & Simpson LLP enters an 
appearance as attorneys of record for and on behalf of A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation 
District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company and Twin Falls Canal Company, 
and Fletcher Law Office enters an appearance as attorneys of record for and on behalf of 
American Falls Reservoir District #2 and Minidoka Irrigation District, these entities are 
collectively referred to as the Surface Water Coalition or Coalition. All papers in this action 
shall be served upon the respective counsel at the addresses listed above. 
The above-named entities were parties to the underlying administration action. Pursuant 
to paragraph 3 of the Procedural Order Governing Judicial Review of Final Order of Director of 
Idaho Department of Water Resources entered in this matter, the parties understand that the 
Court will treat this Notice of Appearance as a motion to intervene and will treat them as 
Intervenors. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 2015. 
K. Simpson 
ravis L. Thompson 
Paul L. Arrington 
LLP 
Attorneys for A&B Irrigation District, Burley 
Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, 




Attorneys for American Falls Reservoir 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of October, 2015, I served true and correct 
copies of the foregoing upon the following by the method indicated: 
SRBA District Court 
253 3rd Ave. North 
P.O. Box 2707 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-2707 
Garrick Baxter 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0098 
The City of Blackfoot 
Represented by: 
Luke H. Marchant 
Andrew Rawlings 
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
The City of Blackfoot 
Represented by: 
Garrett H. Sandow 
220 N. Meridian 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
NOTICE OF 
APPEARANCE 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 







LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
CLIVE J, STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief. Natural Resources Division 
GARRICK L. BAXTER, ISB #6301 
MEGHAN CARTER, ISB #8863 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 8372()..0098 
Telephone: (208) 287-4800 
Facsimile: (208) 287-6700 
garrick.baxter@idwr.idaho.gov 
meghan.carter@idwr.idaho.eov 
Attorneys for Respondents 
08:52:52 a.m. 11-10-2015 
District Court - SRBA 
Fifth Judicial District 
In Re: Administrative Appeals 
County of Twin Falls - State of Idaho 
NOV t O 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENffl JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his official capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 IN THE NAME OF 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT. 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
NOTICE OF LODGING AGENCY 
RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT 
WITH THE AGENCY 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE COURT AND ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD 






IN THE MATIER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 IN THE NAME OF 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT. 
08:53:02 a.m. 11-10-2015 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE COURT AND ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD 
In accordance with LR.C.P. 84(j), YOU ARB HEREBY NOTIFIED that the agency record 
and transcript, having been prepared pursuant to LR.C.P. 84(f) and (g), are lodged with the agency 
for the purpose of settlement. 
A copy of the record and transcript, which are contained on one (1) DVD, have been 
served by mail with a copy of this notice to the parties' attorneys of record. In accordance with 
Rules 84(f) and (g) the Petitioner City of Blackfoot has paid $17.00 per the estimated fee for 
preparation of the record and transcript. The actual preparation cost of the record and transcript 
is $17.00. The agency does not anticipate any further charges affiliated with continued 
preparation of the record and transcript. However, the agency will inform the parties 
immediately should additional charges be incurred. 
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of the mailing of this notice to file any 
objections to the record and transcript. If no objections are filed within that time, the record and 
transcript shall be deemed settled. The agency's decision on any objection timely filed along 
with all evidence, exhibits, and written presentation of the objection shall be included in the 
record. Thereafter, the agency shall lodge the settled transcript and record with the district court 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(k). 
II 
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12082876702 08:53: 13 a.m. 11-10-2015 
DA TED this /(1~ day of November 2015. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CUVE R. J. STRONG 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
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District Court - SRBA 
Fifth Judie/al District 
In Re: Administrative App,:,aJs 
County of Twin Falls • State of Idaho 
NOV 1 6 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRI 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACK.FOOT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY SP ACKMAN, in his official capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES 
Respondents, 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, AMERICAN 
FALLS RESERVOIR DISTRICT #2, 
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY and 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY, 
Intervenors. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. 
) Case No. CV-2015-1687 
) 
) ORDER TREATING 
) APPEARANCE AS MOTION TO 


























On November 4, 2015, the A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, Milner 
Irrigation District, American Falls Reservoir District #2, Minidoka Irrigation District, North Side 
Canal Company and Twin Falls Canal Company filed a Notice of Appearance in the above-
captioned matter. Although the above-mentioned entities were parties to the underlying 
ORDER TREATING APPEARANCE AS MOTION TO INTERVENE AND GRANTING SAME - I -
S:\ORDERS\Administrative Appeals\Bingham County 2015-1687\0rder Granting Motion to Intervene.docx 
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administrative proceeding, they were not made named parties in the Petition for Judicial Review 
filed by the Petitioner. Pursuant to the Procedural Order issued by the Court in the above-
captioned matter, the Notice of Appearance will be treated as a Motion to Intervene. This Court 
finds, following a review of the file, that the above-mentioned entities are real parties in interest 
to this proceeding, that they were parties to the underlying administrative proceeding from which 
judicial review is being requested, and that they have interests that could be affected by the 
outcome of this proceeding. This Court further finds that no party has objected to the above-
mentioned entities participating in this proceeding. Therefore, in exercising its discretion, this 
Court finds that the A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, 
American Falls Reservoir District #2, Minidoka Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company 
and Twin Falls Canal Company are entitled to leave to intervene as parties to this proceeding. 
THEREFORE THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Motion to Intervene is hereby granted. 
2. All further captions used in this proceeding shall include the A&B Irrigation 
District, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, American Falls Reservoir District 
#2, Minidoka Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company and Twin Falls Canal Company as 
Intervenors as shown above. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his official capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents, 
and 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, NORTH SIDE 
CANAL COMPANY, TWIN FALLS CANAL 
COMPANY, AMERICAN FALLS 
RESERVOIR DISTRICT #2, and MINIDOKA 
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IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 IN THE NAME OF 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT. 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE COURT AND ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD 
I, Gary Spackman, Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources, do hereby 
certify that the record in the above entitled matter was compiled under my direction, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings, papers and proceedings therein as shown in the index to this 
record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set by hand and affixed the seal of the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources at Boise, Idaho this gth day of December 2015. 
~~;ii&L -=; 
Director 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his official capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents, 
and 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, NORTH SIDE 
CANAL COMPANY, TWIN FALLS CANAL 
COMPANY, AMERICAN FALLS 
RESERVOIR DISTRICT #2, and MINIDOKA 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
NOTICE OF LODGING THE 
SETTLED AGENCY RECORD 
AND TRANSCRIPT WITH THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
NOTICE OF LODGING THE SETTLED AGENCY RECORD AND 




IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 IN THE NAME OF 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT. 
TO: THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE PARTIES OF RECORD 
On November 10, 2015, the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("Department") 
served its Notice of Lodging Agency Record and Transcript with the Agency ("Notice") in this 
matter pursuant to I.R.C.P. 840). The Notice gave the parties fourteen (14) days from the date of 
the Notice to file any objection to the agency record and transcript. No objections to the agency 
record or transcript were filed with the Department. 
The Department filed an Order Settling the Agency Record and Transcript with the Court 
on December 8, 2015. The agency record and transcript are deemed settled pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
84(j). 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the settled record and transcript are being filed 
with the District Court pursuant to I.R.C .P. 84(k), by providing one ( 1) DVD dated December 8, 







NOTICE OF LODGING THE SETfLED AGENCY RECORD AND 
TRANSCRIPT WITH THE DISTRICT COURT Page 2 
000045
12~L 
DATED this _-r,_-_ day of December 2015. 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE R. J. STRONG 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
MEGHAN CARTER 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 
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GARRETT H SANDOW 
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BLACKFOOT ID 83221 
gsando w law @ao I. com 
JOHN K SIMPSON 
TRAVIS L THOMPSON 
PAULL ARRINGTON 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
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D Overnight Mail 
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D Email 
[8J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
[8J Email 
[8J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
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[8J Email 
[8J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
[8J Email 
[8J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his official capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents, 
and 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, NORTH SIDE 
CANAL COMPANY, TWIN FALLS CANAL 
COMPANY, AMERICAN FALLS 
RESERVOIR DISTRICT #2, and MINIDOKA 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
ORDER SETTLING THE AGENCY 
RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT 




IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 IN THE NAME OF 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 840), on November 10, 2015, the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources ("Department") served upon the parties its Notice of Lodging Agency Record and 
Transcript with the Agency ("Notice"). The Notice gave the parties fourteen (14) days from the 
date of the Notice to file any objections to the agency transcript or record. No objections were 
filed. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, with no objections to the agency 
record and transcript having been filed, the agency record and transcript are now deemed settled. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 840), this order shall be included 
in the record on the petition for judicial review. The Department shall provide the parties with a 
copy of the agency record on one (1) DVD consistent with this order. 
DA TED this 81h day of December 2015. 
G~ii~_/ 
Director 
ORDER SETTLING THE AGENCY RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT - Page 2 
000049
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of December 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Court and served on the following 
parties by the indicated methods: 
Original to: 
SRBA DISTRICT COURT 
253 3RD AVENUE NORTH 
PO BOX 2707 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-2707 
Facsimile: (208) 736-2121 
ROBERT L HARRIS 
LUKE H MARCHANT 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
PO BOX 50130 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405 
rharris@holdenlegal.com 
lmarchant@holdenlegal.com 
GARRETT H SANDOW 
220 N MERIDIAN 
BLACKFOOT ID 83221 
gsandowlaw@aol.com 
JOHN K SIMPSON 
TRAVIS L THOMPSON 
PAULL ARRINGTON 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
195 RIVER VISTA PLACE STE 204 




W KENT FLETCHER 
FLETCHER LAW OFFICE 
POBOX248 
BURLEY ID 83318 
wkf@pmt.org 
D U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
~ Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
D Email 
~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
~ Email 
~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
~ Email 
~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
~ Email 
~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
~ Email 
Mef.2z ~  
Deputy Attorney General 
ORDER SETTLING THE AGENCY RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT - Page 3 
000050
IN THE DISTRICT COu'RT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN M'D FOR THE COUNTY OF BlNGHAi\1 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO 
DEPART?vfEKT OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
LODGED 
JAN 1 2 2016 I 
PETITIONER'S OPEl'(ING BRIEF 
Judicial Review from the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
Honorable Eric J. Wildman, District Judge, Presiding 
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Petitioner, the City of Blackfoot (the "City" or "Blackfoot"), hereby submits Petitioner's 
Opening Brief This brief is filed pursuant to this Court's Procedural Order of October 27, 
2015; I.R.C.P. 84(p); I.AR. 35; and I.AR. 36. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a civil action pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 42-1701A(4), 67-5270, and 67-5279, 
seeking judicial review of the Order Addressing Exceptions and Denying Application for Permit 
(the "Final Order") issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources, Gary 
Spackman (the "Director"), on September 22, 2015. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The City submitted the application for permit for 27-12261 (hereinafter simply "27-
12261") on September 12, 2013. R. at 1-27. The original application was signed by then-Mayor 
Mike Virtue. R. at 3. On September 2, 2014, the Idaho Department of Water Resources (the 
"Department") assisted the City with preparation of an amended application for permit, which 
was signed by Mayor Paul Loomis.1 R. at 28-58. On January 27, 2015, the City submitted a 
second amended application with the assistance of Rocky Mountain Environmental Associates, 
Inc., complete with an amended mitigation plan. R. at 92-105. The second amended application 
was also signed by Mayor Paul Loomis. R. at 93. 
Evidence of the Department's assistance is contained in the style and layout of a map submitted with the 
amended application. 
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After these amendments, 27-12261 sought a water right permit to develop 9.71 cfs of 
ground water for the irrigation of 524.2, acres with Water Right No. Ol-181C (hereinafter, 
simply "Ol-181C") being offered as mitigation for the depletive effects to the Eastern Snake 
Plain Aquifer (the "ESP A") resulting from diversion of water under 27-12261. R. at 200-0 l. 
27-12261 was protested by the Surface Water Coalition (the "Coalition"). At the hearing, 
the Coalition stipulated that items (b) through (e) ofldaho Code § 42-203A(5) were not at issue, 
and specifically stipulated that they did not disagree v.ith or object to the modeling analysis 
performed quantifying the recharge benefits of water lost from Jensen's Grove or the proposal to 
leave small portions of certain water rights in the Blackfoot River to mitigate for modeled 
impacts to downstream reaches of the Snake River. R. at 203-04, 207. More specifically, the 
Coalition's concern was not factual in nature, but based only on legal issues surrounding 
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, IDWR Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, 
dated June 2006 (the "Settlement Agreement"). Ex. at 18-23. 
In fact, the Coalition presented no witnesses at the hearing. Tr., p. 49, IL 21-23. Stated 
another way, the Coalition did not submit evidence of any factual concerns or rebuttal testimony 
or analysis regarding the modeling analysis and other analyses submitted by the City, or to rebut 
the reality that ground water recharge occurs at Jensen's Grove under Ol-181C. The only 
assertion of injury was that use of Ol-181C for mitigation would injure the Coalition because 01-
181 C would be used differently than the Coalition believed the Settlement Agreement allowed. 
R. at 155-56. The Coalition has taken the position that 01-181C was not authori:r,ed to be used 
for mitigation purposes. R. at 163-69. This is why briefing was submitted specifically 
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addressing the legal question of: "Is there a legal impediment to using water right 01-181C in a 
mitigation plan for the proposed permit?" R. at 200. Therefore, the only item under Idaho Code 
§ 42-203A(5) at issue was subpart (a), which is whether 27-12261 "will reduce the quantity of 
water under existing water rights" based on the Coalition's interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement and its perceived limitations of using O 1-181 C for mitigation purposes. 
On June 30, 2015, the hearing officer entered the Preliminary Order Issuing Permit (the 
"Preliminary Order"), which issued 27-12261 v.ith the condition that the City file a transfer to 
allow it to use the recharge provided by 01-181 C as mitigation for 27-12261. R. at 200-16. On 
July 14, 2015, the City filed its Exceptions to the Preliminary Order and asked the Director to 
correct errors made by the hearing officer in reaehing his conclusion. R. at 220-44. The 
Coalition responded on July 30, 2015. R. at 249-69. 
On September 22, 2015, the Director issued the Final Order within which the Director 
refused to consider the Settlement Agreement, found that O 1-181 C could not be used for ground 
water recharge without a transfer application, and denied the City's application for27-1226l. R. 
at 271-74. The City filed this present petition for judicial review on October 16, 2015. R. at 
278-85. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
l. The City of Blackfoot is located in Bingham County, Idaho, and with a population of 
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2. Many years ago, during the planning and construction of Interstate 15 ("I-15"), the 
Blackfoot City fathers were approached by Federal Highway Administration officials to 
discuss relocation of a portion of the Snake River channel because doing so would 
eliminate construction of four bridges, thereby saving the federal government the expense 
of constructing the bridges. Tr., p. 35, l. 22~p. 36, l. 10. 
3. As responsible citizens, these City fathers recognized the benefit to taxpayers, and agreed 
to the channel relocation even though doing so would mean sacrificing significant 
riverfront property. Tr., p. 36, ll. 19-23. In addition, the old river channel was used to 
mine gravel for the road construction, and has continued to be used for mining gravel. 
Tr., p. 29, 1. 16-p. 30, l. 17. The City therefore effectively replaced Snake River 
riverfront property with a gravel pit. 
4. This gravel pit that exists at the former location of a portion of the Snake River channel 
on the east side ofl-15 is known as Jensen's Grove. R. at 203-04. 
5. Decades after the City allowed the federal government to relocate the Snake River 
channel, tbe City was awarded a federal grant of approximately two hundred and fifty 
thousand dollars ($250,000.00), through the help of Congressman Mike Simpson, to 
secure a water right to fill and maintain water levels in Jensen's Grove. Tr., p. 36, 1. 24-
p. 37, l. ll. 
6. The City used these funds to purchase 01-l&lC from the New Sweden Irrigation District. 
Tr., p. 37, 11. 12-15; see also Ex. at 12. These federdl funds represent payment for only a 
small part of the losses the City incurred by giving up its riverfront property, and the 
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benefit of the City's purchase of a water right for Jensen's Grove is that it salvaged some 
of that loss by significantly improving a recreational area and facility for local residents. 
7. The City filed a transfer application to amend 01-181C on October 27, 2005, which was 
numbered as Transfer No. 72385 (hereinafter, simply "72385"). Ex. at 28, 49. 01-181C 
was an irrigation-only water right. Tr., p. 37, 11. 16-19. The transfer requested a change 
in the place of use and changes to the nature of use of most of01-181C to diversion to 
storage, storage, diversion to recharge, as well as retaining a small portion for irrigation 
purposes. Ex. at 28, 49. 
8. The Coalition protested 72385. See Ex. at 15, 65. Eventually, the parties agreed to 
resolve the Coalition's protest pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Settlement 
Agreement. Ex. at 18-23, 46-47, 74-87. 
9. Approval of72385 was issued on February 14, 2007. Ex. at 88-90. 01-181C now al!m,;s 
the City to divert(!) 46.00 cfs as diversion to storage; (2) 1.00 cfs and 200.0 AF for 
irrigation; (3) 200.00 AF for irrigation storage; (4) 200.00 AF for irrigation from storage; 
and (5) 2,266.8 AF for recreation storage, of which 1,100 AF of this amount is stored in 
Jensen's Grove during its season of use and 980.8 AF is allocated for seepage losses 
during its season of use. As stated by condition no. 5 of the transfer approval: 
The reservoir established by the storage of water under !his right shall not 
exceed a total capacity of 1100 acre feet or a total surface area of 73 
acres. This right authorizes additional storage in the amount of 186 
afa to make up losses from evaporation and 980.8 afa for seepage 
losses. 
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Ex. at 90 ("Condition No. 5") ( emphasis added). Thus, i:t1 addition to 980.8 AF of 
seepage, 1,100 AF of water left in Jensen's Grove at the end of the irrigation season 
enters into the ESPA as ground water recharge in the amount 2,080.8 AF. 
I 0. It is this annual seepage loss-ground water recharge----of 2,080.8 AF that the City seeks 
to use as mitigation for 27-12261. See Ex. at 2. 
11. Additionally, condition no. 9 of the transfer approval incorporates the provisions of the 
Settlement Agreement: 
The diversion and use of water under this transfer is subject to 
additional conditions and limitations contained in a Settlement 
Agreement-lD"''R Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, 
dated June 2006, including any properly executed amendments 
thereto, entered into by and between the New Sweden Irrigation District, 
the City of Blackfoot, A& B Irrigation District, American Falls Reservoir 
District #2, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, Minidoka 
Irrigation District, Twin Falls Canal Company, and North Side Canal 
Company. The Settlement Agreement has been recorded in Bingham 
County (Instrument No. 575897) and Bonneville County (InstfUillent No. 
1249899) and is enforceable by the parties thereto. 
Ex. at 90 ("Condition No. 9") ( emphasis added). 
12. Condition No. 5 and Condition No. 9 were incorporated into the SRBA partial decree for 
Ol-I81C as part of the quantity element and as an "other provision necessary for 
definition or administration of this water right," respectively. Ex. at 91-94. 
13. Thus, both the Department's approval of72385 and the SRBA partial decree for Ol-181C 
incorporate the Settlement Agreement. See Ex. at 90 and 93. 
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14. For that reason, the interpretation of the elements and conditions of 01-181 C, including 
the provisions of the Settlement Agreement-particularly paragraph I-was at issue in 
the contested case of27-12661. See Rat 137, 155-156. 
15. The City applied for 27-12661 in order to replace an expensive and dated pump station 
on the Blackfoot River that the City currently operates. 
16. The City delivers several surface water rights through the pump station. Tr., p. 9, 1. 22-p. 
l 0, 1. l. The water right entitlements diverted at the pump station include water rights 
that were previously delivered through a facility known as the "Miner's Ditch,"2 as well 
as water allocated to shares owned by certain shateholders of the Corbett Slough 
Irrigation Company and shareholders of the Blackfoot Irrigation Company. Ex. at 1; R 
at 201. 
17. Prior to the 1960s, Miner's Ditch ran through the City and crossed 1-15. Tr., p. 9, 11. 13-
17. :tvfiner' s Ditch ran near a proposed school, and in an effort to increase safety and 
eliminate the dangers of an open ditch, the City, the State ofldaho, and the school district 
decided to eliminate Miner's Ditch in exchange for installation of a pump station on the 
Blackfoot River to provide water to the water users who took delivery of their water 
through Miner's Ditch. Tr., p. 9, 1. 18-p. 10, L 1. 
18. The pump station arrangement was accepted by the City, not by agreement, but by 
actions of the Blackfoot City Council. Tr., p. 10, IL 2-9. Since its construction, the City 
has maintained the pump station almost entirely on its own. Tr .. p. 10, IL 10-14. The 
'Water Right Nos. 27-17, 27-20A, 27-20B, 27-23E, 27-10790, 27-10999, and 27-11117. 
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City only receives a small stipend yearly from the irrigators who benefit from the pump 
station, but receives no contribution from the school district, the State of Idaho, or anyone 
else for maintenance and operation of the pump station. Tr., p. 10, IL 10-14. 
19. The pump station has proven to be a major burden for the City, both operationally and 
financially, particularly \vith no help from the school district or the State ofldaho. 
20. The pump station requires significant maintenance because of the high sedimem load in 
Blackfoot River water. Tr., p. 10, IL 21-22. The pump station has to be refurbished 
every two to three years, and dne to these maintenance issues, operates at an annual cost 
of between $40,000 and $50,000 per year. Tr., p. 10, I. 22-p. 11, I. 9. The pump station 
has two pumps, one of which operates, while the other is being serviced or repaired. Tr., 
p. 35, IL 1-10. 
21. Cnrrently, the concrete culvert and other attendant equipment associated with the pump 
station have aged and may need to be replaced soon. Tr., p. 11, IL 1-5. As a result, the 
City, with the aid of consultants, examined a number of options to address the situation. 
Tr.,p.11,1.10-p. 13,L 13. 
22. The City analyzed refurbishment of the pump station, installation of settling ponds, and 
replacing the delivery of water to the Miner's Ditch users with a well. Tr., p. 11, 1. 10-p. 
13, L 13. Result5 from the City's experts estimated that refurbishment of the Blackfoot 
River pump station would cost just under $400,000.00, and that settling ponds would be 
very expensive as well. Tr .• p. 12, 11. 5-14. The most cost effective option was drilling a 
new well, at an estimated cost of $80,000.00. Tr., p. 12, 11. 10-11. 
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23. The City first analyzed drilling a well very near to the pump station on the Blackfoot 
River with the hope that it would qualify under the Department's current policy for 
changing a water right's source. Tr., p. 11, IL 13-24; See also Administrator's 
Memorandum, Transfer Processing No. 24, December 21, 2009, at 26 ("The ground 
water and surface water sources must have a direct and immediate hydraulic connection 
(at least 50 percent depletion in original source from depletion at proposed point of 
diversion in one day)"). Unfortunately, based upon analysis of the local geology, the 
City's consultants determined that there is a basalt layer approximately 50 feet below 
land surface which would require the City to hit a "sweet spot" of 48.5 feet for the well to 
function and operate appropriately. Tr., p. 12, L 25-p. 13, I. 6. With so little margin of 
error, the City elected to look at other options instead. Tr., p. 13, IL 7-13. 
24. The alternative eventually pursued by the City was to drill a new well and use ground 
water recharge from Jensen's Grove to mitigate for the ground water withdrawals. Tr., p. 
13, IL 7-24. The operational costs of the new well are anticipated to be between 
$12,000.00 and $14,000.00 per year, compared to $40,000.00 to $50,000.00 per year to 
maintain the Blackfoot River pump station. Tr., p. 15, II. 1-12. The result is an estimated 
savings of between $28,000.00 and $36,000.00 per year to the City. The new well would 
provide water to the lands serviced by the pump station, most of which is v.i.thin City 
limits or within the City's impact area. Tr., p. 15, 11. 13-21. 
25. Accordingly, the City filed 27-12261 to authorize development of a water right to provide 
water to the Miner's Ditch users. See R. at 1, 28, and 92. 
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26. 27-12261 was protested by the Coalition. R. at 66-6 7. 
27. The only matter at issue at the hearing on this matter was the legal question of whether, 
under Idaho Code 42-203A(5)(a), 27-12261 "will reduce the quantity of water under 
existing water rights" based on the Settlement Agreement and the use of 01-181C for 
mitigation purposes. 
II. ISSt'ES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
A. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) by failing 
to consider the Settlement Agreement as an element of 01-181 C. 
B. Vv'hether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by not 
engaging in contractual interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. 
C. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by 
concluding that nothing in 72385 or the SRBA partial decree that allows 01-181 C to be 
used for ground water recharge. 
D. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by 
concluding that the City must file a transfer if it wants to use O 1-181 C for mitigation 
purposes. 
E. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by 
determining that the recharge to the aquifer accomplished under 01-18IC is merely 
incidental recharge and therefore cannot be used as a basis for claim of a separate or 
expanded water right. 
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F. Whether questions of injury to the Coalition's water rights were already addressed in the 
Settlement Agreement and O 1-181 C, and therefore, under principles of res judicata, the 
City is not required to file a transfer application to permit the Coalition to have a second 
opportunity to raise the same injury arguments addressed previously. 
G. \Vhether the Director's actions prejudiced a substantial right of the City. 
III. ARGUMENT. 
Judicial review of a fmal decision of the Director is governed by the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act (LC.§ 67-5201, et seq., hereinafter "IDAPA"). LC.§ 42-1701A. 
Under IDAPA, the Court reviews an appeal from an agency decision based upon the record 
created before the agency. LC. § 67-5277; Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 61, 831 P.2d 527, 
529 (1992). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of 
the evidence on questions of fact. LC. § 67-5279(1); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 
923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998). Where, as here, the ageney "was required ... to issue an 
order," the Court must affirm the agency decision unless the court finds that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlav,ful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
LC. § 67-5279(3); Castaneda, 130 Idaho at 926, 950 P.2d at 1265. Further, the party challenging 
the agency decision must also show that at Jea;.1 one of its sub~iantial rights have been 
prejudiced. LC.§ 67-5279(4). 
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As set forth below, the City requests that this court engage in contractual interpretation of 
the Settlement Agreement because the Director did not. If this Court finds that the Director's 
failure to engage in contractual interpretation violated the provisions of Idaho law as described 
herein, then the court should thereafter itself engage in contractual interpretation and rule on this 
issue because "[ w ]hen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and 
legal efl:ect are questions oflaw," Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P .3d 743, 
746 (2003), and "[o]n appeal, this Court exercises free review over matters oflaw." Id. 
A. The Settlement Agreement is an element of Water Right No. 01-18IC, and 
should therefore have been considered by the Director. 
The Director improperly refused to "considerD or discussO" the Settlement Agreement. 
R. at 272. The Director held that "the Settlement Agreement does not in any way affect the 
Director's decision in this matter. The decision can be made using principles of Idaho water law 
without referring to the Settlement Agreement." R. at 272 (italics added). In effect, the Director 
was, in three sentences, refusing to consider a component of O 1-181 C and its significant 
implications on how 27-12261 could be mitigated. The Director narrowly focused only on the 
listed beneficial uses on the face of O 1-181 C, and because he did not see ground water recharge 
expressly listed, he concluded that Ol-181C could not be used for mitigation. But this approach 
ignored the conditions in 01-181 C which refor to the Settlement Agreement and necessarily make 
the analysis of01-181C more nuanced. 
Conditions contained in a water right are recognized as elements of the water right and 
are no more or less important than other elements of a water right. For permits, Idaho Code § 
42-203A(5) allows the Director to "grant a permit upon conditions." The perfected permit is 
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then licensed pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-219 wherein the license issued must bear ''the number 
ofl] the permit under which the works from which such water is taken were constructed." Such 
license must therefore incorporate any permit conditions which are part and parcel to the 
description of how the water right can be used, and in some instances, additional conditions can 
also be included in the license. See Idafw Power Co. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res. (In Re 
Licensed Water Right :,lo. 03-7018), 151 Idaho 266,255 P.3d 1152 (2011) (Department had 
authority to include a term condition in Idaho Power's license, even though such a condition was 
not included in the original permit). As a result of including these conditions in a license, "[s]uch 
license shall be binding upon the state as to the right of such licensee to use the amount of 
water mentioned therein, and shall be prima facie evidence as to such right[.]" Idaho Code § 42-
220 (emphasis added). 
The binding effect of conditions in a water right license remains unchanged in the formal 
adjudication of a water right license. With claims submitted in an adjudication (sueh as the 
SRBA), the claim form requires inclusion of "conditions of the exercise of any water right 
included in any decree, license, approved transfer application or other document," Idaho Code § 
42-14096), the report of the Director requires inclusion of the same conditions, Idaho Code§ 42-
1411(2)6), and the final step of the adjudication process-issuance of the partial decree--.,.,is 
required to "contain or incorporate a statement of each element of a water right as stated in 
subsections (2) and (3) of section 42-1411, Idaho Code." Idaho Code § 42-1412(6). Therefore, 
conditions in a water right license or partial decree are elements of the water right and are no less 
important than the diversion rate or any other water right element. 
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The Settlement Agreement is an incorporated element of OI-18IC. The Department's 
approval of 72385, the City's transfer that changed the beneficial use of Ol-l81C, specifically 
states that it is "subject to additional conditions and limitations contained in [the Settlement 
Agreement], including any properly executed amendments thereto." R at 90. Further, the 
corresponding SRBA partial decree relating to 72385 contains the exact same language, 
incorporating the Settlement Agreement by reference. R at 93. 
Based on the above, the Director did not give appropriate consideration to the Settlement 
Agreement, and instead, focused on the other elements of the water right to excuse him from 
considering the provisions of the Settlement Agreement or engaging in contractual interpretation. 
In effect, the Director elevated other elements of the ,Nater right over the provisions of th.e 
Settlement Agreement despite the statutory edict that such conditions are binding on him, as an 
agent of the State of Idaho: "[ s ]uch license shall be binding upon the state as to the right of 
such licensee to use the amount of water mentioned therein, and shall be prima facie evidence as 
to such right[.]" Idaho Code§ 42-220 (emphasis added). Ignoring the conditions of Ol-181C 
was not a lawful exercise of the Director's discretion and would not be a lawful exercise of this 
Court's discretion as well. 
In terms of how the Settlement Agreement should be considered in an incorporated 
agreement, the principle of incorporating an agreement is perhaps best illustrated in divorce 
jurisprudence, because in divorce eases, the parties \'Vill frequently arrive at a property settlement 
agreement, which may or may not thereafter be incorporated, or merged, into the court's divorce 
decree. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 386-87, 462 P.2d 49, 51-52 (1969). Courts 
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first look within the four comers of the divorce decree to determine whether the agreement was 
incorporated. Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 177, 233 P.3d 102, 108 (2010). Only if the 
divorce decree is ambiguous regarding incorporation may a court look to extrinsic evidence. Id. 
If the agreement is incorporated, it has become a part of the divorce decree. Davidson v. 
Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227,230,296 P.3d 433,436 (Ct. App. 2013). In that circumstance, the only 
way to enforce or otherwise adjudicate the incorporated agreement is to pursue that action in the 
original divorce case, beeause it is no longer just an agreement between the parties, but is the 
court's judgment. Id. Further, subsequent courts are not at liberty to ignore or disregard the 
agreement, which has become part of the divorce decree. See id. 
Here, by conducting the san1e analysis, this Court must conclude that the Settlement 
Agreement was incorporated into the Department's approval of01-181C and the SRBA's partial 
decree that affected 01-181 C. Ex. at 90 and 93 (the approval and the partial decree, respectively, 
both stating that the diversion and use was "subject to additional conditions and limitations 
contained in [the Settlement Agreement], including any properly executed amendments thereto"). 
The first step of the appropriate analysis, "to look first only to the four comers" of the judgment, 
Barley, 149 Idaho at 177,233 P.3d at 108 (emphasis in original), is dispositive since both the 
administrative determination and the judicial decree clearly and unambiguously incorporate the 
Settlement Agreement. Because the license and partial decree are unambiguous, this Court need 
not consider any evidence extrinsic to those documents to detennine whether the Settlement 
Agreement was incorporated into O 1-181 C or to interpret the Settlement Agreement. The 
Director erred by failing to consider the Settlement Agreement at all. Neither the Department nor 
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this Court may consider 01-181C without the Settlement Agreement, because to do so is to 
consider only part of the City's water right. 
Assume, for illustrative purposes only, that the City and the Coalition properly amended 
the Settlement Agreement to allow Ol-181C to be applied to mitigate a third party's water right. 
By the terms of the approval of72385 and the SRBA's partial decree, that would settle the issue 
(at the very least between the City and the Coalition). But, under the Director's approach of 
refusing to consider the Settlement Agreement, the amendment would not be recognized and the 
third party's water right would not be mitigated. By refusing to consider the Settlement 
Agreement, the Director erroneously discarded part of01-181C, R. at 272, and this Court should 
not do the same. 
The only way to understand 01-181C is to consider and construe (by contractual 
interpretation) the Settlement Agreement. The Director's error in not doing so is in violation of 
the statutory provisions described above (Idaho Code§§ 42-203A(5), 42-219, 42-1409, 42-1411, 
42-1412(6)) because the Director may not arbitrarily ignore part of an appropriator's water right. 
The error was made unsupported by substantial evidence, since there is nothing to show that the 
Settlement Agreement is not relevant to this dispute. Finally, the error was arbitrary, capricious, 
and an abuse of discretion, since the three sentences in the Final Order detailing the Director's 
decision to ignore the Settlement Agreement provide no rational reason for ignoring what was 
incorporated by the Department's approval of 72385 and the SRBA's partial decree regarding 
01-181C. 
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B. 01-181C, as modified by 72385, can be used by the City as mitigation for 27-
12261. 
Because the Settlement Agreement is incorporated into Ol-181C, it must be construed 
(along with the rest of Ol-181C) in order to determine how 01-181C relates to 27-12261 and 
answer the following questions: (1) whether the City gave away its ability to use Ol-181C to 
mitigate for 27-12261 when it entered into the Settlement Agreement; (2) whether the City must 
file a transfer in order to have the Department consider any portion of O 1-181 C as mitigation; 
and (3) whether the recharge provided to the aquifer provided by Ol-181C can be used as 
mitigation or whether it is mere! y incidental. 
1. The plain language of the Settlement Agreement, when considered in 
conjunction l':ith the rest of Ol-181C, shows that the City should be 
allowed to utilize the annual seepage loss of01-181C as mitigation for 27-
12261. 
Any time interpretation of a contract is in dispute, it can certainly be argued that the 
eontract should have been more clearly drafted. If it had, then perhaps this matter would not 
even be before this Court. But the parties to this proceeding are bound by the words that the 
parties agreed to in the Settlement Agreement, and rather than thinking of ways that the contract 
eould have been better drafted, this court should focus on what it has before it and engage in the 
appropriate analysis outlined by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The testimony from the mayor and former mayor of the City stated clearly that the City 
never intended to give away the recharge benefits from 01-181C's diversion and use in Jensen's 
Grove, a well-known gravel pit. The City needs this Court to tell it whether it did or did not give 
away those benefits through interpretation of the plain language of the Settlement Agreement. If 
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the City did give those rights away in this Court's estimation, then the City will have to move on 
now knowing it executed a poorly-worded agreement that did not reflect its intent, and will be 
more careful when working with the Coalition the future. However, as set forth below, the City 
is confident that the plain language of the Settlement Agreement supports its position that it never 
gave away its rights use the recharge occurring in Jensen's Grove from 01-181C. 
The interpretation of three paragraphs-paragraphs I.a., Lb., and l.e--of the Settlement 
Agreement are critical in determining the rights of the City in this matter. These provisions 
provide: 
a. After approval of the pending Transfer, the CITY shall not, 
temporarily or permanently, thereafter transfer the Water Right, or any 
portion thereof, without receiving the written consent of the 
COALITION. 
b. Without the written consent of the COALITION, the CITY agrees to 
hold the Water Right in perpetuity for diversion of the water from the 
Snake River into storage at the Pond, for irrigation and recreation 
purposes, and to not transfer the Water Right or change the nature of 
use or place of use of the Water Right. 
e. The CITY shall not lease, sell, transfer, grant, or assign to any other 
person or entity any right to recover groundwater or mitigation for the 
diversion of groundwater as a result of diversions under the Water 
Right including any incidental groundwater recharge that may occur as 
a result of such diversions. Furthermore, the CITY shall not request or 
receive any such mitigation credit on behalf of any other person or 
entity. If the CITY proposes to utilize the Water Right for 
groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes associated v..ith existing 
or future groundwater rights, the CITY must file the appropriate 
application for permit andior transfer. 
Ex. at 19-20 (capitalization in original). 
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Contractual interpretation is a two-step process wherein the administrative agency or 
court first reviews the plain language of the contract to determine if there is an ambiguity. City 
of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 435, 299 P.3d 232, 242 (20I3) (citations omitted). If 
there is no ambiguity, then the contract is interpreted consistent with its plain language. Id. 
(citations omitted); see also Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207, 211, 268 P.3d 
1159, 1163 (2012). This is especially true where, as here,3 the contract is fully integrated; 
meaning that the language of the contract reflects the entirety of the parties' intent. City of 
lvferidian, 154 Idaho at 435, 299 P.3d at 242 (citations omitted); Hap Taylor & Sons. Inc. v. 
Summenvind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600,610, 338 P.3d 1204, 1214 (2014). Only if there is 
ambiguity in the term or terms in dispute may the court or hearing officer resort to extrinsic 
evidence, also known as parol evi.denee, to interpret the ambiguous provisions. Buku Properties, 
LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 834, 291 P.3d 1027, 1033 (2012). In the face of ambiguity, the 
goal remains to give effect to the parties' intent at the time of contracting. Hap Taylor & Sons, 
157 Idaho at 610, 338 P.3d at 1214; Bondy v. Le,y, 121 Idaho 993, 998, 829 P.2d 1342, 1347 
(1992). 
As already explained above, the Director did not consider or interpret the Settlement 
Agreement, but fouod that 01-181 C as currently described could not be used for mitigation, 
"using principles of Idaho water law without referring to the Settlement Agreement." R. at 272 
(italics added). The Director made this decision on his own, not based on a position taken by the 
3 The Settlement Agreementis an integrated agreement. See Ex. at 21, '117-
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Coalition. In its Post-Hearing Brief, the Coalition focused on interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement, and specifically, the requirement to obtain written consent from the Coalition: 
It is undisputed that the City failed to comply with requirements l(a) and l(b). 
Each requires that the City obtain "written consent" from the Coalition before 
seeking to transfer any portion of water right O 1-181 C. Id. This includes any 
attempt to change the nature of use of the water right. Id. In order to effectuate 
the proposed mitigation, the City would be required to file a transfer of water 
right 01-181C to include "recharge" as a purpose of use. Since the City has not 
complied vvith this obligation, it has no authority to seek the changes proposed by 
the mitigation plan. 
R. at 167. 
1bis Court must engage in the contractual interpretation process. The proposition that the 
City must obtain ,vritten consent from Coalition is not supported by the plain language of either 
Paragraph 1.a. or 1.b. Both paragraphs refer to a "transfer" or to "change the nature of use or 
place of use" of O 1-181 C as administrative actions that require the Coalition's consent, but these 
provisions do not mention a water right permit application. A ''transfer" or "change" are terms 
of art under Idaho water law and are specific to the provisions of Idaho Code § 42-222, not the 
provisions of Idaho Code § 42-203A(5) for new permit applications. Furthermore, these 
provisions were included and approved by the Coalition as a party to the Setilement Agreement, 
and it perhaps goes without saying that the Coalition is very familiar with Idaho water law. Use 
of these specific terms has specific meaning. Because 27-12261 is an application for permit, and 
not a transfer application, the provisions of Paragraphs La and 1. b do not require \\ntten consent 
from the Coalition. Consequently, there is no legal litnilation under these provisions that would 
prohibit the City from pursuing 27-12261 without obtaining written consent from the Coalition. 
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Similarly, there is no part of the plain language of Paragraph l.e which would require the 
City to file a transfer to realize the benefits associated with seepage under O 1-181 C already 
approved through the prior transfer that changed its nature of use. Through that transfer, 01-
181 C expressly included seepage as one of its elements and incorporated the provisions of the 
Settlement Agreement wherein the City-under certain circumstances-retained the right to 
claim the benefits of the recharge at a future date. 
The circumstances under which the City could claim the benefits of ground water 
recharge are described in the Settlement Agreement. In what appears to be a clear attempt to 
prevent others from benefitting from Jensen's Grove recharge under 01-181C, the first sentence 
of Paragraph l.e provides: 
The CITY shall not lease, sell, transfer, grant, or assign to any other 
person or entity any right to recover groundwater or mitigation for 
the diversion of groundwater as a result of diversions under the 
Water Right including any incidental groundwater recharge that may 
occur as a result of such diversions. 
R. at 20 (bold emphasis added, capitalization in original). Nothing in the plain language of this 
provision states that the City cannot claim any credit from the ground water recharge occurring 
under 01-181C. In fact, the plain language of this sentence contemplates that the City would 
actually accrue benefits from ground water recharge, but that it could not convey those 
benefits to "any other person or entity." R. at 20. 
The second sentence of Paragraph l .e is similar to the first, and it provides that the City 
"shall not request or receive any such mitigation credit on behalf of any other person or 
entity." R. at 20 (emphasis added). Again, this sentence recognizes the recharge benefits the 
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City generates, and it does not say that the City cannot claim any credit from the ground water 
recharge occurring through the annual seepage. While the fust sentence prevents the City from 
assigning ground water recharge benefits, this second sentence prevents the City from requesting 
or receiving such benefits on behalf of someone else. 
Finally, the third sentence of Paragraph l.e most directly addresses the City's ability to 
use the benefits or credits of ground water recharge occurring under 01-181 C: 
If the CITY proposes to utilize the Water Right for groundwater recharge 
or mitigation purposes associated with existing or future groundwater 
rights, the CITY must file the appropriate application for permit 
and/or transfer. 
R. at 20 (underlining and bold emphasis added, capitalization in original). This sentence does 
not prohibit the City from using ground water recharge under Ol-181C for mitigation. 1n fact, it 
specifically states that the City can use the mitigation credits as long as it submits the appropriate 
application for permit and/or transfer. Under the plain language of Paragraph l .e, the City is 
permitted to use O 1-181 C "for groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes associated with 
future groundwater rights," R. at 20, and 27-12261 is a future ground water right sought by the 
appropriate application for permit because a transfer is unnecessary (see Section III.B.2, infra). 
Based on the plain language of the Settlement Agreement, the City has the option of filing 
a permit application (or transfer) to realize the benefits of the seepage under Ol-181C. The City 
has done that by submitting 27-12261. There is nothing ambiguous about these provisions. If 
the Settlement Agreement was intended to bar the City from using 01-181 C for mitigation or 
recharge purposes, it should have simply said so-and it does not say so. In fact, the Settlement 
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Agreement is completely preoccupied with preventing the City from conveying the mitigation 
benefits of O 1-181 C to any third party. In other words, the Settlement Agreement speeifically 
recognizes the mitigation, in the form of ground water recharge, resulting from 01-181C and 
only limits how the City can later utilize the benefits from such recharge. If the parties intended 
the Settlement Agreement to require the Coalition's consent in all cases where O 1-181 C is 
proposed as mitigation, the contract would have simply stated that the City must obtain the 
Coalition's consent before submitting a permit application that requires mitigation under 01-
181 C. Or it could have said that there is no recharge benefit from 01-181C, \vithout the 
necessity of specifying that such a recharge benefit cannot be conveyed to or applied on behalf of 
another. The Settlement Agreement does not say any of this, and that omission does not create an 
ambiguity. 
Because the Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous, and because it is integrated into the 
four comers of the partial decree, this Court should not look to parol evidence to interpret it as 
the Director did. The Director relied on parol evidence (correspondence between the parties' 
attorneys) to find an ambiguity sufficient to consider parol evidence in construing Ol-18IC. R. 
at 272 (citing exhibits 8 and 103 from the hearing, presently Ex. at 46 and 70, respectively). This 
approach gets the analysis of contractual interpretation out of order. Paro! evidence cannot be 
the source of ambiguity that causes this Court to consider parol evidence to interpret 01-181C, 
including the Settlement Agreement. See Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 
266, 297 P.3d 222, 229 (2012) ("Paro] evidence may be considered to aid a trial court in 
determining the intent of the drafter of a document if ambiguity exists," eitation omitted). 
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Furthermore, if this Court were to consider parol evidence, the only testimony presented 
at the hearing of the contemporaneous negotiations or conversations concerning the Settlement 
Agreement were from Mayor Reese, the mayor of the City at the time the Settlement Agreement 
was executed. Tr., pp. 34-49. l\1ayor Reese was asked what his recollection of the Settlement 
Agreement was relative to ground water recharge, and he testified that the City neither gave up 
nor intended to give up its right to use recharge from Jensen's Grove under Ol-181C in the 
settlement negotiations. Tr., p. 38, 1. 5-p. 40, I. 19. The mayor also discussed the provisions of 
Paragraph l .e, and the language therein stating that the City preserved the right to submit an 
application for permit to utilize the benefits accruing from the ground water recharge in Jensen's 
Grove under Ol-I81C. Tr., p. 38, I. 5-p. 40, I. 19. This is consistent with the plain language of 
the Settlement Agreement. 
No member of the Coalition was present to submit any testimony supporting the 
Coalition's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. Even if this Court reviews and considers 
the correspondence of Travis Thompson and Daniel Acevado, Ex. at 46-48, nothing there states 
that the City cannot claim the annual seepage from O 1-181 C for mitigation under a permit 
application. The correspondence provides a legal argument based on the language of the 
Settlement Agreement, rather than a factual argument that illuminates the parties' intent; 
therefore the correspondence has only minor probative value of the parties' intent in drafting the 
Settlement Agreement. See Ex. at 46-48. In fact, the correspondence only addresses a request to 
not expressly include ground water recharge as a beneficial uses at the time of the transfer 
approval (see Section 111.B.3., infra). This makes sense under the terms of the Settlement 
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Agreement because the benefits of the recharge could not be realized yet until the City filed an 
application for permit (such as 27-12261) or a transfer application. 
The Director erred in failing to consider that the Settlement Agreement, as part of 01-
181 C, expressly forbids the City from conveying any mitigation credit associated with O 1-181 C 
to any third party vvithout the Coalition's approval and, while tacitly acknowledging that 01-
181C provides mitigation, the Settlement Agreement does not bar the City from using that 
mitigation itself. Properly interpreted by this Court, it should find that the Settlement Agreement 
allows the City to use the recharge from Ol-181C to mitigate for 27-12261. 
2. The mitigation provided bv 01-181C can be used to mitigate for 27-12261 
v.ithout the necessity of filing a transfer to list ground water recharge as an 
express beneficial use of01-181C. 
The City's position is that the Settlement Agreement, incorporated into Ol-181C, already 
acknowledges the recharge occurring under O 1-181 C and the parties' limitation of the 
circumstances upon which the City could use that recharge. The Director ignored the Settlement 
Agreement, and focused instead on the listed beneficial uses of the water right which do not list 
ground water recharge as one of those uses. But there is rational explanation for not expressly 
including it and that is because at the time of the transfer approval for 01-181 C, the City was not 
immediately claiming credit for the ground water recharge. If the City wanted to claim credit for 
the ground water recharge, it had to file an application for permit or a transfer, so why list ground 
water recharge on the face of the water right? By only reading the listed elements of the water 
right, and ignoring the Settlement Agreement, the Director's reading of the elements of01-181C 
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is much too narrow. The Settlement Agreement condition is just as much part of the water right 
as any other element of the water right. 
Unfortunately, with that incorrect first step, the Final Order proceeds down an analytical 
track that it should not have gone, and we see no need to respond to the details that the Director 
discussed (such as the difference between how non-use of a water right does not require a 
transfer but a change in how a water right is used for mitigation does require one). The bottom 
line is that the City and the Coalition entered into the Settlement Agreement which described the 
process for claiming credit for the recharge from O 1-181 C, and it was accepted by the 
Department and the SRBA Court when it issued the partial decree for 01-181C. From the City's 
perspective, it is only trying to finally get credit for recharge that everyone factually 
acknowledges it is responsible for: 
Q. Was the City going to forfeit it for a time, a period of time, meaning 
that they weren't getting any credit at the time the application was settled? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. But did the City agree, to your understanding, to forfeit that 
forever? 
A. No. 
Tr., p. 39, 1. 22-p. 40, 1. 14 (Testimony of Mayor Scott Reese). 
No additional conditions on Ol-181C are needed because the Settlement Agreement 
already recognizes the recharge that occurs. The Final Order ignores 723 85-the prior approved 
transfer wherein the ability for the City to realize the benefits associated with seepage under 01-
181 C-which was already approved and expressly included seepage as one of its elements and 
incorporated the provisions of the Settlement Agreement wherein the City retained the right to 
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claim the benefits of the recharge (while bargaining away its ability to convey that right to any 
third party without the Coalition's approval). The Court should fix these errors and properly 
construe 01-181C. 
There is also no need to file a second transfer for O 1-181 C and then file an application 
identical to 27-12261 (as required by the Final Order) and provide the Coalition, and other 
persons, two additional chances to protest this action and make it more costly for the State, the 
Department, and especially the City to beneficially use the water that annually seeps into the 
ESPA from Jensen's Grove. 
Instead, consistent with 72385 and Settlement Agreement, approval of01-181C's seepage 
as mitigation for 27-12261 should be addressed through the conditions of approval for 27-12261. 
Providing conditions for approval is something that the Department does routinely and the 
mitigation provided by O 1-181 C should be addressed in the same way. It is important to note on 
this point that the Department did not state or advise the City at the time it submitted its 
application and revised applications- with which the Department assisted-that the City had to 
file another transfer of 01-181C before it could be used for mitigation purposes. The City 
believed that any question of injury caused by using Ol-181C for mitigation purposes was to 
be-and actually was-addressed in this contested case. As further described below, a transfer 
would be a duplicative proceeding not permitted under principles of res judicata. Therefore, this 
Court should determine that seepage from O 1-181 C can be designated in the approval order for 
27-12261 as mitigation without the need for the City to file a transfer for this water right. 
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Finally, if a transfer for O 1-181 C was required, the Department should have informed the 
City before proceeding to a hearing on 27-12261. The transfer could have been filed and 
consolidated vvith the 27-12261 proceedings to address the entire matter at once. The 
Department's detennination that a transfer now has to be filed will subject the City to a 
duplicitous hearing. And it is unlikely that a transfer hearing will even occur. It is unrealistic to 
think that that the Coalition will consent to the transfer only to later protest it. The consent ,vill 
not be given, which ,vill effectively hold the City hostage indefmitely. 
In sum, a transfer application is not necessary because the City's ability to realize the 
benefits associated with Ol-181C's annual seepage was already approved through 72385 that 
changed Ol-181C's nature of use which expressly included seepage as one of Ol-181C's 
elements and incorporated the provisions of the Settlement Agreement wherein the City retained 
the right to claim the benefits of the recharge occurring under this right. It is only if the City 
wanted to file a transfer to add beneficial uses which would allow the City to possibly assign 
those benefits to others that the Coalition was concerned about. Accordingly, the City requests 
this Court to determine that a transfer application is not necessary to amend Ol-181C and that the 
consent of the Coalition is therefore not necessary to utilize the ground water seepage occurring 
under Ol-18IC for mitigation purposes.4 
' To be clear, the City recognizes that if the City were change the nature of use of other portions of01-181C 
(such as converting the right back to solely an irrigation water right), such a transfer application would require 
consent from the Coalition based on the plain language of the Settlement Agreement. However, as to utilization 
of the ground water recharge benefits, no such consent is required. 
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3. The ground water recharge provided by 01-181C is not merelv incidental, and 
therefore can serve a~ mitigation for 27-12261. 
The annual seepage of 2,080.8 AF into the ESPA from Jensen's Grove was, and is, 
intentional and not incidental, and may therefore be considered a~ mitigation. The Director held 
1hat "[w]ithout expressly listing recharge as a beneficial use, any recharge to the aquifer achieved 
by diversion and use under Right O 1-181 C, is merely incidental recharge and eannot be 'used as 
the basis for claim of a separate or expanded water right."' R. at 272 (quoting LC. § 42-234(5)). 
However, this analysis does not go far enough. 
The City agrees that, pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-234(5), incidental recharge cannot be 
used as the basis for an additional water right, but this is for situations where ground water 
recharge or seepage is not included anywhere on the water right. Stated another way, incidental 
recharge is for recharge not included as an element of a water right. This is not the case wi1h O 1-
181 C. The Settlement Agreement is a condition of O 1-181 C and it allowed the City to claim the 
ground water recharge benefits occurring under 01-181C. Bo1h the Settlement Agreement and 
the reference to seepage losses on the face of 01-181 C expressly acknowledge the ground water 
recharge that occurs under 01-lBlC. That which is express in not implied or incidental. The 
annual seepage accounted for in 01-181 C is allowed with the express purpose of providing 
recharge to the aquifer so that the City (and not some third party, as apparently concerned the 
Coalition) could use that as mitigation. This is allowed by 01-181C and the Settlement 
Agreement (see Sections III.B. l and 2, supra), and therefore, is not incidental recharge under 
Idaho Code§ 42-234(5). All of the evidence indicates that the City intended (and still intends) 
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for the 2,080.8 AF of annual seepage to recharge the aquifer and be used to offset an application 
for permit, which, in this matter. is 27-12261. 
C. The questions of injury to the Coalition's water rights were already 
addressed in the Settlement Agreement and 01-181C, and therefore, under 
principles of res judicata, the City should not be required to file a transfer 
application to permit the Coalition to have a second opportunity to raise the 
same injury arguments regarding 01-181C's use for ground water recharge. 
As described above, the Coalition's concerns in this matter were only based on legal 
issues surrounding interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, not factual issues of injury to its 
water supply. The Coalition did not submit any factual concerns or rebuttal testimony or 
analysis regarding the modeling analysis and other analyses submitted by the City. The 
Coalition did so knowing full well that the hearing was the time to submit evidence of injury, if 
any, and it did not submit any such evidence. It was clear to the Hearing Officer and the parties 
that the City proposed O 1-181 C to be used for mitigation purposes. 
Because the question of injury has already been addressed, addressing it again in a 
transfer proceeding is barred by res judicata, specifically, the claim preclusion portion of res 
judicata: 
Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion ( true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion ( collateral estoppel). Under principles of claim preclusion, a 
valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent 
jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same 
parties upon the same claim. The three fundamental purposes served by 
res judicata are: 
First, it "[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution 
against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results." Second, it 
serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the 
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burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private 
interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation 
of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any 
claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made 
or which might have been made. 
Hindmarsh v. A1ock. 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) (citations omitted, brackets in 
original, emphasis added). 
The Final Order was likely just as much of a surprise to the Coalition as it was to the 
City because both parties believed that the major issue to be decided was interpretation of the 
Settlement Agreement, and not a decision that now requires the City to file a second transfer to 
again amend 01-181C. The Coalition had the opportunity to offer evidence of injury, and the 
only evidence offered was injury based on a legal interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. 
Tr., p. 49, 11. 21-24. It would be improper to now give the Coalition a second bite at the apple to 
assert other bases of injury in a transfer proceeding. It is important to remember that the doctrine 
of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also 
subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were a(,1:ually 
made or which might have been made. Accordingly, the Coalition should now be barred from 
presenting the same claims of injury that were addressed in OI-181C, 72385, and the Settlement 
Agreement. The City should not be required to file a second transfer for Ol-181C to have its 
recharge benefits tied to a water right permit and then submit an application identical to 27-
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12261 (as required by the Final Order) and provide the Coalition two more chances to protest 
this action with the same arguments it has already made. 
The Coalition has already raised its issues with using O l-181 C for mitigation ( where the 
Coalition's primary concern appears to be that the City would transfer that mitigation credit to a 
third party) and in this c-0ntested case (where the Coalition presented no factual evidence, but 
merely a legal argument that the City was not allowed to file 27-12261 by the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement). The Director's error was made in excess of the Department's authority, 
since the Department may not arbitrarily ignore res judicata and require the City to give the 
Coalition multiple chances to protest 27-12261. The error was made unsupported by substantial 
evidence, since the evidence shows that the Coalition had opportunity to protest and put forward 
its evidence of injury ( which it chose not to do) and there is no factual reason to give the 
Coalition multiple chances to protest 27-12261. Finally, the error vvas arbitrary, capricious, and 
an abuse of discretion, since res judicata should estop the Coalition from asserting the same 
injuries over and over, yet the ~Final Order appears to require just that. 
D. The Director's actions prejudiced a substantial right of the City. 
Generally, "directly interested parties ... have, as a proeedural matter, substantial rights 
in a reasonably fair decision-making process and, of course, in proper adjudication of the 
proceeding by application of correct legal standards." State Transp. Dep't v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 
Idaho 297,302,311 P.3d 309,314 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Here, the City is a directly interested party, since it made the application for 27-12261. 
The Department's procedure was "a reasonably fair decision-making process." Id. However, 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF-PAGE 32 
000087
the Department's adjudication was not made by the "application of correct legal standards." Id. 
As discussed above, the Final Order erroneously failed to consider the Settlement Agreement, 
which is an inc-0rporated part of O 1 -181 C and the application of Idaho water law to this case in 
the absence of the entirety of01-181C was incorreet. Additionally, the law was applied by the 
Director incorrectly, since he wholly failed to consider mitigatory conditions for 27-12261 since 
his analysis hung solely on the fact that ground water recharge is not expressly listed as a 
beneficial use of Ol-18IC. Thus, the City's substantial right "in proper adjudication of the 
proceeding by application of correct legal standards" was violated. Id. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
The City never intended to give away the recharge benefits from 01-181 C's diversion and 
use in Jensen's Grove, a well-known gtavel pit. The City needs this Court to tell it whether it did 
or did not give away those benefits through interpretation of the plain language of the Settlement 
Agreement. If the City did give those rights away in this Court's estimation, then the City will 
have to move on now knowing it executed a poorly-worded agreement that did not refleet its 
intent, and will be more careful when working with the Coalition the future. However, as set 
forth above, the City is confident that the plain language of the Settlement Agreement supports its 
position that it never gave away its rights use the recharge occurring in Jensen's Grove from Ol-
18IC. If it did, why didn't the Settlement Agreement just say that the City could not ever claim 
those benefits? 
For the reasons set forth above, there is no legal impediment to using Ol-181C's annual 
seepage in a mitigation plan for 27-12261. Under the plain language of Paragtaph Le of the 
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Settlement Agreement, the City is pennitted to use O 1-181 C "for groundwater recharge or 
mitigation purposes associated with future groundwater rights," and 27-12261 is a future ground 
water right. 27-12261 provides substantial benefits to the City in the form of reduced costs of 
maintaining the Blackfoot River pwnp station. Furthennore, because 27-12261 is an application 
for permit, and not a transfer application, the provisions of Paragraphs l.a and 1.b do not require 
wTitten consent from the Coalition. 
The errors described above have been made in violation of statutory provisions; in excess 
of the statutory authority of the Department; without support of substantial evidence; and 
arbitrarily, capriciously, and as an abuse of discretion. The errors have violated the City's 
substantial right in the proper adjudication of this matter by the application of correct legal 
standards. Where, as here, "there is no indication in the record that further findings of fact could 
be made from the paucity of evidence that would affect the outcome of this case," remand to the 
Department is unnecessary. Bonner Gen. Hosp. v. Bonner Cnty., 133 Idaho 7, 11,981 P.2d 242, 
246 (1999); see also l.C. § 67-5279(3). The Coalition has only ever made a legal argument in 
this case, ,vhich can be answered by this Court upon the record already established because 
contract interpretation is a matter oflaw. 
This Court should issue an order approving the issuance of a pennit for 27-12261 because 
there are no legal impediments to using ground water recharge under O l-181 C to mitigate for 27-
12261. Indeed, such mitigation for a water right permit like 27-12261 was specifically 
contemplated under the Settlement Agreement. A detennination that the City must file a transfer 
and obtain consent from the Coalition is contrary to the plain language of the Settlement 
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Agreement, and as a practical matter, the Coalition will not consent to any transfer. The 
inequitable result will be that the City will never be able to utilize the recharge benefits everyone 
acknowledges occurs at Jensen's Grove under Ol-181C to aid the growing City of Blackfoot. 
Dated this ,~-day of January, 2016. 
Robert L. Harris, Esq. ' 
HOLDEN, KID\VELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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I, MEGHAN CARTER, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. That I am a deputy attorney general and represent the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources ("Department"), in the above matter. 
2. That the Respondents' brief is due February 8, 2016. 
3. That the Department bas not previously requested an extension of time in this 
matter. 
4. That due to other urgent intervening matters related to water rights administration 
and orders of the Department requiring counsel's attention, counsel will not be able to complete 
the Respondents' brief by the due date. 
S. That I believe an extension of three (3) days, to and including February 11, 2016, 
is a reasonable and necessary extension. 
6. That the undersigned counsel contacted counsel for the other parties to request an 
extension of time for filing its Respondents' brief. Counsel stipulated to the request upon the 
condition that the Department broaden its request to apply to all Respondents' briefs so that there 
will be unifonnity in the briefing schedule. Accordingly, the Department requests an extension of 
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time for the filing of all Respondents briefs in this appeal to February 11, 2016, thereby extending 
the deadline for filing reply briefs to March 3, 2016. 
7. I am reasonably assured that the Respondents' brief will be timely filed on or 
before June 8, 2015, should this request be granted. 
Jd, 
DATED this~ day of February 2016. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
Deputy Attorney General 
Deputy Attorney General 
Department of Water Resources 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this i+~ day of February 2016. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at ft> \.e , Idaho 
Commission Expires: oc.t\Ol\\"' 
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IN THE MATIER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 IN THE NAME OF 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT. 
09:46:05 02-08-2016 
COMES NOW the Respondents, the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
("Department") and Gary Spackman, in his capacity as Director of the Department, by and 
through their counsel of record, pursuant to Rules 34(e) and 46 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, and 
move this Court for an extension of time for filing all Respondents briefs in this appeal to February 
11, 2016, and thereby extending the deadline for filing reply briefs to March 3, 2016. 
The undersigned counsel has contacted the counsel for the other parties to request an 
extension of time for filing its Respondents' brief. Counsel did not oppose but also asked that the 
Department broaden its request to apply to all ResJX)Ddents' briefs so that there will be uniformity in 
the briefing schedule. Accordingly, the Department requests an extension of time for the filing of 
all Respondents briefs in this appeal to February 11, 2016, thereby extending the deadline for filing 






This motion is based upon the affidavit of counsel filed herewith. 
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DATED this U day of February 2016. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CLIVEJ. STRONG 
Chief, Natural Resources Division 
Deputy Attorney General 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 
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On October 27, 2015, this Court entered an Order setting the deadline for the filing of 
Respondents' Brief(s) as February 8, 2016, and the deadline for the filing of Reply Brief(s) as 
February 29, 2016. On February 8, 2016, the Respondents filed a Motion requesting an 
extension of time in which to file their Respondents' Briefto February 11, 2016. In their 
Motion, the Respondents represent that they have contacted counsel for the other parties, and that 
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they do not oppose the Motion. The Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Meghan Carter. For 
good cause appearing, and in an exercise of discretion, the Court will grant the Motion. 
THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING, THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY 
ORDERED: 
1. The Respondents' Motion for Extension is hereby granted. 
2. The deadline for the filing of Respondents' Brief(s) is hereby extended until 
February 11, 2016. 
3. The deadline for the filing of Reply Brief(s), if any, is hereby extended until 
March 3, 2016. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated F=~ I':, 1 201 (o 
District Judge 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a judicial review proceeding in which the City of Blackfoot ("City"), appeals a 
final order issued by the Director ("Director") of the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
("Department") denying an application for permit filed by the City. The order appealed is the 
September 22, 2015, Order Addressing Exceptions and Denying Application for Permit ("Final 
Order"). 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 12, 2013, the City filed Application for Permit No. 27-12261 
("Application") with the Department. R. at I. The application was amended on September 2, 
2014, (R. at 28), and again on January 27, 2015 (R. at 92). A joint protest was filed by A&B 
Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal 
Company, Twin Falls Canal Company, American Falls Reservoir District #2, and Minidoka 
Irrigation District ( collectively referred to as the "Coalition"). R. at 66. 
The City seeks a permit to divert 9.71 cfs of groundwater to irrigate 524.2 acres near the 
City. R. at 92. The City seeks the permit to replace surface water the City currently delivers 
through a pump station on the Blackfoot River and to supplement other existing ground water 
rights. R. at 95. 
The proposed permit "constitutes a consumptive use of water and, without mitigation, would 
reduce the amount of water available to satisfy water rights from sources connected to the Eastern 
Snake Plain Aquifer" R. at 207. Because of this, the City submitted a mitigation plan with the 
Application. R. at 95. The City proposes to mitigate for the new ground water use by leaving in 
the Blackfoot River 0.16 cfs of the water the City currently delivers through the river pump. R. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page 1 
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at 97. In addition, the City proposes using Water Right 01-181C ("Ol-181C") to recharge 1,066 
afa of water into Jensen Grove, a gravel pit near the City. R. at 96. 
Water Right 01-181 was originally described in the 1910 Rexburg Decree, and New 
Sweden Irrigation District ("NSID") claimed a portion of the water right in the Snake River 
Basin Adjudication ("SRBA"). R. at 204. The City purchased the water right from NSID and 
applied for a transfer in 2005 ("Transfer"). Ex. at 49. The Transfer requested a change in place 
of use from NSID to Jensen Grove and a change in the purpose of use. Id. The Transfer sought 
to add diversion to storage, storage, irrigation from storage and diversion to recharge as new 
purposes of use. Id. The Coalition protested the Transfer. Ex. at 75. The City and the Coalition 
executed a private settlement agreement in June of2006 ("Private Agreement"). Ex. at 18. The 
City, NSID, and the Coalition are the only parties to the Private Agreement. Id. In the Private 
Agreement, the City voluntarily agreed to limit its ability to transfer or change the nature of use 
of O 1-181 C without first receiving consent from the Coalition. Ex. at 19. The City also agreed 
that if it "proposes to utilize [Ol-181C] for groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes 
associated with existing or future groundwater rights, the CITY must file the appropriate 
application for permit and/or transfer." Ex. at 20. 
The Department circulated a draft transfer approval for comment on December 1, 2006. 
Ex. at 70. The draft included "ground water recharge" and "ground water recharge storage" as 
purposes of use. Ex. at 72. The Coalition disagreed with some aspects of the draft, specifically 
inclusion of "ground water recharge" and "ground water recharge storage" as purposes of use. 
Ex. at 46. The City disagreed with the Coalition and requested the Department approve the 
transfer as drafted, keeping "ground water recharge" and "ground water recharge storage" as 
purposes of use. Ex. at 48. The Department approved the Transfer in February of 2007 without 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page2 
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"ground water recharge" and "ground water recharge storage" as purposes of use. Ex. at 88. 
The Transfer authorized five beneficial uses: diversion to storage, irrigation, irrigation storage, 
irrigation from storage, and recreation storage. Ex. at 89. A partial decree was issued by the 
SRBA District Court for 01-181C on May 29, 2009. Ex. at 91. The five authorized purposes of 
use in the partial decree are the same as the Transfer. Ex. at 92. The partial decree for 01-181C 
contains, among other things, two conditions which were included in the transfer. The first 
condition under the quantity element states: 
The reservoir established by the storage of water under this right shall not exceed 
a total capacity of 1100 acre feet or a total surface area of 73 acres. This right 
authorizes additional storage in the amount of 186 afa to make up losses from 
evaporation and 980.8 afa for seepage losses. 
Ex. at 92. The second condition is located in the Other Provisions Necessary for Definition or 
Administration section and provides: 
The diversion and use of water under transfer 72385 is subject to additional 
conditions and limitations contained in a Settlement Agreement - IDWR Transfer 
of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, date June 2006, including any properly 
executed amendments thereto, entered into by and between the New Sweden 
Irrigation District, the City of Blackfoot, A&B Irrigation District, American Falls 
Reservoir District #2, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, 
Minidoka Irrigation District, Twin Falls Canal Company and North Side Canal 
Company. The Settlement Agreement has been recorded in Bingham County 
(Instrument No. 575897) and Bonneville County (Instrument No. 1249899) and is 
enforceable by the parties thereto. 
Ex. at 93. 
A hearing on the Application was held on April 21, 2015. Whether 01-181C could be 
used to mitigate for the Application was a question raised at hearing. R. at 207-208. The City 
argued it does not need to file an application for transfer to add recharge or mitigation as a 
purpose of use to 01-181C because the City's ability to realize the benefits associated with 
seepage under 01-181C was approved through the Transfer. R. at 207. The Coalition argued 
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paragraphs l(a), l(b) and J (e) of the Private Agreement "prohibit using water right Ol-181C to 
offset the diversion of water proposed in the pending application for pennit." R. at 209. The 
hearing officer rejected the City's argument stating "[t]he beneficial uses of 'recharge' and 
'mitigation' are not explicitly authorized under water right Ol-181C." Id. The hearing officer 
also cited the Private Agreement and the fact ground water recharge and ground water recharge 
storage were removed as beneficial uses in tl1e Transfer approval as evidence those uses "were 
not intended to be included as beneficial uses on water right Ol-181C through [the Transfer]." R. 
at 208. The hearing officer issued his Preliminary Order Issuing Permit ("Preliminary Order") 
on June 30, 2015. R. at 200. ln the Preliminary Order, the hearing officer conditionally granted 
the Application, directing the City to file a transfer for OJ -181 C to change the purpose of use to 
include either recharge or mitigation. R. at 211, 215. The hearing officer could not determine if 
Ol-181C would provide sufficient mitigation for the Application without a transfer proceeding 
and included the following condition to account for all possible outcomes of the transfer 
proceeding: 
Prior to diversion of water under this right, the right holder shall file an 
application for transfer to describe "ground water recharge'' and/or "mitigation" 
as an authorized beneficial use under water right O l-181C. If the transfer 
application is denied, then this permit is void and no longer of any effect. If the 
transfer application is approved and the beneficial use of "ground water recharge" 
or "mitigation" is for an annual diversion volume less than 1,066 acre-feet, then 
the diversion rate and annual diversion volume for this permit shall be reduced in 
proportion to the shortfall. 
R. at 211,215. 
The City filed exceptions to the Preliminary Order on July 14, 2015. R. at 221. In its 
exceptions, the City argued the hearing officer "did not correctly apply principles of contractual 
interpretation," that the hearing officer "failed to follow Department policy by requiring a 
transfer for O 1-181 C to be filed to include 'mitigation' or 'ground water recharge' as beneficial 
RESPONDENTS'BRIEF Page4 
000110
uses," and that being required to file a transfer implicates the doctrine of res judicata. R. at 230. 
The City asked the Director to interpret the Private Agreement between it and the Coalition and 
requested the Director not require the City file a transfer to use O 1-18 lC as mitigation. R. at 230. 
On September 22, 2015, the Director issued the Final Order. R. at 271. In the Final 
Order the Director determined a decision on the City's exceptions could "be made using 
principles of Idaho water law without referring to the Settlement Agreement," and declined to 
consider principles of contract interpretation. R. at 272. The Director determined "Right O 1-
181 C does not provide for mitigation or ground water recharge as a beneficial use. lfthe City 
would like to use Right O 1-181 C for mitigation through ground water recharge it must file a 
transfer." R. at 273. The Final Order denied the Application without prejudice and suggested 
the City refile the Application in conjunction with a transfer adding mitigation or recharge as 
authorized uses to 01-181C to "allow the Department to fully consider the City's mitigation plan 
as part of the application for permit process." R. at 274. The City timely filed its petition for 
judicial review on October 16, 2015. R. at 278-85. 
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Il. ISSUES 0~ APPEAL 
The Department reformulates the issues presented as follows: 
A. Whether the Director correctly determined the Private Agreement did not need to be 
considered to decide whether Ol-181C currently authorizes the use of water for 
mitigation or recharge purposes. 
B. ·whether the Director correctly determined the plain language of the Private Agreement 
does not authorize the use of Ol--18C for recharge or mitigation. 
C. Whether the reference to seepage in the quantity element of Ol-181C authorizes the City 
to use the water right for mitigation or recharge. 
D. Whether the Court may consider the documents from the earlier transfer proceeding when 
interpreting the paitial decree for 01-18 IC. 
E. ·whether the doctrine of res judicata precludes the Director from concluding that the City 
must file a transfer to add mitigation or recharge as an authorized use to 01-181 C. 
F. ·whether the City's substantial rights have been prejudiced. 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judicial review of a final decision of the Department is governed by the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act. chapter 52. title 67, Idaho Code. Idaho Code§ 42-1701A(4). 
Under the Act, the court reviews an appeal from an agency decision based upon the record 
created before the agency. Idaho Code§ 67-5277; Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 61,831 P.2d 
527, 529 (1992). The court shall affirm the agency decision unless it finds the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; ( c) made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or ( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3); Barron v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 135 
Idaho 414,417, 18 P.3d 219,222 (2001). The party challenging the agency decision must show 
that the agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3), and that a substantial 
right of the petitioner has been prejudiced. Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4); Barron, 135 Idaho at 417, 
18 P.3d at 222. "Where conflicting evidence is presented that is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, the findings of the [agency] must be sustained on appeal regardless of 
whether this Court may have reached a different conclusion." Tupper v. State Farm Ins., 131 
Idaho 724,727,963 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1998). If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set 
aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. Idaho Power Co. 
v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 151 Idaho 266, 272, 255 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2011). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5) provides that when evaluating a new application for permit, the 
Director must consider whether the new use will cause injury to other water rights by "reduc[ing] 
the quantity of water under existing water rights .... " An application which would otherwise be 
denied because of injury to other water rights maybe approved, however, if the applicant 
provides mitigation to offset the injury. IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. The City's Application 
proposes a new consumptive ground water diversion from the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer 
("ESPA") which would reduce the amount of water available to satisfy existing water rights from 
sources hydraulically connected to the ESPA. R. at 207. In recognition ofthis, and to offset the 
injury to other water rights, the City submitted a mitigation plan along with the Application. R. 
at 95-97. Relevant here is the City's proposal to use water right Ol-181C as mitigation by 
recharging 1,066 afa of water into the ESPA. R. at 96. 
The question presented in this case is whether mitigation or recharge is an authorized 
purpose of use for water right Ol-181C. The City is entitled to use Ol-181C as part of its 
mitigation plan only if mitigation or recharge is an authorized purpose of use associated with the 
water right. The Director cannot recognize a purpose of use not authorized by the water right. 
See Idaho Code § 42-351 ("It is unlawful for any person to divert or use water. .. not in 
conformance with a valid water right.) 
A. The Private Agreement does not need to be considered to decide whether 01-181C 
currently authorizes the use of water for mitigation or recharge purposes. 
To decide whether recharge or mitigation is an authorized use under 01-181C, the hearing 
officer started with the SRBA decree and concluded that "[t]he beneficial uses of 'recharge' and 
'mitigation' are not explicitly authorized under water right 0!-181C." R. at 207. The hearing 
officer recognized that there is a condition referencing seepage but concluded the reference 
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"does not create or equate to a new or independent beneficial use of water." Id. The hearing 
officer also reviewed the draft transfer approval circulated as part of the finalization of the 
Transfer involving 01-18\C. The draft approval included "ground water recharge" and "ground 
water recharge storage" as authorized purposes of use. Ex. at 72. In response to the draft 
approval, counsel for the Coalition, which had protested the Transfer, asked that those uses be 
removed from the transfer approval because they were contrary to the stipulation reached 
between parties to the transfer proceeding. Ex. at 46. The Department ultimately removed those 
uses from the final transfer approval. Ex. at 89. The hearing officer concluded that this was 
"further evidence" that mitigation and recharge "are not currently authorized under water right 
01-18\C." R. at 208. In addition, the hearing officer also considered whether the Private 
Agreement entered into between the City, the Coalition, and NSID during the Transfer 
proceeding authorizes the City to use Ol-181C for mitigation or recharge. The hearing officer 
found that the Private Agreement "confirms that 'ground water recharge' and 'mitigation' were 
not intended to be included as beneficial uses on water right O 1-181 C." Id. Based upon the 
above analysis, the hearing officer concluded that before the City can divert water under O 1-
18 lC "for 'mitigation' or 'ground water recharge' purposes, the City must file an application for 
transfer to describe one or both of these beneficial uses on water right Ol-181C." Id. 
The City appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Director. Like the hearing officer, 
the Director started by reviewing the SRBA partial decree for 01-18\C. The Director observed 
that "01-181 C ha.s five beneficial uses listed: diversion to storage, irrigation, irrigation storage, 
irrigation from storage, and recreation storage." R. at 272. The Director concluded that 
"nothing" in the in the purpose of use element "indicate[ s] Right O 1-181 C can be used for ground 
water recharge." Id. The Director also reviewed the transfer approval documents associated 
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with the previous Transfer and reached the same conclusion as the hearing officer. The Director 
found that "ground water recharge and ground water recharge storage were deliberately removed 
from the beneficial uses listed in [the transfer approval]." Id. The Director concluded that 
''[w]ithout expressly listing recharge as a beneficial use, any recharge to the aquifer achieved by 
di version and use under Right O 1-181 C is merely incidental recharge and cannot be used as the 
basis for claim of a separate or expanded water right." Id. (guotatiorn and citations omitted). 
Unlike the hearing officer, however, the Director concluded he did not need to review the details 
of the Private Agreement entered into between the City, the Coalition and NSID. He concluded 
he must rely on the purposes of use listed on the face of the decree to determine which uses were 
authorized under the water right. Id. 
1. The Private__,:\greement is not an element of water._r.ight Ol-181C. 
On appeal to this Court, the City argues the Director erred when he did not review and 
consider the details of the Private Agreement entered into between the City, the Coalition and 
NSID in his analysis. Opening Brief at 12. The City argues the Private Agreement is "an 
element of water right No. Ol-181C." Id. The City points to the provision referencing the 
Private Agreement in the decree and argues that its inclusion in the decree means the Director 
must consider it in determining the authorized nature of use for O 1-181 C. Id. The City argues 
"conditions in a water right license or partial decree are elements of the water right and are no 
less important than the diversion rate or any other water right element." Id. 
The Director properly concluded that he does not need to inquire into the details of the 
Private Agreement. First, contrary to the City's argument, the Private Agreement is not itself an 
element of the water right. A remark referencing the existence of the Private Agreement is 
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included under the "Other Provisions Necessary" section of the partial decree for O 1-181 C.1 
This is an important distinction. Since the remark only references the agreement, the question 
becomes what was the intent of including this information in the water right. It has been a long 
standing practice in the SRBA to include remarks referencing private contracts or private 
agreements in the partial decrees to resolve objections. See, e.g., SRBA Subcases 75-5 
(Arrowhead Water District)2 and 75-14608 (Tyacke )3. The Department has adopted the same 
practice with protested transfers and applications for permit and will, as this case evidences, 
include a condition referencing a private settlement agreement in the approval documents to 
resolve a protest. The purpose of referencing such agreements, however, is only to provide 
notice of private agreements that govern the relationships of the parties to the agreements. 
Remarks such as these are included under the other provision necessary section of the partial 
decree "as a courtesy to the parties" and "their successors-in-interest." Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Order Granting Motion to Strike, In Re 
SRBA Subcase No. 02-2318A at 6, fn.4 (Oct. 31, 2011) (Hon. J. Wildman). That is the limited 
purpose for its inclusion. 
1 At least one SRBA Special Master has indicated that remarks in the "Other Provision Necessary" section of a 
partial decree are not elements of the water rights. See Order Recommending Partial Decree Be Set Aside, In Re: 
SRBA Subcase Nos.: 31-7311, 31-2357 and 31-2395, at 6 (Jan.30.2004) (Special Master Bilyeu) ("There is no 
legal justification for this Special Master to interpret or recommend setting aside the elements of the Partial Decree. 
What is ambiguous in the Partial Decree is the 'other provisions necessary' to define or administer section.") 
(underlining and italics in original); But See Idaho Code§ 42-1411(2) ("The director shall determine the following 
elements ... U) such remarks and other matters as are necessary for definition of the right, for clarification of any 
element of a right. or for administration of the right by the director."). 
2 The partial decree includes a remark that provides; "This water right is subject to a private agreement among the 
City of Salmon; Myrtle, Dale and Laura Edwards; and Arrowhead Water District, and recorded in the Lemhi County 
Recorder's Office on December 1, 2011, as instrument no. 288296." 
3 The partial decree includes a remark that provides; "The operation, use and administration of this water right is 
subject to a private water right agreement effective December 21, 2011, among Sunset Heights Water District, Cecil 
and Judith Bailey Jackson, Michael Tyacke, and the State ofldaho, and recorded in the Lemhi County Recorder's 
Office as Instrument No. 288625:· 
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2. The reference to the Private Agreement was not intended to make the Director 
and other water users parties to the private agreement or to bind the Director and 
other water users to the contents of the private agreement. 
The City suggests the intent behind the remark referencing the Private Agreement was to 
incorporate the Private Agreement into Ol-181C and thereby makes its terms and provisions 
binding on the Director and other water users. Opening Brief at 15. The language of the remark 
suggests otherwise. The language of the remark states the agreement is only "by and between" 
NSID, the City and the Coalition. Ex. at 93. There are no other parties to the agreement. This 
reference does not suggest a broader intent to make the Private Agreement binding on others but 
just the opposite - that it is "by and between" NSID, the City and the Coalition and it only 
affects the rights and obligations of those parties. Furthermore, enforcement of the agreement is 
limited to the parties to the agreement. See Id. (The agreement is "enforceable by the parties 
thereto.") This further emphasizes that the Private Agreement only governs the relationship 
between the parties to the agreement. The inclusion of language referencing the Private 
Agreement does not suggest an intent to incorporate the agreement into the water right. 
The City cites to Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384,462 P.2d 49, (1969); Barley v. Smith, 
149 Idaho 171,233 P.3d 102 (2010); and Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 296 P.3d 433 
(Ct. App. 2013), divorce cases, to support its reasoning that the Private Agreement is 
incorporated into 01-181C. Opening Brief at 14-15. The City uses the divorce cases "because in 
divorce cases, the parties will frequently arrive at a property settlement agreement, which may or 
may not thereafter be incorporated, or merged, into the court's divorce decree." Opening Brief at 
14. 
In Phillips, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a separation agreement is presumed 
merged into a divorce decree absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Phillips, 93 
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Idaho at 387,462 P.2d at 52. The Idaho Supreme Court in Barley went further saying the 
analysis of whether a separation agreement is merged into the divorce decree begins with the 
"four corners of the divorce decree." Barley, 149 Idaho at 177, 233 P.3d at 108. Once a 
separation agreement is merged into a divorce decree, "the right to enforce the contract through 
an action for breach of contract is supplanted by the divorce court's authority to enforce its 
orders." Davidson, 154 Idaho at 230, 269 P.3d at 436. The merged separation agreement is 
enforceable as a part of the divorce decree and "if necessary may be modified by the court in the 
future." Phillips, 93 Idaho at 387, 462 P.2d at 52. 
The City erroneously relies on the concepts of merger within divorce law. The Idaho 
Supreme Court in Phillips explains that the justification for considering agreements merged is 
the strong policy interest the courts have in maintaining jurisdiction in divorce cases. 
Specifically, the Court points to the "just and equitable disposition" of matters concerning the 
"care, custody and support of the minor children of the parties" and also states "[o Jther matters 
of importance in a divorce action are the disposition and division of the community property of 
the parties and the award of alimony or support to the wife. Our statutes place the same 
jurisdiction, responsibility and duty on the district courts in the disposition of these matters." 
Phillips 93 Idaho at 387,462 P.2d at 52. In essence, merger of separate agreements into a 
divorce decree is justified because of a policy to provide enforcement of all agreements within 
one court. Because water administration does not take place through the SRBA Court, there is 
no similar policy in recognizing merger of the Private Agreement. Once a water right has been 
decreed it is up to the Department to enforce and administer the provisions of the water right. 
See Idaho Code§§ 42-220 and 42-602. With a divorce decree, the court maintains a more active 
role. A water right decree and a divorce decree are two very different decrees and as such 
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merger under a divorce should not be the body of law used to determine if the Private Agreement 
is incorporated into O 1-181 C. 
To the extent the Court concludes that the doctrine of merger is applicable, the more 
appropriate body oflaw involving merger would be the doctrine of merger developed within 
property law. A water right is "a valuable right which is entitled to protection as a property 
right." Murray v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 27 Idaho 603,619, 150 P. 47, 50 (1915). Since a water 
right is afforded the same protection as a property right, property law would be more appropriate 
in determining whether the Private Agreement is merged with Ol-181C. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has a generally recognized that "[ w ]here the covenants in the 
contract do not relate to the conveyance, but are collateral to and independent of the conveyance, 
they are not merged in the deed .... " Jolley v Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373,384,414 P.2d 
879,885 (1966). The Private Agreement is not merged or incorporated with the decree for 01-
18C because it is collateral and independent of O 1-181 C. 
The Private Agreement is collateral to and independent of01-181C because it does not 
relate to the elements of O 1-181 C but focuses on the rights and duties of the signatories outside 
of the current administration of the water right. In Jolley, the parties agreed to trade properties 
and provide each other with an abstract of title to the real property being transferred. Id. at 378-
379, 881. The court determined that the agreement to provide an abstract was not merged with 
the deed, stating "[a]n abstract does not relate to the title, possession, quantity, or emblements of 
the land. It is a graphic history of the title, but has nothing to do with the title itself." Id. at 384, 
885. The Private Agreement does not relate to the elements of01-181C in the same way an 
abstract of title doesn't relate to the title possession, quantity or emblements of the land. The 
Private Agreement details the obligations the City has if it wants to change the elements of 01-
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18 lC but does not govern any of the elements of 01-18 lC. Therefore the Private Agreement is 
collateral to and independent of the partial decree. 
Further, the terms of the Private Agreement are not inhered to the very subject matter of 
Ol-181C and it is therefore collateral to the partial decree. In Sells v. Robinson, Sells and 
Robinson executed a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement ("REPSA"), which discussed 
timber rights on an easement Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 770, 118 P.3d 99, 103 (2005). 
A deed was executed three days later with different language describing the easement and timber 
rights. Id. The court held the terms of the REPSA were merged into the deed because they 
"inhere in the very subject matter with which the deed deals - the timber on the Sell' s remaining 
property." Id. at 772, 104 (internal quotations omitted). The Private Agreement addresses the 
rights and responsibilities of the City concerning use of O 1-181 C and permissions needed from 
the Coalition, while a water right decree defines the nature and extent of a water right and directs 
the use and administration of that right. The Private Agreement does not affect current 
administration nor does it define the nature and extent of01-18lC and therefore is not inhered in 
the very subject matter of the water right. 
In Fuller v Dave Callister, a seller and a buyer entered into a purchase agreement and 
subsequently executed an addendum where the seller agreed that it would deed over a portion of 
the property to ACHD through a condemnation and transfer the proceeds of the conveyance to 
the sellers. Fuller v. Dave Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 850, 252 P.3d 1266, 1268 (2011). The buyer 
then executed a warranty deed conveying the property to a third party which did not mention the 
addendum or the anticipated condemnation. Id. In analyzing whether the purchase agreement 
and addendum were merged into the warranty deed the court stated, "[b]y the very nature of the 
obligation established in Addendum# 1, it is clear that the parties expected that provision to 
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continue in effect after the execution of the warranty deed." Id. at 854, 1272. The Court went on 
to hold that the doctrine of merger did not apply stating "[w]here the relevant conditions of a 
contract could not have been performed prior to execution of the warranty deed, merger is 
inappropriate." Id. The Private Agreement outlines how the signatories will interact concerning 
use of 01-181C after the Transfer. This discussion about the terms of the Private Agreement 
indicates the City and the Coalition intended it to continue after the elements of O 1-181 C were 
finalized in the Transfer. The Private Agreement even contemplates continuing on after Ol-181C 
was partially decreed. Ex. at 21. The Private Agreement is a separate agreement beyond the 
elements of a water right and therefore merger into the partial decree would be inappropriate. 
The Private Agreement does not relate to the elements of01-181C nor is it inhered to the 
very subject matter of the water right. The signatories to the Private Agreement intended for the 
agreement to continne past the Transfer and partial decree making it a separate agreement 
beyond the elements of the water right. Because the Private Agreement fits into all of the 
exceptions of the doctrine of merger it is collateral to and independent of 01-181C and is 
therefore not merged. 
3. In order for the Department to properly administer water right Ol-181C it must be 
able to rely on the face of the decree. 
The Director must be able to rely on face of decree. To determine the authorized 
purposes of use, the Director must first look to the purpose of use element on the face of the 
water right. In this case, the purpose of use element for 01-181 C does not include recharge or 
mitigation. The only authorized purposes of use of Ol-181C are: diversion to storage, irrigation, 
irrigation storage, irrigation from storage, and recreation storage. Ex. at 92. The elements on the 
face of the water right are conclusive as to the nature and extent of the water right. Idaho Code § 
42-1420. Like a judgment, a water right must outline with certainty the nature and extent of 
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beneficial use of the water. See Rangen Decision at 19 (The purpose of SRBA was to provide 
certainty and finality to water rights.); see Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 524 (1961) ("A 
judgment must be definite and certain in itself ... It must fix clearly the rights and liabilities of 
the respective parties to the cause and be such as the parties may readily understand their 
respective rights and obligations thereunder."). The provisions in a partial decree must be set 
forth with "the certainty required for a decree which will have application in perpetuity." A&B 
Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Conservation League, 131 Idaho 411, 423, 958 P.2d 568, 580 (1997) 
vacated in part on reh 'g (1998). 
The City's argument leads to unacceptable uncertainty of water rights. Here, the City is 
asking the Court to adopt a rule that requires the Director to go beyond the face of the decrees 
and interpret private agreements referenced in the decrees. Often times, the Director does not 
have copies of the private agreements. Moreover, many of these private agreements are subject 
to change by the signatories. The agreement here highlights the uncertainty that would be 
injected into water rights. 
The Private Agreement provides that it "may [be] amended or modified" by agreement 
of NSID, the City, and the Coalition. Ex. at 21. The City poses a hypothetical asking the Court 
to assume that the City and the Coalition amend the Private Agreement and agree "to allow 01-
181C to be applied to mitigate a third party's water right." Opening Brief at 16. The City 
suggests it would then be inequitable to not make that agreement binding on the Director and 
other water users. Id. The opposite is true. Not only would it be inequitable to require that the 
Department and other water users be bound by agreements decided by only the City and the 
Coalition, it would also be contrary to law. 
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The hypothetical presented by the City focuses the issue. The hypothetical is premised 
on the City and the Coalition making an agreement that modifies the elements of the 01-181C. If 
the Comt were to accept the City's argument and conclude that parties to a private settlement 
agreement are allowed to modify the express elements of a water right, and that those changes 
would be binding on the Director and all other water users, the parties to the agreement could 
make a private agreement to change any element of the water right. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the City and the Coalition could agree to change the priority date, place of use, point 
of diversion or any other element and then say that change is binding on the Director and other 
parties. Idaho Code provides strict processes for changing water rights (Idaho Code§ 42-222) 
and changes that result in enlargement are contrary to law. See C.f Jensen v. Boise-Kuna Irr. 
Dist., 75 Idaho 133, 142, 269 P.2d 755, 760 (1954) (A contract that is contrary to law is ultra 
vires and void.). While the signatories are free to change their agreement, that change cannot 
affect or modify the elements of the water right. 
Furthermore, allowing a private agreement to change a water right is contrary to the 
notice rights of other water users. In water right permitting (Idaho Code § 42-203A), in the 
transfer process (Idaho Code§ 42-222), and in water right decrees (Idaho Code§ 42-1412), third 
parties have the opportunity to object to elements of the proposed water right that may affect 
their interests. If private agreements could alter express elements of a water right third parties 
would be deprived of their right to receive notice of changes. Moreover, the Department would 
not know with certainty the nature and extent of water rights thereby severely inhibiting the 
Department's ability to administer water rights. 
To be clear, the signatories are free to change their Private Agreement, thereby changing 
their own rights, duties and obligations. They are also then entitled to seek to have those 
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changes enforced among the signatories. But they are not entitled to change the elements of a 
water right simply by agreement among the signatories. Since the Private Agreement cannot 
change the express elements on the face of the water right and is only binding on the signatories, 
the Director correctly determined he did not need to look to the settlement agreement when 
evaluating Ol-181C. 
B. The plain language of the Private Agreement does not authorize the use of 01-181C 
for recharge or mitigation. 
The City suggests that if this Court concludes the Director erred in failing to engage in 
the contractual interpretation of the Private Agreement, the Court "should thereafter itself engage 
in contractual interpretation and rule on this issue" because it is a question of law. Opening Brief 
at 12. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) is clear: "If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set 
aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Thus, if the 
Court does not affirm the Director, the Court should not engage in contractual interpretation but 
rather should remand the matter back to the Director. 
Even if the Court were to evaluate the Private Agreement, the plain language of the 
sections at issue does not authorize use of Ol-181C for recharge or mitigation without the City 
filing a transfer. The City argues sections l(a), l(b), and l(e) of the Private Agreement indicate 
the City can accrue benefit from ground water recharge. Opening Brief at 21. However, the 
Private Agreement merely mentions the City needs permission from the Coalition to pursue use 
of Jensen Grove for ground water recharge. And specifically section l(e) of the Private 
agreement states "If the CITY proposes to utilize the Water Right for groundwater recharge or 
mitigation purposes associated with existing or future groundwater rights, the CITY must file the 
appropriate application for permit and/or transfer." Ex. at 20. This language indicates the City 
does not get recharge credit for the seepage at Jensen Grove without some affirmative action 
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either an application for permit or transfer. Therefore the Private Agreement supports the 
Department's position that Ol-181C does not have ground water recharge or mitigation as a 
purpose of use. 
The City also points to paragraph l(e) of the Private Agreement and argues the City only 
had to file an "application for permit" to use 01-181C for recharge or mitigation. Opening Bri~f 
at 22. The City suggests that this provision means that to add mitigation and recharge as 
purposes of use to 01-181C, all the City had to do was file Application for Permit 27-12261. 
This is an illogical argument and ignores an important qualifier in the paragraph. The paragraph 
states that the City must file "the appropriate application for permit and/or transfer." It is clear 
that the City can file a transfer to add recharge or mitigation to 01-181C. But it is also possible 
for the City to file an application for permit to establish a new water right for recharge or 
mitigation specifically at Jensen Grove. This would result in the City being able to use water in 
Jensen Grove for recharge and mitigation purposes. This is clearly the type of application for 
permit contemplated in the Private Agreement. This would be the appropriate application for 
permit for the City to file if it wants to use water in Jensen Grove for mitigation or recharge 
purposes without filing for a transfer to O 1-181 C. 
C. The reference to seepage in the quantity element of 01-lSlC does not authorize the 
City to use the water right for mitigation or recharge. 
The City argues in its Opening Brief that since seepage is expressly mentioned in Ol-
181C, the City can claim the seepage as recharge to offset the Application. Opening Brief at 29. 
While there is a reference to seepage in a condition under the quantity element, its inclusion was 
not intended to expand the authorized purpose of use for 01-181C to include recharge or 
mitigation. The relevant condition states: 
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The reservoir established by the storage of water under this right shall not exceed 
a total capacity of 1100 acre feet or a total surface area of 73 acres. This right 
authorizes additional storage in the amount of 186 afa to make up losses from 
evaporation and 980.8 afa for seepage losses. 
Ex. at 92. 
The reference to seepage in the quantity element of 01-181 C is to make clear that an 
additional volume of water was authorized for storage to make up for losses from both 
evaporation and seepage. This condition in no way suggests its inclusion was to authorize 
additional purposes of use that were not included under the purpose of use element. The mention 
of seepage does not mean recharge or mitigation are authorized uses under 01-18 lC. To imply 
otherwise goes against the plain reading of water right Ol-181C. The City's argument that 
seepage is an express element of01-181C is a just a backdoor attempt by the City to add uses to 
01-181 C that are not currently authorized under the water right. 
Since Ol-181C does not contain recharge or mitigation as a purpose of use, the seepage 
from Jensen Grove is merely incidental recharge and cannot be "used as the basis for claim of a 
separate or expanded water right." Idaho Code§ 42-234(5). Incidental recharge is unintended 
recharge that is secondary to the express purpose of use of a water right. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Challenge, subcase nos. Ol-23B et al., Abeerdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 
at 15, fn 8 (April 4, 2011). The City recognizes this definition. Opening Brief at 29 ("incidental 
recharge is for recharge not included anywhere on the water right."). The water seeping out of 
Jensen Grove into the aquifer is secondary and incidental to the stated purposes of use listed in 
01-181 C. If the City wants to use O 1-181 C as mitigation for the City's Application it should file 
a transfer. Since incidental recharge cannot be the basis for a new water right the City cannot 
use 01-181C to mitigate for its new ground water diversion without a transfer. 
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D. The Court may consider the documents from the earlier transfer proceeding 
when interpreting the partial decree for 01-lSlC if the Court concludes the 
decree is ambiguous. 
The City argues that the Private Agreement authorizes the use of water under 01-181 for 
mitigation or recharge purposes. While the Department believes both the Decree and the Private 
Agreement are clear and do not authorize the use of water under Ol-181C for mitigation or 
recharge purposes, should the Court determine the Private Agreement introduces ambiguity into 
decree, it is appropriate for the Court to consider the approval documents related to the Transfer. 
The rules of interpretation applicable to contracts also generally apply to the interpretation of a 
water right decree. A & B Irr. Dist. v. Spackman, 153 Idaho 500, 523, 284 P .3d 225, 248 (2012). 
If a court finds the language of a contract ambiguous, parol evidence can be reviewed to 
asce1tain intent behind the contract. Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 27, 966 P.2d 23, 27 
(1998). 
In this case, the Transfer documents show that recharge was expressly rejected as an 
authorized use for 01-181C. The Department originally circulated a draft transfer approval that 
included "ground water recharge" and "ground water recharge storage" as purposes of use. Ex. 
at 72. The Coalition informed the Department that inclusion of "ground water recharge" and 
"ground water recharge storage" were not part of the agreement between it and the City and 
requested the Department remove them. Ex. at 46. The Department approved the Transfer in 
February of 2007 without ground water recharge and ground water recharge storage as purposes 
of use. Ex. at 88. 
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E. The doctrine of res judicata does not preclude the Director from concluding that the 
City must file a transfer application to add mitigation or recharge as an authorized 
use to 01-181C. 
Finally, the City argues the doctrine of res judicata precludes the Director from requiring 
the City file a transfer application to add mitigation or recharge as an authorized use to 01-181C. 
Opening Brief at 30 ("[U]nder the principles of res judicata, the City should not be required to 
file a transfer application ... "). The City argues that "[b]ecause the issue of injury has already 
been addressed, addressing it again in a transfer proceeding is barred by res judicata, 
specifically, the claim preclusion portion of res judicata." Id. The City states "[i]t would be 
improper to now give the Coalition a second bite at the apple to assert other bases of injury in a 
transfer proceeding." Id. at 31. The City argues "the Department may not arbitrarily ignore res 
judicata and require the City to give the Coalition multiple chances to protest 27-12261." Id. at 
32. 
Claim preclusion, part of resjudicata, will bar a subsequent action only if three 
requirements are met: 1) the subsequent action involves the same parties, 2) the action raises the 
same claims and 3) there was a final judgment on the merits. Andrus v Nicholson, 145 Idaho 
774, 777-778, 186 P. 3d 630, 633-634 (2008). Resjudicata is an affirmative defense and the 
party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007). 
Because the City seeks to apply the doctrine to preclude the Director requiring a transfer, 
the City must point to a final judgment on the merits in a previous action that resolved the same 
claim. The City has failed to meet its burden in this case because it has failed to point to any 
final judgment on the merits in a previous action that in any way addresses whether the City is 
required to file a transfer. 
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The City points to the proceedings before the hearing officer in this case and discusses 
the Coalition's arguments related to injury, Opening Brief at 31-32, but the doctrine applies only 
to subsequent actions. Andrus v Nicholson, 145 Idaho at 777, 186 P. 3d at 633. Moreover, the 
Department is not a party to the proceeding but rather decides the contested case. See ID APA 
37.01.01.005.2; see also IDAPA 37.01.01.150. 
Furthermore, the Coalition's arguments related to injury have no bearing on whether 
Idaho law requires the City to file a transfer to add a new purpose of use to a water right. The 
City's assertion that the prior Transfer proceeding is binding on the Department is without merit. 
The fact that there was "no final judgment on the merits" in the Transfer proceeding and the 
Department was not a party does not preclude the Director from requiring a transfer to add 
recharge as a purpose of use to O 1-181 C. The City has failed to meet its burden to show how the 
doctrine of res judicata applies. 
The City also seems to be suggesting that the Coalition should not be allowed to raise 
issues of injury in any future proceeding involving Ol-181C. Opening Brief at 31. To the extent 
the City is arguing that this Court should rule that the Coalition is precluded from raising issues 
of injury in a future proceeding, such a request must be rejected as a request for an advisory 
opinion. Taylor v. AJA Sen,s. Corp., 151 ldaho 552,569,261 P.3d 829,846 (2011) (Courts are 
"not empowered to issue purely advisory opinions."). 
The Director denied the City's Application "for failure to submit sufficient information 
for the Department to consider the City's mitigation plan." R. at 273. He did so without 
prejudice and suggested a path forward that would allow the City to accomplish its goals with the 
Application. Denying the application and directing the City to file a transfer to O 1-181 C in 
conjunction with a new application for permit does not, as the City suggests, implicate principles 
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of res judicata, causing an error that was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.4 This 
Court should affirm the Director's Final Order. 
F. The City's substantial rights have not been prejudiced. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4) provides that an "agency action shall be affirmed unless 
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." The City claims its substantial rights 
were prejudiced because the Director failed to consider the Private Agreement when considering 
whether recharge and mitigation are authorized purposes of use under 01-lSlC. Opening Bri~f 
at 33. As discussed above, the Director applied the correct legal standards in evaluating the 
City's plan to use 01-lSlC to mitigate for its new ground water use. Because the Private 
Agreement did not need to be considered, the City's substantial rights have not been prejudiced. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither recharge nor mitigation are an authorized purposes of use identified on the face 
of 01-lSlC. Without recharge or mitigation as a purpose of use, the City cannot use 01-18 lC to 
mitigate for the proposed new ground water diversion in its Application. If the City wants to use 
01-lSlC to mitigate for the Application, it needs to file a transfer for 01-lSlC. 
The City has not demonstrated the Director's findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions are in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; in excess of the statutory 
4 While the Director has conditionally approved conjunctive management mitigation plans (see Order Approving 
IGWA 's Fourth Mitigation Plan filed in Rangen Inc. v Spackman, CV-2014-4970, (http://idwr.idaho.gov/files/legal/CM-MP-
2014-006/CM-MP-2014-006_2014l029_0rder_Approving_IGWA's_Fourth_Mitigation_Plan.pdf)) the Director rejected the hearing 
officer's proposed approach of conditionally approving the Application because of the uncertainty associated with 
the "yet-to-be-filed" transfer and the possible conflicting provisions that may occur as a result of the transfer. R. at 
273. Without seeing the lransfer application, it is difficult to impossible to determine how much water is available 
for mitigation. The hearing officer issued the permit with a diversion rate of 9.71 cfs but did not identify the 
authorized diversion volume under lhe quantity element. Instead, the hearing officer drafted a condition that would 
result in a variable annual diversion volume and in a diversion rate potentially less than 9.71 cfs depending on the 
outcome of lhe lransfer. R. at 215. Because this condition could result in a confusion and potential conflict within 
the decree depending on the outcome of the transfer, the Director decided the "the better approach" in this case is to 
deny the application and provide the City the opportunity to resubmit the application for permit along with tl1c 
transfer so that they can be considered together. R. at 273. 
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authority of the agency; made upon unlawful procedure; unsupported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The Court should affirm the 
Director's Final Order. 
b 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J_\__'_: day of February 2016. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
CLIVE J. STRONG 
Deputy Attorney General 
CHIEF, NATURAL RESOURCES DNISION 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page 26 
000132
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I{ ~lay of February 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Court and served on the following 
parties by the indicated methods: 
Original to: 
SRBA DISTRICT COURT 
253 3RD AVENUE NORTH 
POBOX2707 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-2707 
Facsimile: (208) 736-2121 
ROBERT L HARRIS 
LUKE H MARCHANT 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
POBOX50130 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405 
rharris@hol den legal .corn 
l1narchan1.@ h ol clenl~':!l. co tl} 
GARRETT H SANDOW 
220 N MERIDIAN 
BLACKFOOT ID 83221 
gsandowlaw (ci> aol.com 
JOHN K SIMPSON 
TRAVIS L THOMPSON 
PAULL ARRINGTON 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
195 RIVER VISTA PLACE STE 204 




W KENT FLETCHER 
FLETCHER LAW OFFICE 
POBOX248 
BURLEY ID 83318 
wkf@pmt.org 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
D U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[g] Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
D Email 
[g] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
[g] Email 
[g] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
[g] Email 
[g] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
[g] Email 
[g] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand Delivery 








...J r-,littrtctrici1eo~ui';;;,tr'.". s&a:r-.:.._--, 
I .. ~~!:'~8lrlct C n n&. ::!'"!m.•••"""' Appeals 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DIS~u n Fallt. Stai<> of ldaoo 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY TWI. ~, f 20J6 
Docket No. CV-2015-1687 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR PERMIT NO. 27-12261 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
GARY SP ACKMA."i, in his capacity as Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents, 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, A.'1:ERICAN FALLS RESERVOIR DISTRICT#:?,. 
BURLEY IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MINIDOKA 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY and NORTH SIDE 
CANAL COMP A1''Y, 
Intervenors. 
SURF ACE WATER COALITION'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE SURFACE WATER COALITION: 
John K. Simpson, ISB #4242 
Travis L. Thompson, ISB #6168 
Paul L. Arrington, ISB #7198 
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
195 River Vista Place, Suite 204 
Tv.inFalls, Idaho 83301-3029 
Telephone: (208) 733-0700 
Facsimile: (208) 735-2444 
Attorneys for A &B Irrigation District, Burley 
Irrigation District, l.1ilner Irrigation District, 
North Side Canal Company, Twin Falls Canal 
Company 
W. KentFleteher, ISB #2248 
FLETCHER LAW OFFICE 
P.O. Box248 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
Telephone: (208) 678-3250 
Facsimile: (208) 878-2548 
Attorneys for American rails Reservoir 
District #2., Minidoka Irrigation District 
(See Service Page for Remaining Counsel) 
000134
TABLE OF COl'<ffENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i 
TABLE OF AU1110RITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................................... I 
I. Nature of the Case ................................................................................................................ 1 
II. Course of Proceedings/Statement of Facts .......................................................................... 1 
A. Stipulations at the Hearing ............................................................................................... I 
B. Application for Permit No. 27-12261 .............................................................................. 2 
C. Proposed Mitigation/The Jensen Grove Water Right (Ol-181C) ..................................... 3 
D. The Jensen's Grove Transfer & Settlement Agreement.. ................................................. 4 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 7 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7 
I. .The Law Requires that a Transfer be Filed to Change the Use of a 
-l'\:Vater Right. The City Must File a Transfer in Order to Use Water 
Right Ol-181C as Mitigation For this New Consumptive Use 
Groundwater Right. ................................................................................................ ; ............ 8 
A. The Elements ofa Water Right Cannot Be Changed without A Transfer ....................... 8 
B. · The City Cannot Use the Settlement Agreement to Cirewnvent the Law. 
Further, the City Must Obtain the Coalition's Written Consent Prior to 
Changing the Nature of Use of Water Right Ol-181C ................................................... 14 
C. It is Not the Department's Fault that the City Failed to File a Transfer 
Application ..................................................................................................................... 18 
II. The Coalition is Not Bound by any Decision in This Case ............................................... 19 
III. Incidental Recharge from a Water Right Canoot be Used to Mitigate New 
Conswnptive Uses ............................................................................................................ 21 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 26 
SURFACE WATER COALITION'S JOThT RESPONSE BRIEF - i 
000135
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE LAW 
AED, Inc. v. KDC Jnvs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159 (2013) ................................................................... 15 
Chisholm v. JDWR, 142 Idaho 159 (2005) ...................................................................................... 7 
Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227 (Ct. App. 2013) ................................................................. 11 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92 (2002) .................................................................................... 21 
Memorandwn Decision & Order on Challenge, SRBA Subcase Nos. Ol-23B, et al. (Apr. 4, 2011) 
................................................................................................................................................... 22 
Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798 (2002) ..................................................................................... 19 
Sagewillow. Inc. v. IDWR, 138 Idaho 831 (2003) .......................................................................... 7 
CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
LC.§ 42-1411(2)(±) ................................................................................................................... 8, 24 
L(j); § 42-l 412(6) .................................................................................................. ;J:: ................ 8, 24 
1.c. § 42-1420 ........................................................................................................................... 9, 12 
I.C. § 42-222 ...................................................................................................................... 10, 13, 15 
LC. § 42-234 .......................................................................................................... : ........................ 9 
I.C. § 42-234(2) ....................................................................................................................... 21, 24 
LC. § 42-234(5) ...................................................................................................... : ................ 22, 24 
J.C.§ 45-1425 ................................................................................................................................ 22 
LC.§ 67-5245(7) ........................................................................................................................... 13 
LC. § 67-5279(3) ............................................................................................................................. 7 
LC. §§ 42-203A ............................................................................................................................ 15 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Administrator's Memorandum, Transfer Process No. 24 ............................................................. l 0 
Amended Moratorium Order (April 30, 1994) ............................................................................... 21 
SURFACE WATER COALITION'S JOINT RESPONSE BRIEF - ii 
000136
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of the Order Addressing Exceptions and Denying Application for Per-
mit (the "Final Order"), issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
("IDWR" or "Department") on September 15, 2015. 
II. Course of Proceedings/Statement of Facts 
This matter involves an attempt by the City of Blackfoot to use the incidental seepage of wa-
ter in Jensen Grove to mitigate for new groundwater depletions under Application for Permit No. 
27-12261. The facts stated in the City's brief are largely undisputed in this matter. However, the 
City does not tell the entire story and does not properly frame the Coalition• s1 interests. As such, 
the following fuctual infonnation is provided to assist the Court. 
A. Stipulations at the Hearing 
Following the hearing on this matter, there was very little in dispute. Toe parties stipulated 
to the elements of section 42-203A(5)(b) through (f). The parties also stipulated that the modeling 
performed by the City's experts showed that recharge in Jensen's Grove could offset the impacts 
resulting from the new consumptive uses contemplated under this application. That modeling 
showed a slight deficiency in the mitigation proposed, and the Coalition stipulated that leaving a 
small portion of additional water in the Snake River would offset that mitigation deficiency. R. 
203-04. 
1 The "Surface Water Coalition," "Coalition" or "S WC" is comprised of A&B Irrigation District, American Falls 
Reservoir District #2, Burley Irrigation Districi, Milner Irrigation Distric~ Minidoka Irrigation District, North Side 
Canal Company and Twin Falls Canal Company. 
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In light of these stipulations, the only remaining issues, which was briefed for the Hearing 
Officer, was whether water right O 1-181 C could be used as mitigation for the new permit. Tbe Coa-
lition did not stipulate that water seeping in Jensen's Grove, which is diverted pursuant to water 
right O 1-181 C, constitutes "grotmdwater recharge" that can be used to mitigate a new water right. 
To the contrary, the Coalition asserted, and continues to maintain, that such water is incidental re-
charge in that it is incidental to the recreational storage beneficial use authorized under the water 
right. As confirmed by the City's representative testifying at hearing, the seepage supports and 
makes it possible for the City to use water right 01-18IC for recreational purposes. See generally 
Tr. 26-31 (Mayor Loomis testifying that water must be continually diverted to Jensen's Grove to 
maintain recreational water levels). 
B. Application for Permit No. 27-12261 
According to testimony at hearing, at some point during the I 960's, the City's growth re-
quired the relocation of the Miner's Ditch. An arrangement was made to remove the portion of the 
Miner's Ditch that interfered with the City's growth. Water that had historically been diverted 
through the Miner's Ditch was now pumped directly from the Blackfoot River by the City and in-
jected into the Miner's Ditch at a different location. See, generally Tr. at 9-11. From there, the wa-
ter was conveyed to the private water users - identified as "users of the Miner's Ditch east of Inter-
state 15 ... shareholders from the Corbett Slough Irrigation Company and shareholders from the 
Blackfoot Irrigation Company." Ex. 1; see also Id. at Att. #2 (providing list of water rights and 
identifying owners of those water rights). 
Since the above operation was instituted, sediment in the Blackfoot River has caused high 
operation and maintenance costs for the pump in the river. According to the City: 
Toe City of Blackfoot currently provides delivery of several surface water rights 
(hereinafter, ~Rights") through a pump in the Blackfoot River. . .. The Blackfuot 
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River is heavily laden with sediment and requires high maintenanee on the pump 
and delivery system. 
Id. As such, the City has determined that it will be more cost effective to divert groundwater. 
The City filed Application for Pennit No. 27-12261 on September 2, 2014, seeking to divert 
9. 71 cfs of groundwater for irrigation and conveyance loss. See Ex. 1, at 1.2 Ibrough the applica-
tion, 1he City seeks to effectively move its point of diversion from the river to a groundwater well, 
and from the groundwater well into the Miner's Ditch. See, generally Tr. at 9-11. With the excep-
tion of a small portion of water that will be left in the river for mitigation, the surface water rights 
currently diverted from the Blackfoot River would then be available for sale or lease by the owners 
of those water rights. 
C. Proposed Mitigation/fhe Jensen Grove Water Right (01-181q 
There is no dispute that diversions under application number 27-12261 will result in new 
consumptive uses of the aquifer and will require mitigation pursuant to Idaho law. To mitigate for 
the new consumptive uses associated with 1he application, the City proposed to use the seepage 
from Jensen's Grove presently oceurring as a result of the diversion and use of water right Ol-181C 
for other prn:poses (i.e. "recreational storage"). See, generally, Exs. 1 & 2. 1n essence, the "re-
charge" contemplated by the mitigation plan is incidental recharge alreadv occurring at Jensen 
Grove as part of a recreational storage water right(i.e. Ol-181C). Id. 
Water right Ol-181C includes a number of elements and conditions that are relevant to these 
proceedings. For example, the right authorizes "Recreational Storage" in the amount of 2,266.8 afa 
and a season of use identified as "01/01 to 12/31." Ex. 106. "Diversion to Storage," in the amount 
of 46 cfs, is authorized from "4/01 to 10/31." Id. When approved, it was recognized that the water 
2 The water diverted is not actually used by the City and the real property on which it is applied is not owned by the 
City. Rather, the City intends to pump the water into the Miner's Ditch so 1hat it may be delivered by other third 
pany private irrigation entities to real property o"ne<l by third party private water users. Tr. 2!-23. 
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right would have significant seepage losses resulting from the use of the right, and as a result the 
water right includes the follow condition under the "Quantity" element: 
The reservoir established by the storage of water under this right shcll not exceed 
a total capacity of 1100 aere feet or a total surface are of 73 acres. This right au-
thorizes additional storage in the amonnt of 186 AF A to make up losses from 
evaporation and 980.8 afa for seepage losses. 
Id. The water right also contains an irrigation purpose of use authorizing a diversion of 1 cfs and 
storage of 200 af for this purpose. Jd.3 
During his testimony at hearing, Mayor Loomis testified that Jensen's Grove is very leaky. 
See Tr. at 25-29. He testified that, but for consistent diversions into Jensen Grove, all of the water 
would seep and there would be no water in the Jensen's Grove pond for recreational purposes. Id. 
In its briefing here, the City again confirms that water right O 1-181 C was acquired "to fill and 
maintain water levels in Jensen's Grove." City Br. at 4(emphasis added). In other words, in order 
to enjoy the recreational storage water rights and maintain water levels, water must be regularly di-
verted into the pond. See also Ex. 102 ("The lake loses large amounts of water due to seepage into 
the ground, so a constant flow into the lake is needed to·maintain the lake level"). Water seeping 
from Jensen's Grove provides "a benefit to the flows in the Snake River and the Eastern Snake 
Plain Aquifer." Id. at 2; see also Id. ("The water provided for Jensen Grove Lake under this trans-
fer, should benefit the Snake Plain Aquifer and also benefit the flows of the Snake River below 
Blackfoot"). 
D. The Jensen's Grove Transfer & Settlement Agreement 
Water right O 1-181 C bas not always been used for recreational storage purposes in Jensen's 
Grove. Prior to 2005, the water was a relic irrigation water right located ·within the New Sv.'Cden 
3 No evidence was presented that the right has ever been used for irrigation purposes at Jensen Grove and there was testi-
mony that the right is not now being used for irrigation. 
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Irrigation District botmdaries. Ex. 100. On October 27, 2005, the City filed an application for 
transfer, seeking to move water right OJ-J8JC into Jensen's Grove. Id. As originally filed, the ap-
plication sought to use water right O 1-181 C for "Diversion to Recharge" and "Storage" - defined as 
including "Irrigation, Recreation, Fish & Wildlife, Aquifer Recharge & Aesthetics." Id. The appli-
cation further provided that the use would be ''systematically non-consumptive" and that "recharge 
simply moves surface storage to grotmdwater storage." Id. at 6. 
The Coalition protested the transfer application. In response, the City, again, confirmed that 
the use proposed by the transfer (i.e. storage in Jensen's Grove) would be "non-conswnptive." Ex. 
101 at 2 ("The change proposed in this transfer is non-consumptive"). 
The Department reviewed the application for transfer and, in a memo dated October 2, 
2006, made the following relevant conclusions: 
• "The lake loses large ammmts of water due to seepage into the grotmd, so a constant 
flow into the lake is needed to maintain the lake level. Water that flows into Jensen 
Grove Lake sinks and returns back to the Snake River and/or sinks into the aquifer." 
Ex. 102 at 1. 
• "Changing an inigation water right into a reereatiooal storage right will reduce the 
consumptive use and increase the grotmdwater recharge and improve Snake River 
flo,•1s." Id. 
• "The new use of this water right in Jensen Grove Lake will be for the most part non-
consumptive and a benefit to the flows in the Snake River and the Eastern Snake 
Plain Aquifer. The consumptive uses of this water right, after the transfer, would be 
the 50 acres ofinigationand some evaporation from the lake." Id. at 2. 
• "The water provided for Jensen Grove Lake under this transfer, should benefit the 
Snake Plain Aquifer and also benefit the !lows in the Snake River below Blackfoot." 
Id. 
The parties began negotiations to address the Coalition's protest. To that extent, an agree-
ment was reached between the Coalition and City to allow for the transfer's approval. The resulting 
"Settlement Agreement" provides: 
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Ex.4. 
I. Conditions to Water Right After Transfer: 
The City and NSID agree that the following terms and conditions be in-
cluded in the Water Right ("Conditions") after transfer: 
a. After approval of the pending Transfer, the CITY shall not, tempo-
rarily or permanently, thereafter transfer the Water Rights, or any portion 
thereof, without receiving the "wntten consent of the COALITION. 
b. Without the written consent of the COALIT!O~, the CITY agrees 
to hold the Water Right in perpetuity for diversion of water from the Snake 
River into storage at the Pond, for irrigation and recreation purposes, and to 
not transfer the Water Right or change the nature of use or place of use of the 
Water Right 
e. The CITY shall not lease, sell, transfer, grant or assign to any other 
person or entity any right to recover groundwater or mitigation for the diver-
sion of groundwater as a result of diversion under the Water Right including 
any incidental groundwater recharge that may occur as a result of such diver-
sion. Furthermore, the CITY shall not request or receive any such mitigation 
credit on behalf of any other person or entity. If the CITY proposes to utiliz.e 
the Water Right for groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes associated 
with existing or future groundwater rights, the CITY must file the appropri-
ate application for permit'!llld/or transfer. 
The initial draft of the proposed ll;!lnsfer order included "Groundwater Recharge" and 
"Groundwater Recha1ge Storage" as purposes of use. Ex. 103. The Coalition challenged the inclu-
sion of these purposes of use as being contrary to the settlement agreement - reinforcing, as the 
agreement required, that the City must obtain the Coalition's prior approval and file the necessary 
applications with the Department in order to seek "recharge" as a purpose of use. Ex. 8. In that let-
ter, the Coalition repeated its position on the issue of"recharge" at Jensen's Grove: 
The Agreement is specific about the transferred purpose of use (irrigation and 
recreation) and period of use (411 to 10/31). See Agreement, ff l.b, I.e. By 
agreement, the parties have stipulated to these elements which modifies the origi-
nal application for transfer filed by the City. Contrary to the Agreement, the draft 
approval includes "growid water recharge" and "ground water recharge storage" 
as new purposes of use for water right 1-181 C. These proposed uses should be 
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removed .... Further, under paragraph Le of the Agreement, only incidental re-
charge will be recognized and the City is required to file a new application if it 
desires to ehange the nature of use to "reeharge." Paragraph Lb of the Agree-
ment further requires the City to obtain approval from the Prote;,tants to change 
the narure of use of water under this right. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Although, at the time, the City asserted that the Coalition's request was "not consistent with 
our June agreement," Ex. 9, the Director's final transfer order removed any reference to "reeharge," 
Ex. 105. The City did not appeal the transfer order. Finally, water right Ol-18!C was subsequently 
decreed in the Snake River Basin Adjudication consistent v.ith the transfer order -without any ref-
erence to "recharge" as an authorized beneficial use. Ex. I 06. The partial decree represents a final 
judgment that, like the transfer order, v.:as not appealed by the City . 
. . STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Any party "aggrieved by '.Ile final order in a contested case decided by an agency may file a 
' 'I, 
petition for judicial review in the.district court." Sagewillow, Inc. v. !DWR, 138 Idaho 831, 835 
(2003). The Court reviews the matter "based on the record created before the agency." 
Chlsholm v. IDWR, 142 Idaho 159, 162 (2005). 
An agency's decision must be overturned ifit (a) violates "constitutional or statutory pro-
visions," (b) "exceeds the agency's statutory authority," (c) "was made upon unlawful proce-
dure," (d) "is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole," or (e) is "arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion." LC.§ 67-5279(3); Clear Springs Foods. Inc., 150 Idaho at 
796. 
ARGUMENT 
The Director rejected the City's application because the City had failed to file a transfer ap· 
plication to add "reeharge" and/or "mitigation" as an authorized use of water right O 1-181 C. R. 
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273. Absent any transfer to add these uses, the proposed mitigation failed. On appeal, the City as-
serts that the Director should not have rejected the application because the Settlement Agreement 
effectively added "recharge" as an authorized use of water right O 1-I 81 C. 
In order for the City to prevail on its appeal, it must convince this Court that a private agree-
ment, that does not include the Department of Water Resources, can change the elements of a water 
right such that the water right can be used for purposes other than those identified on the face of the 
partial decree. The City contends that the Settlement Agreement between the City and the Coali-
tion allow the City to use water right 0!-181C for "groW1dwater recharge'"' even though that use is 
not identified as an authorized use of the water right. The law does not support such a contention. 
Therefore, the Director's decision should be affirmed. 
I. The Law Requires that a Transfer be Filed to Change the Use of a Water Right. The 
City Must File a Transfer in Order to Use Water Right 01-181C as Mitigation For this 
New Consumptive,Use Groundwater Right. 
A. The Elements ofa Water Right Cannot Be Changed without A Transfer. 
Since the Settlement Agreement was reached, the Coalition has maintained that water 
seeping as a result of diversions under 01-181 is "incidental recharge" and that any reference to 
recharge "should be remo.ved" from the righl Ex. 8. The Coalition's assertions are important 
here, as this case involves the interpretation of the City's partial decree. 
A water right is defined by its elements. The elements of the water right specify the au-
thorized use of that water. See LC.§ 42-1411(2)(t); see also LC.§ 42-1412(6) ("The district 
court shall enter a partial decree determining the nature and extent of the water right which is the 
4 The City repeatedly, and incorrectly, refers to seepage from Jensen's Grove as "groundwater recharge"' as though 
the mere repetition of the phrase would make the statement true. See, e.g., City Br. at 18. However, testimony at 
bearing confumed the undisputed fact that water seeping in Jensen's Grove is incidental recharge. See also Ex. 8. 
Water must continlllllly be diverted into Jensen's Grove in order to maintain the level sufficient fur the desired recre-
ational activities. Supra. 
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subject of the objection or other matters which are the subject of the objection. The decree shall 
contain or incorporate a statement of each element of a water right as stated in subsections (2) 
and (3) of section 42-1411 "); LC. § 42-1420 (once entered, the decree is "conclusive as to the na-
ture and extent of all water rights in the adjudication"). Where water is diverted for multiple pur-
poses, the water right must identify all such uses. See Ex. 106 (identifying multiple authorized 
uses of water right 01-18 IC). For example, a water right with a use for "irrigation" cannot be 
used for "fish propagation" unless that use is also identified on the water right Similarly, with-
out additional acknowledgement on the water right, a water right with a purpose of use identified 
as "recreation storage," such as water right O 1-181 C, cannot be used for "mitigation" or "ground-
water recharge." These uses are not the same. See l.C. § 42-234 (identifying groundwater re-
charge as a beneficial use). The water right identifies the uses for which it may be used and the 
law prohibits a water user from unilaterally changing those uses. 
Importantly,-the City knows that groundwater recharge is a separate and distinct use from " 
the uses identified on water right 01-181C. See City Br. at 28 (recognizing that mitigation is not 
one of the "listed elements of the water right"). Indeed, when filing the transfer of water right 
01-181C, the City specifically identified "recharge" as a separate and distinct use of the water 
right. Ex. 100. When the Department initially included "groundwater recharge" on the draft 
transfer approval order, Ex. 103, the Coalition challenged that decision explaining that any refer-
ence to "recharge" "should be removed" because the Settlement Agreement only recognized "in-
cidental recharge." Ex. 8. In the final transfer order, all reference to "recharge" use was re-
moved from the water right. Ex. 105; see also Ex. 106 (SRBA Decree). The City never ap-
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pealed the agency's final decision or the subsequent SRBA Partial Decree. Accordingly, the ele-
ments are established and cannot now be collaterally attacked by the City. Tr. 44-45 (Former 
Mayor Reese testifying that the uses for the water right are recreation storage and irrigation). 
Any water user seeking to change the purpose of use of a water right must "make applica-
tion to the department of water resources:" 
Any person, entitled to the use of water whether represented by license issued 
by the department of water resources, by claims to water rights by reason of 
diversion and application to a beneficial use as filed under the provisions of 
this chapter, or by decree of the court, who shall desire to change the point of 
diversion, place of use, period of use or nature of use of all or part of the wa-
ter, ,mder the right shall first make application to the department of water re-
sou,•ces for approval of such change. 
LC. § 42-222 (emphasis added). 
To assist with the transfer process, the Department has issued "Administrator's Memoran-
dum, Transfer Process No. 24."5 That memo explains when a transfer is required, as follows: 
Section 42-222, Idaho Code, requires the holder of a water right to obtain ap-
proval from the department prior to changing: (I) the point of diversion, (2) the: 
.place of use, (3) the period of use, or (4) the nature of use of an established wa:,,,, 
ter right. An established water right is a licensed right, a decreed right, or a 
right established by diversion and beneficial use for which a claim in an adju- ' , 
dication or a statutory claim has been filed. Approval is sought by filing an ap-
plication for transfer with the department. 
Changes to Elements of a Water Right. An application for transfer is required 
if a proposed change would alter any of the four elements of the water right 
listed above that can be changed pursuant to Section 42-222, Idaho Code, as 
recorded with the department or by decree. 
Transfer Memo at 2-3.6 
'See http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/WaterManagement/WaterRights/PDFs/ESPA Transfer Memo.pdf. 
6 The Transfer Memo does provide a brief list of actions that do not require a transfer. Id. at 3-5 (listing change in 
ownership, split rights, replacement of point of diversion, refined descriptions, generally described place of use, mu-
nicipal places of use, instream stock watering and intensified use of water). However, none of these actions apply to 
these proceedings and the City does not claim that any apply here. 
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Both the transfer decision and SRBA decree include a section identifying the "Purpose and 
Period of Use" for water right Ol-181C. Exs. 105 & 106. There is no dispute that neither iden-
tify "groundwater recharge" or "mitigation" as authorized purposes of use for the water right. Id. 
Given the lack of any such authorized use on the face of the water right, the City is forced 
to point to a private settlement agreement to justify its assertion that recharge is authorized under 
water right OJ-I81C. The City asserts that the law requiring a transfer does not apply because of 
the Settlement Agreement. City Br. at 17-25. It contends that the private agreement, between 
two private parties, that does not include the Department, has the effect of altering the uses au-
thorized under the water right. Id. The City even asserts that the Coalition and City could 
"properly amend the Settlement Agreement to allow OJ-181C to be applied to mitigate a third 
partxls·water right" and that such an amendment would "settle the issue" - even with:eut the De-
partment's involvement. Id. at 16. 
-Rather than provide legal support for this novel theory, 1he City spends much of its brief 
analyzing whether a condition on a v11ater right that references the Settlement Agreement is valid 
and enforceable. City Br. at 12-17. Claiming that this case is more "nuanced" than ·other water 
righHssues, the City compares the matter to a divorce decree with a merged settlement agree-
ment and concludes that reference to the Settlement Agreement on water right OJ-181C is suffi-
cient to alter the elements stated on the face of the water right decree. Id. 
Even though the condition on the water right references the Settlement Agreement, it does 
not mean that the Settlement Agreement is binding on, or will be enforced by, the non-Party De-
partment. This is made clear from the law on divorce decrees cited by the City. In Davidson v. 
Soelberg, I 54 Idaho 227 (Ct. App. 2013), the Court recognized that the merger of any agreement 
is based on the language of that merger. There, the stipulated decree provided that it "merged 
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and incorporated [the settlement agreement] into this decree of divorce, exeept for Paragraph L 
which is not merged and shall remain a separate contract between the parties." Id. at 231. Since 
Paragraph L was not merged, it was a matter of contract between the parties and not part of the 
divorce decree. Id. Therefore, the statutes providing for the enforcement of a child support pro-
vision in a divoree decree did not apply. Id. 
In this case, the Department is not a party to the Settlement Agreement. As such, the 
agreement is only referenced in a condition on the water right. Importantly, the condition refer-
encing the Settlement Agreement provides that it is only "enforceable by the parties thereto." 
Ex. I 06. In other words, the Department is not a party to the Settlement Agreement and does not 
enforce the terms of that agreement. 
The City's arguments miss the point. There is no dispute that the condition is valid and en-
·/ forceable, that the Coalition and City are bound by the terms of the Settlement Agreement or that 
, ,-the Settlement Agreement provides "additional conditions and limitations" regarding the "diver-
i:tsion and usett of water right 01-1 &IC. Ex. 106. Further, the partial decree is .. binding on the 
··tState, City and the Coalition. I.C. §42-1420. The fact that the condition is binding, however, 
•:<foes not mean that the private Settlement Agreement alters the authorized uses-of water right 01-
181 C and does not somehow force the Director to recognize incidental recharge as mitigation for 
a new groundwater right. This is particular true, here, where "recharge" was included on both 
the application for transfer and draft approval, but was removed upon agreement between the 
Coalition and City. Supra. Indeed, Mayor Reese, the Mayor at the time the City entered into the 
agreement with the Coalition, confirmed that v,1ater right O l -181 C is used for "irrigation and rec-
reation purposes" and that written consent from the Coalition would be required "if you want to 
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change that." Tr. at 44-45. The City cannot now shoehorn a changed use for water right Ol-
181C through an erroneous reading of the Settlement Agreement. 
The City asserts that the Director "discarded" and "arbitrarily ignore[ d]" an element of wa-
ter right 0I-181C because he refused to consider the Settlement Agreement. City Br. at 16. 
Given the clarity of the law, however, even if the Director had thoroughly analyzed the Settle-
ment Agreement, the result would have been the same. The law provides only one mechanism 
for changing the purpose of use of a water right- a transfer under LC.§ 42-222.7 Any water 
user desiring to change the authorized uses of a water right must submit an appropriate applica-
tion to the Department asking to ''transfer" or change the elements of that right. There is nothing 
in this Settlement Agreement, which is only "enforceable by the parties thereto," that accom-
plishes any change in the use of water right 0I-181C. The City has not filed any transfer appli-
cation - and continues to refuse such a filing. Since the private Settlement Agreement cannot 
. .•. · legally change the authorized uses of a water right, the Director was.torrectto conclude that "the 
., Settlement Agreement does not in any way affect the Director's decision in this matter. The de-
•·;· cision can be made using principles ofldaho water law without referring to the Settlement 
Agreement." R. 272.8 
The Director properly rejected the City's attempt to change the purpose of use of water 
right 01-181C from what is presently authorized. See also R. 215, ,r 9 (The Hearing Officer also 
7 A transfer may result in a permanent change to an element of a water right, or it may result in a temporary change 
- such as through the Idaho State Water Supply Bank. 
'Confusingly, the City asserts that the Director ~made this decision on his own, not based on a position taken by the 
Coalition." Ciry Br. at 19-20. This assertion is wrong. See R. 256-59 (Coalition response to City's exceptions brief 
asserting that a transfer must be filed and that the Settlement Agreement canno~ by itself, represent a change in the 
decreed elements of a water right). That notwithstanding, the City's assertion has no bearing on the validity of the 
Director's decision. See I.C. § 67-5245(7) ("The head of the agency or his designee for the review of preliminary 
orders shall exercise all of the decision-making power that he would have had if the agency head had presided over 
the hearing"). 
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rejected the City's attempt to change the prupose of use of the water right without a transfer ap-
plication). These final orders are supported by Idaho Law and should be affinned on appeal. 
8. The City Cannot Use the Settlement Agreement to Circumvent the Law. Fur-
ther, the City Must Obtain the Coalition's Written Consent Prior to Changing 
the Nature of Use of Water Right Ol-181C. 
The City argues that it is not required to follow the law and file a transfer application be-
cause the Settlement Agreement states that the City may file "the appropriate application for per-
mit and/or transfer." City Br. at 18-23; see Id. at 20 ("Because 27-12261 is an application for 
permit, and not a transfer application, the provisions of Paragraph I .a. and l .b do not require 
written consent from the Coalition"). Again, this contorted reading oftbe Settlement Agreement 
fails. 
The City demands that the Director engage in contractual interpretation. City Br. at I 9-
21. In doing so. it points the Court to the follov.-ing language from the Settlement Agreement: 
If the CITY proposes to utilize the Water Right for groandwater recharge or miti-
gation purposes associated with existing or future groWJdwater rights, the CITY 
must file the appropriate application fur permit and/or transfer.9 
Ex. 4. The City asserts that the application for permit is sufficient to authorize groundwater re-
charge WJder O 1-181 C. The City further claims that this language "specifically states that the 
City ean use the mitigation credits as long as it submits the appropriate application for pennit 
and/or transfer." City Br. at 22. 
The Agreement's language speaks for itself. However, under even the most strained 
reading, there is no "specific" statement about the City's use of mitigation credits. Quite the op-
' There is no dispute that the Settlement Agreement prohibits the City from attempting to obtain any "right ID re-
cover groundwater or mitigationn for any third party. Ex. 4. The only issue here is whether the last provision of 
section I .e, quoted above, automatically authorized the City to claim credits for the incidental recharge in Jensen 
Grove. 
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posite. See Ex. 8 (under the Settlement Agreement "only incidental recharge will be recog-
nized"). The language mandates that the City file an "appropriate application." Ex. I 04. Such 
an application - whether that be an application for permit or transfer - would then be reviewed 
by the Director and open for protest. LC. §§ 42-203A & 42-222. Such an application could then 
be approved, approved with conditions/limitations, or denied by IDWR. Id. The City is mis-
taken in its belief that the above language somehow guarantees that water right O 1-18 JC could 
be used for groundwater recharge merely as a result of a single sentence from the Settlement 
Agreement. 10 
Further, even if the Coalition and City attempted to "specifically" authorize groundwater 
recharge through the Settlement Agreement, such an attempt would be contrary to the law requir-
ing a transfer- thus causing the Settlement AgreementtoSail. AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs., LLC, 155 
Idaho 159, 167 (2013) ("a contract [that] cannot be perfoi:med without violating applicable law is 
illegal and void"}. 
Although it quotes the language of the relevant provisions of the Settlement Agreement, 
the City's arguments overlook vital aspects of the Agreement. Indeed, in all of its arguments, the 
City completely skips over the requirement that it must file an "appropriate" application with the 
Department. Supra. As discussed above, supra, Part LA; the QJJI...Y mechanism in Idaho for 
changing an element of a v,'lller right - i.e. the only "appropriate" filing in this matter is an ap· 
10 Through the trllnsfer of water right 01-l&IC, the City sought groundwater recharge as a purpose of use. Ex. 6. 
That use was challenged by the Coalition and, tbrough the Settlement Agreement, was removed from the water 
right. Exs. 4, 6, 8, 9, I 03 & J 05. The resulting water right, which has been partially decTeed, Ex. l 06. authorizes 
recreational storage as a beneficial use - it does not authorize groundwater recharge or mitigation as a beneficial use. 
Although the water right identifies a volume of storage in Jensen's Grove as well as a volume of water for seepage, 
Ex. 106, it does not provide that that seepa,,oe is "groundwater recharge" or "mitigation." 
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plication for transfer. Neither a private settlement agreement - particularly one that is only "en-
forceable by the parties thereto," Ex. 106 - nor a separate application for permit can alter lhe ele-
ments of water right Ol-181C. 
Further, and importantly, the City refuses to recognize that it must obtain the C-Oalition's 
written consent prior to changing the use of water right O 1-181 C.'1 The City points to Para-
graphs La and Lb of the Settlement Agreement- even quoting them in their entirety in its brief 
- and concludes that, since this is an application for permit and not a transfer application, "there 
is no legal limitation under these provision that would prohibit the City from pursuing 27-12261 
without obtaining written consent from the Coalition." Ciry Br. at 20. This argument fails for at 
least two reasons. First, there is no argument that tl:e City must obtain written permission to pur-
sue 27-12261. The Court should not be confused:,by the City's effort to cloud this matter by con-
flating two separate issues. The Settlement Agreement mandates ·written approval for any effort 
to change the use of water right Ol-!81C. It does0not speak, in any respect, to the City's Appli-
cation for Permit 27-12261. To the extent the City seeks to use 01-181 C to mitigate 27-12261, 
lhe Coalition's written permission is required. However, that permission is required due to the 
necessary changes to water right Ol-181C- not due to the City's efforts in "pursuing 27-12261." 
Second, although it repeatedly points the Court to Paragraph 1. b, the City misstates the 
obligations of the provision. In particular, that provision requires written consent from the Coali-
tion whenever the City seeks to "transfer the Water rights f!: change the nature of use or place 
of use of the Water Right." Ex. l at ,i 1.b (emphasis added). 12 
'1 The City complains that any such attempt would be futile because the Coalition will consent and further hearings 
would be required and that, as a result, lhe City will be held" hostage indefmitely." City Br. at 28 & 30-3 l. Be-
cause no such application has been provided to ihe Coalition for review and/or approval, there is no basis to assume 
that tbe Coalition will withhold its consent to that unidentified transfer. 
12 Confusingly, even though the City quotes the entire language of Paragraph I .b, City Br. at 18, it fails to 
acknowledge this important provision. This is likely because the City recognizes the provision is fatal to its argu-
ments. 
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Confusingly, although the City argues that written consent is required to add "mitigation" 
or "groundwater recharge" as a use for water right Ol-181C, it admits that written consent would 
be required if the City were to seek to change the use back to "solely an irrigation right." Id. at 
28, n.4. Nothing in Paragraph l.b allows for this types of a dual standard. Rather, the obligation 
to obtain written consent applies to any attempt to alter, in any way, the decreed uses of water 
right O 1-181 C - such as here, where the City seeks to alter the uses from "recreational storage" 
and "irrigation" to include "mitigation" or "recharge." Supra Part I.A. 
In the end. the City's argument that the Settlement Agreement authorize the use of water 
right 0!-181C as mitigation for a new groundwater right cannot stand. There is absolutely no ba-
sis to contend that the Coalition would protest the original transfer of0I-l81C in order to re-
move any reference to "recharge," challenge the insertion of"recharge" as an authorized use on 
the draft transfer order, and, at the same rtme, enter into a Settlement Agreement automatically 
reinserting that use back on the water right; · 
The City's failure to read the entire language of the Settlement Agreement presents mis-
leading and confusing arguments to the Court. For example, the City contends that "if the parties 
intended the Settlement Agreement to require the Coalition's consent in all cases where 01-181C 
is proposed as mitigation, the contract would have simply stated" such a requirement. City Br. at 
23. Yet, that is exactly what the Settlement Agreement states when it requires that the City ob-
tain the Coalition's written consent whenever it seeks to "transfer the Water rights or change the 
nature of use or place of use'' of water right 01-181 C. Ex. 104. 
In this case, there is no dispute that the City is attempting to use the ,11ater for a purpose 
not listed on the face of the partial decree. Ex. 105 & 106; see also Tr. at 44-45 (Mayor Reese 
testifying that the water rights are used for ''irrigation" and "recreation"). 
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The obligation to obtain written approval was important to the Coalition. Indeed, the Co-
alition was concerned that the City would attempt to use the incidental recharge from Jensen's 
Grove for mitigation purposes. The Coalition fought to have the "recharge" uses removed from 
the transfer approval. Exs. 4 & 8. When the Department originally placed "recharge" as an au-
thorized use on the draft transfer order, the Coalition challenged the inclusion. demanding that 
the use '"should be removed" and that the Settlement Agreement only recognized "incidental re-
charge." Ex. 8. 
The Coalition further sought to protect itself should the City ever attempt to add the use 
back onto the water right by requiring written eonsent prior to any such attempted change. Ex. 4. 
The City cannot circumvent that agreement by filing an application for permit rather than a trans-
fer. 
C. It is Not the Department's Fault that the City Failed to File a Transfer Applica-
tion. 
As it did in the administrative proceedings, the City again blames the Department for the 
City's failure to file the appropriate application. City Br. at 27 ("It is important to note on this point 
that the Department did not state or advise the City at the time it submitted its application and re-
vised applications-with which the Department assisted-that the City had to file a transfer ofOl-
181 C before it could be used for mitigation purposes"). The City complains that "the Department 
should have informed the City before proceeding to a hearing" that a transfer would be required. 
City Br. at 28. 
The law is clear - a transfer is required to change the purpose of use on any water right. It is 
not the Department's job to advise the City as to its compliance with Idaho law. The City cannot 
blame IDWR for its own failures in this case. 
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II. The Coalition is l'fot Bound by any Decision in This Case. 
It is unfortunate that the City chose not to file a transfer application in association with 
this application for permit. There are several related issues that could have been addressed in 
conjunction with both proceedings and this matter may have been resolved without having to re-
sort to judicial action. However, in an effort to avoid seeking the Coalition's wntten consent, the 
City proceeded without a transfer application. 
Now, the City complains that, if a transfer is filed, and the Coalition decides to protest 
that transfer, the Coalition ,,hould be limited in its arguments in the proceedings for application 
for permit 27-12261. Citing to the legal principles ofresjudicata, the City asserts that the Coali-
tion cannot have a second opportunity to challenge the City's actions. City Br. at 30-32. Since 
no transfer has been filed llf!d.it is not known what issues will be presented in such a transfer, the 
City's arguments are not ripei Noh v. Cenarrusa, 131 Idaho 798 (2002) ("The traditional ripe-
ness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff to prove 1) that the case presents definite and con-
crete issues, 2) that a real and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need 
for adjudication"). 
Furthermore, the arguments are erroneous. The question before the Department in this 
case involved the City's application 27-12261 - it did not involve any issues relating to a transfer 
of water right Ol-181C. The Coalition stipulated that the modeling showed that water put in Jen-
sen's Grove could mitigate for the new consumptive uses under water right 27-12261. The re· 
maining question, therefore, was whether incidental recharge under water right 01-181 C could be 
used to provide that mitigation. The Director correctly determined that that question could not 
be answered absent an application to transfer the water right to add recharge or mitigation as an 
authorized purpose of use. Since no transfer application was filed, the issue of potential injury 
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associated ,vi.th transferring water right O 1-181 C to allow for the addition of "groundwater re-
charge" or "mitigation" as a purpose of use, was not before the Hearing Officer and has not been 
addressed. 
A transfer proceeding is separate and distinct from an application for permit. Whereas a 
transfer proceeding speaks to changes to an existing water right, an application for permit ad-
dresses proposals for new diversions. The cases are not the same. As such, the City's attempt to 
rely on proceedings relative to water right 27-12261 as a bar against the Coalition asserting any 
injury in a future tra'lSfer proceeding for water right 01-181 C must fail. See City Br. at 30-32 
(asserting that the Coalition is barred from "subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted 
[ and] also subsequ,mt rditigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were 
actually made or which might have been made"). This is particularly the case where, as the 
Hearing Officer recognized, there are several issues relating to the transfer of water right 01-
181 C that were not addressed in these proceedings. R. 209, , 19 ("The parties have not had an 
opportunity to presentievidence on the historical consumptive use of water right OI-I81C. The 
question of historical consumptive use, non-consumptive use and incidental recharge are best ad-
dressed within an application for trd.llSfer"). 
If any party is barred by res judicata, it is the City. As stated above, the original transfer 
application for water right 01-181 C sought to include "groundwater recharge" as a permitted use. 
Ex. 100. The Coalition protested that use. When the draft transfer order was issued and identi-
fied "recharge" as an authorized use, Ex. 103, the Coalition challenged the inclusion of that use 
as contrary to the Settlement Agreement. Ex. 8. Although the City disagreed with the Coali-
tion's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement at that time, Ex. 9, it did not challenge the final 
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transfer order removing all references to "recharge" from the face of the decree. Ex. 105. The 
City is therefore bound by the final agency decision on the transfer. 
Moreover, the Coalition's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement at the time of the 
transfer was crystal clear. Ex. 8. The Department apparently agreed with the Coalition and re-
moved the "recharge" use without further discussion in the record. Had the City believed that to 
be in error, it was required to challenge the decision at that time. LC. § 42-222(5) ("any person 
or persons feeling themselves aggrieved by the determination of the department" may seek judi-
cial review). The City's failure to challenge the decision bars its current attempt to construe wa-
ter right 01-!81C as authorizing any "recharge" or "mitigation." lfthe City truly believed that 
such uses W'!re ai,thorized under Ol-l 8JC, it should have challenged the transfer order as re-
quired by Idail()CJaw. See Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94 (2002) (res judicata bars reliti• 
gation of issues;-that should have been raised in prior proceedings). 
III. Incidental Recharge from a Water Right Cannot be Used to Mitigate New Consumptive· 
Uses. 
On April 30, 1993, the Director entered the Amended Moratorium Order, which prohibits 
l. 
processing any applications for new consumptive uses within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer with-
• i .• 
• , ' 1 
out sufficient mitigation to offset the impacts of the new consumptive uses. 13 One way that water 
users may mitigate for their new consumptive uses is through recharge. See I.C. § 42-234(2) (re-
charge is a beneficial use). However, the use of recharge for mitigation of a new ·water right has 
been specifically limited by the Legislature. Indeed, the Legislature has determined that the use of 
"incidental recharge" to mitigate for "separate or expanded water rights" is prohibited; 
(5) The legislature further recognizes that incidental groundwater recharge bene-
fits are often obtained from the diversion and use of water for various beneficial 
purposes. HITWt!l'er, such incidental recharge may not be used as the basis for 
claim of a separate or expanded water right. Incidental recharge of aquifers 
13 http://idwr.idaho.gov/file51}~gaVorders/l9930430 Moratoriwn ESA.pdt: 
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which occurs as a result of water diversion and use that does not exceed the 
vested water right of water right holders is in the public interest The values of 
such incidental recharge shall be considered in the management of the state's wa-
ter resources. 
J.C. § 42-234(5). 
The issue of using incidental recharge was also addressed by the SRBA in subcases con-
cerning ,vater rights claims filed by the Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Company ("ASCC"). See 
Memorandum Decision & Order on Challenge, SRBA Subcase Nos. Ol-23B, et al. (Apr. 4, 2011 ). 
There, the Department recommended ASCC' s irrigation water rights with a purpose of use identi-
fied as "Recharge for Irrigation." Id. at 2. The "Recharge for Irrigation" recommendation was 
based on the Department's determination that the ASCC system was exiremely leaky. Id. As water 
was diverted for irrigation purposes. it leaked through the ASCC canal system,and into the aquifer. 
Id. 
'The Presiding Judge, in reversing an order granting summary judgment in favor of ASCC, 
provided valuable guidance for determining whether "recharge" may be considered an authori7,ed 
use under an existing water right. For example, ASCC claimed that the water seeping through its 
system should be characterized as "recharge" through an accomplished transfer theory. See LC.§ 
45-1425. The SRBA Court rejected this theory: 
An assumption that water was diverted for recharge is countered by common 
practices of carriage or head which is required to operate the delivery system. 
This is required whether or not all shareholders are diverted the surface water and 
applying it to their lands. In fact, Idaho Code § 42-120 l requires that a water de-
livery entity keep its system charged. Thus, one inference that can reasonably 
be drawn from the facts is that the claimed recharge resulting from the use of 
the Ol-23B right is incidental recharge associated with ASCC's delivery prac-
tices. 
ASCC Order. at 24 ( emphasis added); see also Id. at 25 ("These facts do not show whether ASCC 
was purposefully engaged in recharging the groundwater for use by its shareholders or whether the 
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recharge was merely incidental to its overall delivery operation"). 
In this case, the fucts are clear- any water seeping into the ground in Jensen's Grove, under 
water right 01-18 JC is incidental recharge i.e. it is "merely incidental" to the reereational storage 
beneficial use of the water right. The testimony and record clearly shows that Jensen's Grove is a 
leaky lake feature and that water must constantly be diverted into the lake in order to enjoy recrea-
tional uses under water right O 1-181 C. The Department stated that the "lake loses large amounts of 
water due to seepage into the ground, so a constant flow into the lake is needed to maintain the lake 
level." Ex. I 02 at 1. Even the water right itself provides 980 aere-feet for seepage losses. Ex. J 06. 
The City's ~yor confirmed that water must be continually diverted into Jensen's Grove in order to 
maintain the water levels and use the water for recreational purposes. Tr. 27-31 (Mayor Loomis 
Testimony). Since the City cannot enjoy the benefits of its water right unless it regularly diverts 
· , water into the lake, the resulting seepage is incidental recharge and cannot be.used for a "separate or 
expanded water right." Stated another way, but for the losses under the water right, the authorized 
beneficial uses of the water right could not be supported. Just like an irrigation right that must in-
clude conveyance losses to deliver water to a shareholder's headgate, so too are the losses associ-
ated with the City's water right at Jensen's Grove. 
'Ibe City argues that the seepage cannot be considered "incidental recharge" because the 
Settlement Agreement "is a condition of O 1-181 C and it allowed the City to claim the groundwater 
recharge benefits occurring under01-181C." City Br. at 29. It further claims that, since the water 
right identifies a specific portion of the volume diverted as seepage, there is some "express" recog-
nition that the right may be used for recharge and/or mitigation. Id. These arguments do nothing 
but further illuminate the City's misunderstanding of the law regarding the use of water rights and 
the nature of incidental recharge. 
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The law, as discussed above, is clear. The only w-ay to change the use of a water right is 
through a transfer process-not a private settlement agreement. The fact that the private settlement 
agreement is referenced in a condition on the water right does not alter that law. Recharge is a stat-
utorily recognized beneficial use of water in Idaho. I.C. § 42-234(2). Any authorized uses of water 
must be identified on the water right. I.C. §§ 42-1411(2)(1) & 42-1412(6). In this case, it is undis-
puted that recharge is not identified as a use on the face of the partial decree. The law does not al-
low the City to simply alter the authorized use of water right Ol-l 81C based on one sentence con-
tained in a private settlement agreement that is only referenced in the decree and that is only en-
forceable between the parties to that agreement. 
The City contends that the Department's identification of a specific volume of water needed 
to maintain the levels in Jensen's Grove, somehow, transmutes the use of that water from "inci-
dental" to "express" recharge; ,City Br. at 29. This argument lumbers under the same legal errors 
identified above. Further, water rights generally include -whether expressly identified or not · an ····'··· · 
amount necessary tn allow the water user to enjoy the use of the water. For example, the ASCC irri· ! 
gation rights discussed above, include a sufficient quantity to divert water from the river to the head-
gate - i.e. the "carriage" water. Supra. Tbis is a common practice under Idaho water law. In this 
instance, however, the same carriage water has been identified with a volume. Ex. I 06. Im-
portantly, while water right O 1-181 C references a volume for "seepage losses," it does not iderrtify 
those losses as anything other than incidental recharge. The Jaw does not allow the Department-· or 
this Court - to "read between the Jines," as the City demands, and presume a use that is not identi-
fied on the decree. It is the State's recognition that some water rights require a greater diversion at 
the river to compensate for seepage that the Legislature enacted the limitations in seetion 42-234(5). 
The City's attempt to circumvent the law should be rejected. 
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CONCLUSION 
Any change to the purpose or nature of use of a water right can only be accomplished 
through the transfer process. Yet, the City failed to file any such a transfer. The Director's order 
requiring a transfer of water right O 1-181 C, therefore, should be upheld. 
Furthermore, nothing in the Settlement Agreement guarantees that the City will be able to 
use water right Ol-181C for mitigation or groundwater recharge. Such uses were specifically pro-
tested and removed in the prior transfer proceedings. 
Accordingly, the Director's Final Order should be affirmed. 
DATED this 11m day ofFebruary, 2016. 
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Petitioner, the City of Blackfoot, hereby submits Petitioner's Reply Brief1 This brief 
responds to briefs filed by the Director and Department ( collectively, "Respondents"), as well as 
the Coalition, and is filed pursuant to this Court's Procedural Order of October 27, 2015; 
1.R.C.P. 84(p); I.AR. 35; and I.A.R. 36. 
This Court should approve the issuance of a permit for 27-12261, because the 
uncontroverted facts show that a substantial amount of water seeps from Jensen's Grove into the 
ESPA and the City is not required to obtain the Coalition's approval before claiming credit for 
the mitigation provided by that seepage through an application for water right permit. By 
disregarding the Settlement Agreement, which was incorporated as an element of Ol-181C, and 
refusing to acknowledge the mitigation occurring at Jensen's Grove, the Director ruled 
incorrectly in this case, in violation of statutory provisions; in excess of the statutory authority of 
the Department; without support of substantial evidence; and arbitrarily, capriciously, and as an 
abuse of discretion-which has prejudiced the City's substantial rights. By ignoring the 
Settlement Agreement, Respondents have failed to consider all of the elements of 01-181 C and, 
with only that incomplete picture, have erred. 
I. THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF WATER RIGHT NO. 01-181C. 
This case demands the consideration and interpretation of O 1-181 C in order to determine 
whether the City retained the ability to apply the admitted reality of the situation-that more than 
2,000 acre-feet of water annually re-enters the ESPA through Jensen's Grove-as mitigation for 
27-12261. 
Unless otherwise noted herein, all defined terms are used as defined in Petitioner's Opening Brief 
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A. There is no difference between conditions and elements contained in a water right. 
All water right elements and conditions are limitations on how a right to divert water is 
exercised. These limitations are in place to protect other water right holders from injury. Use of 
water outside of the limitations set forth in a water right works to the detriment of other water 
users, and such detriment is often called "enlargement" or "injury." See, e.g, Barron v. Idaho 
Dep 't of Water Res., 135 Idaho 414, 18 P.3d 219 (2001). "[T]here is per se injury to junior water 
rights holders anytime an enlargement receives priority." City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 
830, 835, 275 P.3d 845, 851 (2012) (quoting A&B Irrigation Dist. v. Aberdeen-American Falls 
Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753, 118 P.3d 78, 85 (2005)). 
Every water right is made up of elements that determine its nature and extent. The 
"nature and extent" of a water right is defined by its elements and often such elements are 
determined in the context of a water rights adjudication, such as the SRBA. See Idaho Code §§ 
42-1420, 42-1411(2). "[A] decree entered in a general adjudication such as the SRBA is 
conclusive as to the nature and extent of the water right." Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water 
Res., 2016 Opinion No. 21, at *8 (February 29, 2016) (quoting favorably from the underlying 
administrative decision by the Director ofID\\'R) (hereinafter cited to as Rangen). 
01-181 C received a partial decree in the SRBA determining and confirming the nature 
and extent of the water right by defming its elements. R. at 92-93. Idaho's adjudication statutes 
describe what the elements of a water right are. Each partial decree must include "each eleme11t 
of a water right as stated in subsections (2) and (3) of section 42-1411, Idaho Code, as 
applicable." Idaho Code § 42-1412(6) (emphasis added). 1n turn, Idaho Code § 42-1411(2) 
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explicitly provides that "[f]he [D]:irector shall determine the following elements," which are then 
listed, including: 
(i) conditions on the exercise of any water right included in any decree, 
license, or approved transfer application; and 
G) such remarks and other matters as are necessary for definition of the 
right, for clarification of any element of the right, or for administration 
of the right by the [D]irector. 
Idaho Code§ 42-1411(2) (emphasis added). 
The items outlined in Idaho Code§ 42-1411(2)(i) and G)-<:onditions and remarks-are 
elements of a water right defined by statute. Not surprisingly, case law is in accord with these 
statutory provisions. After quoting the entirety of Idaho Code § 42-1411(2), the Idaho Supreme 
Court has determined that "[t]he elements listed describe the basic elements of a water right .. 
. " City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 839, 275 P.3d 845, 850, 855 (2012) (internal 
citation omitted). Accordingly, the conditions incorporated into the partial decree of0I-181C-
including reference to the "terms and eonditions" of the Settlement Agreement-are elements of 
01-18IC. 
The two recent Idaho Supreme Court cases of City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 
275 P.3d 845 (2012) and Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 2016 Opinion Ko. 21 
(February 29, 2016) demonstrate the importance of recognizing all elements of a water right. 
In Pocatello, the City appealed the SRBA Court's holding on a number of items, 
including the SRBA's inclusion of the follo,wi.ng condition: "To the extent necessary for 
administration between points of diversion for gronnd water, and between points of diversion for 
gronnd water and hydraulically connected surface sources, ground water was first diverted under 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 3 
000170
this right from Pocatello well [description] in the amount of_ cfs." City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 
152 Idaho 830, 834, 275 P.3d 845, 849 (2012). The condition was included in IDWR's 
recommendation to the SRBA Court because IDWR "asserted that the condition was necessary 
to avoid injury to other water rights and to assist in the administration of water rights in times of 
shortage." Id. at 835, 275 P.3d at 850 (emphasis added). Conditions, or limitations on a water 
right, avoid many types of injury, including injury that has nothing to do with physical 
interference of water delivery. On this topic, the Idaho Supreme Court favorably quoted the 
SRBA Court regarding the possible scope of injury: 
Specifically, injury to an existing water right is not limited to the 
circumstance where immediate physical interference occurs between water 
rights as of the date of the change. Injury also includes the diminished 
effect on the priority dates of existing water rights in anticipation of there 
being insufficient water to satisfy all rights on a source ( or in this case a 
discrete region of the aquifer) and priority administration is sought. Even 
though the priority administration may occur at some point in the future, 
injury to the priority date occurs at the time the accomplished transfer is 
approved. 
Id. Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the condition Pocatello objected to must 
be enforced like other elements of a water right, because they serve the dual purposes of 
"avoid[ing] injury to other water rights and to assist in the administration of water rights in times 
of shortage." Id at 835,275 P.3d at 850. 
In the Rangen case just decided on February 29, 2016, Rangen first argued on appeal that 
the Director erred in interpreting its partially decreed water rights referencing the "Martin-Curren 
Tunnel" and referring to a 10-acre tract as its authorized point of diversion. Specifically, Rangen 
argued the following: 
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Rangen contends that the Director erred in interpreting its partial decrees. 
It argues that the source element in its partial decrees is ambiguous and 
that in the relevant context 'Martin-Curren Tunnel' refers to the entire 
spring complex comprised of Curren Tunnel plus the other springs 
scattered across the canyon wall. Additionally, Rangen argues that it 
should be entitled to divert water via the Bridge Diversion because the 
dam is "part of a diversion structure that lies partially v.ithin the [ decreed] 
ten acre tract.' 
Rangen at *8 (brackets in original). In other words, Rangen argued for administration of its rights 
based on something other than what was contained in the plain language of its partially decreed water 
rights. In the underlying administrative proceeding, the Director determined that ''[a]dministration 
must comport with the unambiguous terms of the SRBA decrees." Id. at *10 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Director determined that "[b ]ecause the SRBA decrees identify the 
source of the water as the Curren Tunnel, Rangen is limited to only that water discharging from 
the Curren Tunnel. Because the SRBA decrees list the point of diversion as SES WNW Sec. 32, 
T7S, RI 4E, Rangen is restricted to diverting water that emits from the Curren Tunnel in that IO-
acre tract." Id. ( emphasis added). The Director's choice of words is consistent with what the 
City has asserted in this case ahove, which is that elements of a water right are limitations or 
restrictions on the use of water no matter how they are documented on a water right. In Rangen, 
the district court upheld the Director's determination on this issue, and on appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court also affirmed: "This Court agrees and affirms the district court's holding that 
Rangen' s partial decrees entitle it to divert only that water emanating from the Martin-Curren 
Tunnel and only v.ithin the decreed ten-acre tract. If Rangen wanted its water rights to be 
interpreted differently, it should have timely asserted that in the SRBA." Id. at * l l. 
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In addition to Rang en's first argument, it argued that it should be permitted to use the so-
called "Bridge Diversion" because it lied mostly with the ten-acre tract and was integral to its 
diversion structure consisting also of the so-called "Farmers' Box" and "Rangen Box." Id. The 
Idaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, and focused on the importance of strict 
interpretation of elements: 
Id. 
Logically, if separate and distinct individual diversion structures in 
different tracts were treated as a single diversion structure, any water right 
holder could claim an entitlement to divert water in any tract, as long as at 
least one component of one diversion structure were sited in a decreed 
tract. This approach would render the point of diversion element of a 
water right meaningless. 
The Pocatello and Rangen cases make it clear that elements and conditions are not to be 
ignored or interpreted loosely. Otherwise, the conditions are meaningless, and the result would 
be injury, enlargement, and conflict between water users. Elements and conditions are 
limitations on the exercise of a water right and they cannot later be ignored by the Director in the 
appropriation (Idaho Code § 42-201, et seq.), administration (Idaho Code § 42-601, et seq.), or 
adjudication of water rights (Idaho Code§ 42-1401, et seq.). Stated another way, any attempt to 
distinguish between conditions and elements is to argue a distinction without a difference. No 
matter what they are called, conditions or elements limit how a water right can be exercised, and 
such limitations are binding upon the water right holder and must be enforced by the 
Department. See Petitioner's Opening Br. at 12-13. 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 6 
000173
In light of this clear and recent precedent, it is surprising that the Respondents maintain 
the position that they do not need to recognize the provisions of the Settlement Agreement as an 
element of Ol-181C. The City's response to this position is addressed in the next section. 
B. The Settlement Agreement was incorporated into 01-181 as a condition of the 
exercise of01-181C, which cannot be ignored by the Director. 
Despite the clear statutory provisions contained in Title 42 of the Idaho Code, as well as 
Idaho cases concerning elements of a water right, Respondents are unequivocal that the 
Settlement Agreement "is not an element of water right Ol-181C." Respondents' Brief at IO. 
Respondents argue that because the reference to a private agreement is under the "Other 
Provisions Necessary" section of the partial decree for Ol-181C, the Settlement Agreement is 
relegated to non-element status, and in support of this argument, footnote a 2004 decision from 
Special Master Bilyeu.2 Id. at 11. Additionally, the Respondents argue that reference to 
settlement agreements "is only to provide notice of private agreements that govern relationships 
of the parties to the agreements." Id. ( emphasis added). Therefore, the argument continues, 
reference to the Settlement Agreement was not intended to "make the Director and other water 
users parties to the private agreement," Id. at 12. 
2 The facts faced by Special Master Bilyeu in Subcase Nos. 31-7311, 31-2357, and 31-2395 are quite 
distinguishable from the facts of this case. In that decision, there was ambiguity in the "other provisions 
necessary" portion of a water right because it authorized water use without a water right or any specific 
elements of that right. This ambiguity led the Special Master to recommend a deadline for IDWR to file an 
ADR addressing only the uncultivated land issue "and that IDWR assign a new water right claim number to that 
portion of the claim." See Order Recommending Portia/ Decree Be Set Aside, In re: SRBA Nos. 31-731131-
2357, and 31-2395, at 8 (Jan. 30, 2004) (Special Master Bilyeu). The Special Master held that the "language of 
that provision is ambiguous because it is unclear whether the language defines a vested water right or not." She 
did not unequivocally state that "other provisions necessary" are not elements of a water right. 
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The Respondents arguments are both misplaeed and unavailing. Concerning the first 
"Other Provisions Necessary" argument asserted, Respondents acknowledge the plain language 
of Idaho Code§ 42-1411(2) in their brief, even if it is only in footnote form. Id. at 11 (fn. l). 
But small font size does not diminish the force of law embodied in this statutory provision. The 
City has already addressed the argument above that "other provisions necessary" contained in a 
water right as eonditions-limitations--on the exercise of a water right are elements of a water 
right and are no different than the point of diversion, source element, or any other element of a 
w-ater right. 
ln terms of settlement agreements in general, Respondents assert that all reforences to 
settlement agreements are informational only and do not implicate the Department because, the 
argument goes, the Department is not a party to the Settlement Agreement. In support of this 
argument, Respondents seize on the words of the transfer approval and the partial decree to 
surmise that "enforcement of the agreement is limited to the parties to the agreement." 
Respondents' Br. at 12. From that premise, Respondents incorrectly conclude that the Settlement 
Agreement could not have been incorporated, since it "only governs the relationship between tbe 
parties to the agreement." Respondents' Br. at 12. 
This argument is misleading. The fact that the Settlement Agreement "is enforceable by 
the parties thereto," Ex. 106 at 93 ( capitalization modified), is not surprising. Any judgment, 
decree, or order from any court is not self-effectuating. Its enforcement is dependent on the 
interested parties. An agreement (whether incorporated into a court order or not) must be 
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enforced either by a signatory, a party in privity with a signatory, or another plaintiff who can 
establish standing. 
However, while the Department may not be a party to a settlement agreement, it 
necessarily becomes a participant in a water right settlement agreement containing additional 
limitations on the exercise of the right because of the Director's statutory duty to administer each 
water right consistent with its elements. 
In nearly all cases, the very reason a water right involves a settlement agreement is that it 
resolved a dispute over either the adjudication of a water right or it outlined other limitations of 
the water right to resolve injury concerns andior protests raised in an administrative action 
involving a water right (such as an application for permit for a transfer application). In fact, 
settlement both in the SRBA and in administrative proceedings was and is actively encouraged 
by the SRBA Court and the Department. The proceedings involving 27-12261 illustrate this 
encouragement from the Department. 
Immediately after 27-12261 was protested on October 6, 2014, R. at 66-68, the 
Department sent two letters each dated October 20, 2014 to the City and to the Coalition as the 
protestants. The City's letter outlines three options available for resolution of the contested 
application, and all three include some component of settlement encouragement and one even 
specifically references "a mediated agreement" (each of which is emphasized below): 
-Direct contact with the protestani(s) to determine the nature of the 
protests(s) and to attempt to resolve the protest. Sincere conversation 
between the parties prior to initiation of formal proceedings can often 
resolve protest(s). 
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-Formal proceedings administered by the department pursuant to the 
Department's Rule of Procedure (IDAPA 37.0l.Ol). A pre-hearing 
conference identifies the protestant's concerns and reviews the 
resolution possibilities with the parties. If the concerns cannot be 
resolved, a formal hearing will be scheduled. 
-Mediation through a certified professional mediator can reduce 
costs and time that are associated with formal proceedings, present the 
opportunity to address non-water concems, provide i,ifluence over a 
final settlement, and fast track the processing of the application if a 
mediated settlement agreement is reached. If you are interested in this 
option, plea.~e contact our offu:e for details. 
Id. ( emphasis added). The Department's letter to the Coalition contains the exact same language 
actively encouraging the parties to settle their concerns. R. at 73. 
Most protestants raise injury arguments, and those issues are resolved either through a 
settlement agreement that resolves those concerns, or the issue is resolved after an administrative 
hearing on the issue. In counsel's experience, settlement of contested cases to avoid an 
administrative hearing is never accomplished without some sort of written settlement document. 
And even after an administrative hearing, the hearing officer will often include conditions to 
address injury concerns (which he ean do under Idaho Code § 42-203A(5)). No matter how the 
conditions get incorporated into a water right, they are often included to address some form of 
injury, and they often do not fit easily into one of what the Respondents' would call the 
"explicit" elements of a water right.3 Two examples are worth noting. 
First, a water right permit for ground water recharge (1-10625) was approved after a 
stipulation was entered into between the applicant, Peoples Canal & Irrigating Co., and the 
Coalition, IDFG, BLM, and the Idaho Power Co. The stipulations for withdrawal or protest are 
Respondents' Brief at 8 ("[t]he beneficial uses of 'recharge' and 'mitigation' are not explicitly authori7_.ed under 
water right 0I-181C."), 
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available at http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtS(;)arc!;ilRelatedDocs.asp?Basin= l&Se(Hlilll.C(;)::: 
10625&SplitSuffix=. The issued permit included stipulated conditions which further limit tlie 
exercise of 1-10625. A copy of tlie permit 1s available at 
http://v;,'\vw.idwr.idabQ.gov/apps/ExtSearch/ Docslmages/lzlgQL.PDF. This is an example of a 
water right permit which includes eonditions agreed to by the parties. 
Second, after a contested case involving Karl and Jeffrey Cook and their application for 
permit no. 35-14402-which this court recently ruled on after appeal in its Memorandum 
Decision and Order, CV-42-2015-2452 (filed December 14, 2015)-the hearing officer imposed 
a condition that neither the applicants nor the Coalition agreed to by limiting tl!e exercise of 35-
14402 and six other base rights to a diversion volume of 1,221 acre-foet. This was done to 
ensure no use of water beyond a determined historical use (had the applicant been held to the 
diversion rate of their base rights) after an analysis by the hearing officer. In oilier words. it was 
included by the hearing officer to prevent injury to the Coalition, but it was not agreed to by the 
Coalition or the Cooks. 
Importantly, in either instance where a condition is included in a water right, tl!e 
Respondents were not parties to the proceeding that led to the condition being included in the 
v;,ater right. But Respondents do not have to be a party to a settlement agreement to be impacted 
or bound by the conditions. The Respondents are not bound by contract to a settlement 
agreement, but they are necessarily participants in a settlement agreement by statute because of 
the Director's statutory obligation to distribute water according to water rights. The Director's 
obligation to distribute water according to water rights was recently well explained by this Court: 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE II 
000178
The IDWR has a statutory duty to allocate water. The Idaho legislature 
gave the IDWR's Director the power to make appropriation decisions in 
Idaho Code section 42-602: "[t)he director of the department of water 
resources shall have direction and control of the distribution of water from 
all natural water sources within a water district to the ... facilities diverting 
therefrom." The Director also "shall distribute water in w-ater districts in 
accordance with the prior appropriation doctrine." Id. This means that 
the Director cannot distribute water however he pleases at any time in 
any way; he must follow the law. 
Idaho Code section 42-602 gives the Director broad powers to direct 
and control distribution of water from all natural water sources within 
water districts. In re Idaho Dep't of Water Res. Amended Final Order 
Creating Water Dist. No. 170, 148 Idaho 200, 211, 220 P.3d 318, 329 
(2009). That statute gives 1he Director a "clear legal duty" to distribute 
water. Musser v. Higginson, 125 Idaho 392, 395, 871 P.2d 809, 812 
(1994) ( abrogated on other grounds by Rincover v. State Dep't of 
Fin.,132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 (1999)). However, "the details of the 
performance of the duty are left to the director's discretion." Id. 
Therefore, from the statute's plain language, as long as the Director 
distributes water in accordance with prior appropriatio11, he meets his 
clear legal duty. Details are left to the Director. 
Similarly, this Court has stated that the Director "is charged ·with the 
duty of direction and control of distribution of the waters from the streams 
to the ditches and canals." DeRousse v. Higginson, 95 Idaho 173, 179, 505 
P.2d 321, 327 (1973). More recently, this Court further articulated the 
Director's discretion: "Somewhere between the absolute right to use a 
decreed water right and an obligation not to waste it and to protect the 
public's interest in this valuable commodity, lies an area for the exercise of 
discretion by the Director." AFRD#2, 143 Idaho at 880, 154 P.3d at 
451. Thus, the Director's clear duty to act means that the Director uses his 
information and discretion to provide each user the water it is decreed. 
And implicit in providing each user its decreed water would be 
detennining when the decree is filled or satisfied. 
In re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase 00-91017 (Basin-Wide Issue 17-Does Idaho Law Require 
a Remark Authorizing Storage Rights to 'Refill', Under Priority, Space Vacated for Flood 
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Control), :.los. 40974 and 40975, 157 Idaho 385, 393-94, 336 P.3d 792. 800-01 (2014) 
(hereinafter cited to as "BW 17"). 
In short, it is a red herring to argue that because the Director is not a party to a settlement 
agreement, he is not bound to honor it and distribute water diverted under the conditioned water 
right accordingly.4 He certainly is bound by such conditions as he exercises his statutory duties 
to distribute water, even if such conditions do not "explicitly" fit into one of the standard 
elements of a water right. To use a real world example, IDFG would certainly object if Peoples 
diverted water under 1-10625 in an amount that reduced flows in the Snake River below 2,070 
efs measured in the Snake River at Blackfoot U.S.G.S. Gage No. 13062500 and the Director did 
nothing to enforce this provision against Peoples or otherwise initiate an enforcement action 
underldaho Code§ 42-1701B. Permit No. 1-10625 (Condition No. 4). And the Coalition would 
certainly object if water was diverted under 1-10625 if less than 2,700 cfs was flowing past 
Minidoka Dam and the Director did nothing to enforce this provision against Peoples or 
otherwise initiate an enforcement action under Idaho Code§ 42-1701B. Id. (Condition No. 5). 
These conditions were included to protect against local public interest impacts and injury to an 
exi&1ing unsubordinated hydropower water right. IDFG and the Coalition should expect that the 
Director will honor these provisions and ensure compliance by Peoples accordingly because the 
Director "cannot distribute water however he pleases at any time in any way; he rnU&i follow the 
law." BW 17, 157 Idaho at 393,336 P.3d at 800 
4 Again, divorce jurisprudence demonstrates that a court can incorporate documents into its decrees that are not 
drafted by the court or in consultation with the court or any other agency that will administer the subject matter. 
For example, in divorce proceedings, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare will oversee child support 
payments. 
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In terms of water distribution in accordance with water rights, it is also important to note 
that there is no private ability provided by statute for a party to assume the role of the Director 
and shut and fasten headgates for non-compliant water users. The protestants can file a 
complaint with the Director, but ultimately, the Director must perform the function of water 
distribution and if it is not done to the satisfaction of the protestants, this court has explained the 
remedy: 
The Director has the authority and discretion to determine how water from 
a natural water source is distributed to storage water rights pursuant to accounting 
methodologies he employs. The Director's discretion in this respect is not 
unbridled, but rather is subject to state law and oversight by the courts. See 
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2, 143 Idaho at 880, 154 P.3d at 451 
(addressing court oversight on a properly developed record). When review of the 
Director's discretion is this respect is brought before the courts in an appropriate 
proceeding, and upon a properly developed record, the courts can determine 
whether the Director has properly exercised his discretion regarding accounting 
methodologies. 
Memorandum Decision, Basin Wide Issue 17, Subcase No. 00-91017, at 11-12 (emphasis added). 
The protestants could sue privately for damages for the non-compliance, Idaho Code § 42-
1701B(7), but would have no ability to assume the role of the Director in water distribution. The 
protestants could only challenge the exercise of his discretion. This further supports the City's 
position that the Director is a participant in the Settlement Agreement because he is duty-bound 
to ensure compliance with any limitations in the water right, even though he is not a party to the 
Settlement Agreement. 
In terms of settlement agreements in general, we cannot think of a stipulated settlement 
agreement referenced in a water right that would not have at least something to do with the water 
right. Otherwise, what is the point of referring to such an agreement in a water right? Yet the 
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Respondents and the Coalition would like to categorize the language in the approval and the 
partial decree of Ol-181C as just such a "reference" to the Settlement Agreement. See 
Respondents' Br. at 11; Surface Water Coalition's Joint Response Br. (hereinafter "Coalition's 
Resp. Br.") at 11-12. 
However, in contrast to the examples provided by Respondents, Respondents' Br. at 11, 
n. 2 and 3, the conditions on 72385, which transferred Ol-181C to Jensen's Grove, provide more 
than mere "notice" of the Settlement Agreement. The language in the transfer approval and the 
partial decree for O 1-181 C states that the terms of the Settlement Agreement provides "conditions 
and limitations" in Ol-181C. This is a textbook case of incorporation, which is explicitly 
authorized by Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6). 
Additionally, in the Settlement Agreement, the parties stated that they "understood and 
agreed that any subsequent partial decree issued by the Snake River Basin Adjudication District 
Court should contain the terms and Conditions of this Agreement." Ex. 4 at 4 (paragraph 4 of 
the Settlement Agreement) ( capitalization in original, emphasis added). In entering into the 
Settlement Agreement to resolve the Coalition's protest, the parties recited: "It is the Parties' 
understanding that [the Department] is prepared to grant the proposed Transfer providing: ... 4) 
the conditions agreed to below are incorporated in the Water Right through the transfer 
approvaf' and "The Parties have . . . agreed upon certain conditions to be included in the 
Water Right after its transfer." Ex. 4 at 1-2 (recitals D and E of the Settlement Agreement) 
( emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, the approval of 72385, which transferred 01-181C to Jensen's Grove, and 
the corresponding partial decree both include the following language: 
The diversion and use of water under this transfer is subject to 
additional conditions and limitations contained in a Settlement 
Agreement-IDWR Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, dated 
June 2006, including any properly executed amendments thereto, entered 
into by and between the New Sweden Irrigation District, [the City], [and 
the Coalition]. The Settlement Agreement has been recorded in Bingham 
County (Instrument No. 575897) and Bonneville County (Instrument No. 
1249899) and is enforceable by the parties thereto. 
Ex. 105 at 90, ,i 9 (emphasis added); see also Ex. 106 at 93. The Department's approval 
classifies this as one of the "Conditions of Approval." Ex. 105 at 90. The partial decree 
classifies this language under the heading "other provisions necessary for definition or 
administration of this water right." Ex. 106 at 93 (capitalization modified). Neither example 
provided by Respondents does anything but state that each water right is "subject to a private 
agreement." Respondents' Br. at 11, n. 2 and 3; see also SRBA Subcases 75-5 and 75-14608.5 
As described above, and in clear contrast to these examples, Ol-181C's condition is explicit that 
the Settlement Agreement was intended to be considered "additional conditions and limitations." 
Moving on to Respondents' next argument, in determining whether the Settlement 
Agreement is incorporated into Ol-181C, "the intent of including" the above-quoted language, 
Counsel for the City was directly involved in 75-14608 (Tyacke), and drafted the settlement agreement that was 
recorded. A copy is available at http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/DocslmageslhrhgOl .pdf. The 
agreement addresses distribution issues from the South Fork of Sevenmile Creek and from a spring used to 
service the Sunset Heights Subdivision, both natural water sources, which would likely involve the 
Department's involvement in water distribution because these are natural water sources. It also involved other 
diversion system issues, which are not matters over which the Department has jurisdiction. But it is evident that 
this agreement contains provisions that further limit exercise of the water rights outlined in the agreement, and 
reference to it was not merely for informational purposes. 
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Respondents' Br. at 11, in the approval and the partial decree is completely immaterial. The 
recent Rangen decision explains how water decrees are to be interpreted: 
Idaho courts interpret water decrees using the same interpretation rules 
that apply to contracts. A & B Irrigation Dist., 153 Idaho at 523,284 P.3d 
at 248. 'Whether an ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a question of 
law, over which this Court exercises free review.' Knipe Land Co. v. 
Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,455,259 P.3d 595,601 (2011). Ambiguity may 
be either patent or latent. Id. 'A latent ambiguity exists where an 
instrument is clear on its face, but loses that clarity when applied to the 
facts as they exist.' Id. Idaho law permits ' [ f]irst, the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence to show that the latent ambiguity actually existed; and, 
second, the introduction of extrinsic evidence to explain what was 
intended by the ambiguous statement.' Snoderly v. Bower, 30 Idaho 484, 
487, 166 P. 265, 265 (1917). Interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue of 
fact. Knipe Land Co., 151 Idaho at 455, 259 P.3d at 601 (citing Potlatch 
Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 
P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010)). 
Rangen at *12. 
Additionally, "[t]he interpretation of decrees or judgments is generally subject to the 
same rules applicable to construction of contracts.'' McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 
190 P .3d 925, 928 (Ct. App. 2008) ( citation omitted). Therefore, where a contract, judgment, or 
water right is unambiguous, the document's "meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be 
decided by the court." Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1992). It is 
only when the document is ambiguous that "the interpretation of the document presents a 
question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties." Id. 
Here, Respondents agree that a water right is like a judgment. Respondents' Br. at 16-17 
("Like a judgment, a water right must outline with certainty the nature and extent of beneficial 
use of the water"). But Respondents have made no showing that the Settlement Agreement is 
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ambiguous and, therefore, any inquiry into intent is premature and improper. See Respondents' 
Br. at 11 ("Since the remark only references the agreement, the question becomes what was the 
intent of including this infonnation in the water right") and 22 (providing argument "should the 
Court determine the [Settlement Agreement] introduces ambiguity into deeree [sic]"). While 
Respondents repeatedly return to the issue of intent extrinsic to the Settlement Agreement, their 
failure to demonstrate ambiguity negates those arguments. 
The text of 01-18IC is clear and unambiguous. The Settlement Agreement says what it 
says: the conditions agreed to in the Settlement Agreement will be "incorporated" and "included" 
in 01-I81C. Ex. 4 at 1-2 (recitals D and E of the Settlement Agreement). As a preface to the 
most specific conditions imposed on 0I-181C, the Settlement Agreement again provides that "the 
follov,ing terms and conditions be included in the Water Right ... after transfer." Ex. 4 at 2 
(paragraph 1 of the Settlement Agreement). Likewise, the partial decree says what it says: Ol-
181C is "subject to additional conditions and limitations contained in" the Seftlement 
Agreement. Ex. 106 at 93 ( capitalization modified, emphasis added). That is enough to 
unambiguously answer the question of whether the Settlement Agreement was incorporated into 
the partial decree. 
Because incorporation of water right clements pursuant to a settlement agreement is 
contemplated by Idaho Code § 42-1412(6), but has rarely been analyzed in the water law 
context, the City and Respondents have each provided analogous bodies of law to which the 
Court can look for guidance. Petitioner's Opening Br. at 14-15 (looking to divorce 
jurisprudence); Respondents' Br. at 13-16 (looking to the property law doctrine of merger). But 
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Respondents' analogy to the doctrine of merger in property law, while commg from an 
admittedly more closely related body of law, is a poor analogy for the situation faced by the 
Court here. The doctrine of merger deals ·with the warranties made in a sales contract, between a 
buyer and a seller, merging into the deed between the buyer and seller. Fuller v. Dave Callister, 
150 Idaho 848,853,252 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2011). In broad terms, the doctrine is that only those 
warranties or covenants that are collateral, or not related to, the property itself will survive the 
sale of the property at issue, which is manifested by the execution and acceptance of the deed. 
Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 382, 414 P.2d 879, 884 (1966). However, it is not 
helpful because of factual distinctions and legal differences. 
Factually, the incorporation of a private contract into a court order is an entirely different 
situation from the merger of covenants into the final performance of the contract. First, this case 
does not deal with a conveyance of property; it deals with the determination of the nature and 
extent of a property right. See Idaho Code§ 55-101 (defining a ,vater right as real property). 
Second, this case does not deal with one contract between private parties being merged into 
another contract between those parties; the documents at issue here are one private contract and a 
decree issued by the SRBA Court. Third, this case does not deal with the satisfaction of one 
contract by the consummation of another; it deals with an agreement between litigants that 
facilitated the entry of a court order in the form of a partial decree. 
In addition to being factually distinct, the doctrine of merger, which occurs automatically 
in property transfers, provides very little insight into explicit incorporation. First, incorporation 
is an exception to the doctrine of merger. Belstler v. Sheler, 151 Idaho 819,823,264 P.3d 926, 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 19 
000186
930 (2011) (noting "a generally recognized exception to the [doctrine of merger,] which 
exception relates to collateral stipulations of the contract, which are not incorporated in the 
deetf' (citation and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added)). Because incorporation is an 
exception to merger, the doctrine of merger provides little help in determining when an extrinsic 
document is incorporated into a judgment-as is the question here. Further, merger deals with 
the dissolution of the covenants contained in the prior agreement into the warranties of the deed, 
because the delivery and acceptance of the deed is the purpose of those covenants. The purpose 
of the conditions in the Settlement Agreement was not just to obtain 01-181C, but to restrict the 
City's ability to use Ol-181C in certain ways. In other words, there is nothing in the water right 
for the Settlement Agreement to dissolve into, but they are included in the water right to describe 
the limitations imposed. Finally, Respondents' arguments that the Settlement Agreement "is 
collateral to and independent of O 1-181 C and is therefore not merged" make little sense. 
Respondents' Br. at 16. Besides the language in the partial decree incorporating ( or merging) the 
Settlement Agreement, it is impossible to accept Respondents' contention that the Settlement 
Agreement "does not relate to the elements of01-181C nor is it inhered to the very subject matter 
of the water right." Respondents' Br. at 16. To argue that the conditions in the Settlement 
Agreement are not elements is unsupportable, but it is frivolous to maintain that the Settlement 
Agreement does not even relate to the elements of01-181C. For these reasons, the doctrine of 
merger, borrowed from property law, makes a poor analogy and provides little useful guidance 
for the Court in this case. 
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Divorce law, while different factually from water law, deals with the issue of 
incorporation frequently. See Petitioner's Opening Br. at 14-15. As the partial decree 
determined the nature and extent of 01-181 C in this case, divorce decrees incorporate private 
agreements between the litigants to determine the parties' rights to child custody, support, and 
other property. As the partial decree is a court order that integrates the Settlement Agreement, 
divorce decrees that incorporate settlement agreements are court orders that include a private 
contract as a term of the order. As the partial decree was facilitated by the Settlement 
Agreement, divorce decrees are aided by the entry of private agreements between the parties. 
Respondents argue that the policy considerations underlying incorporation in divorce 
cases are not present in water disputes. Respondents' Br. at 13-14. First, this argument fails to 
account for the statutory language that explicitly mandates that a partial decree "shall contain or 
incorporate a statement of each element of a water right," Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6) (emphasis 
added), in contrast to divorce law where incorporation is a common law doctrine that requires the 
support of policy. This Court cannot ignore incorporation, which is a statutory principle of water 
law, merely on the basis of policy arguments. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Afed Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty., 
159 Idaho 84, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he 
v.isdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the legislature alone," and 
therefore the Court is "reluctant to second-guess the v,isdom of a statute." Id. (citations and 
quotation marks omitted, brackets in original). Because incorporation is specifically allowed by 
statute, this Court must consider whether the partial decree incorporated the Settlement 
Agreement and, upon the appropriate analysis, the Court should conclude that it did. 
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Further, Respondents' policy argument6 is misplaced. Whether the Department or a court 
maintains an "active role" in the administration of a water right does not matter, since the partial 
decree dictates how each water right is to be administered by the Department. See Idaho Code § 
42-1412(6). 
Finally, Respondents agam emphasize the false distinction between elements and 
conditions by arguing that the Settlement Agreement "is collateral to and independent of O 1-181 C 
because it does not relate to the elements of O 1-181 C but focuses on the rights and duties of the 
signatories outside of the current administration of the water right." Respondents' Br. at 14. 
Aside from again trying to distinguish an "element" from a "condition" (see above), Respondents 
mischaracterize the Settlement Agreement. It does not merely "focus[] on the rights and duties" 
of the City and the Coalition. Respondents' Br. at 14. Rather, the Settlement Agreement 
substantively limits how the City can divert and use 01-181C and informs the Director through 
his statutory duty to administer water how the right is limited and should be administered. 
In sum, the Settlement Agreement was incorporated into the partial decree. Incorporation 
is authorized by statute for describing elements of a water right. The partial decree does more 
than provide notice of the Settlement Agreement, but incorporates it by describing its terms as 
"conditions and limitations" on 01-181C. As an element of 01-181C, the Settlement Agreement 
clarifies how O 1-181 C may and may not be used by the City. Respondents erred by failing to 
consider the Settlement Agreement at all. 
6 Respondents' policy argument is that the policy in divorce law of "provid[ing] enforcement of all agreements 
within one court" has no relation to water law since "water administration does not take place through the 
SRBA Court" and "it is up to the Department to enforce and administer the provisions of the water right." 
Respondents' Br. at 13. 
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II. 01-181C MAY BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATION. 
A. Mitigation does not have to be listed as an express beneficial use of a water right in 
order for such water right to be used for mitigation purposes. 
Mitigation is not explicitly defined or described by statute, but use of mitigation 
associated with water is implied from the Department's ability to approve any application "upon 
conditions." Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5). The Department has specified that "[a]n application that 
would otherwise be denied because of injury to another water right may be approved upon 
conditions which will mitigate losses of water to the holder of an existing water right, as 
determined by the Director." IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. This singular mention of mitigation 
in the context of a water right application suggests that it is broad and involves analysis of the 
actual utilization of water rather than only looking at the beneficial uses listed on the face of the 
water right. 
Contrary to the Department's rules, the Director, in this case, refused to consider 
compliance with the Settlement Agreement as a "conditionO which will mitigate losses of water" 
to other water users. There is no factual dispute that 2,080.8 AF of water seeps from Jensen's 
Grove into the ESPA each year. See Coalition's Resp. Br. at I (noting that the City and the 
Coalition "stipulated that the modeling performed by the City's experts showed that recharge in 
Jensen's Grove could offset the impacts resulting from" 27-12261). This amount of water re-
entering the aquifer provides mitigation for 27-12261 and nothing prevents Respondents from 
considering those facts in mitigation. 
Non-use of one water right can, without the filing of a transfer, mitigate for another 
water right. The reasoning for this principle is that the non-use of an existing water right is a 
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condition for the approval of the permit for the new water right, which the Department can 
impose. Idaho Code § 42-203A(5). In this case, the non-use is a "condition[] which will 
mitigate losses of water," and allows the Department to approve the subsequent water right. 
IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. In doing so, the Department takes reality into account, and is not 
constrained by the black-and-white details on the face of each water right, because these arc 
situations where mitigation is not required to be explicitly listed as a beneficial use. 
It is noteworthy in this case that the Coalition has not protested that portion of the City's 
other water rights in the Blackfoot River which the City proposes to hold unused. See R. at 204 
("The Coalition did not challenge the City's proposal to hold 6.2 acres of Blackfoot River right 
unused to offset depletions to the Snake River downstream of Blackfoot"). In fact, "the 
Coalition stipulated that leaving a small portion of additional water in the Snake River [system] 
would offset [the] mitigation deficiency." Coalition's Resp. Br. at l. This is important, because 
the City has not filed any transfer application to use these Blackfoot River water rights as 
mitigation for 27-12261, nor was the City requested to do so by the Coalition. This fact alone 
defeats the Coalition's own argument. 
Yet here, Respondents and the Coalition seek to ignore reality and exalt form over 
substance. The Coalition's repeated emphasis that "the elements of a water right cannot be 
changed without a transfer," Coalition's Resp. Br. at 8 (capitalization modified and emphasis 
omitted), is an oversimplification. Recently, this Court ruled on an appeal in In the ,\fatter of 
Application for Permit No. 35-14402, a case in which the Coalition was involved. In that matter, 
the Cooks were allowed to proceed with 35-14402 using their proposed mitigation plan that 
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included a reduction of volume of their other base water rights. See Memorandum Decision and 
Order, CV-42-2015-2452 (filed December 14, 2015). The Cooks did not file a transfer 
application to amend their other base water rights (Water Right )[os. 35-7280, 35-7281, 35-
13241, 35-14334, 34-14335, and 35-14336). Based upon the action taken in relation to their 
application for water right 35-14402, the Department administratively amended the Cooks' other 
water rights to add the applicable volume limitations contained in 35-14402 to the other base 
\Vater rights. The Cooks were informed by letter of the Department's amendment of the base 
water rights and it contains no mention of the need to file a transfer. See Letter to Cook from 
Shelley Keen, February 5, 2016, available at http://www.idwT.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/ 
P.ocsima2:es/ncv901 .pdf (a copy of which is included as Exhibit 1 for the convenience of the 
C,rnrt). The Cooks' case demonstrates that, contrary to the Coalition's assertion and the 
Respondents' position, it is unnecessary to file transfer applications for water rights that are 
utilized in a mitigation plan for a separate application for a water right permit. The Department 
can, and does, modify the elements of water rights administratively without a transfer 
application. The City has sought the same procedure employed by the Department in the Cooks' 
case, and the City's application in 27-12261 is sufficient to claim the benefits associated with the 
elements of O 1-181 C in accordance v.ith the City's mitigation plan. 
It also makes sense that mitigation or ground water recharge was not listed as a beneficial 
use on the face of O 1-181 C since the mitigation could only be sought or claimed under certain 
strict conditions. Therefore, it is nonsensical to look for mitigation on the "face" of any water 
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right in a vacuum. The 2,080.8 AF that annually seeps into the ESPA was not, and could not be, 
claimed as mitigation until the City applied for 27-12261. 
Respondents' contention that they are entitled to rely solely on the "face of the water 
right" to determine how the water is used or employed, Respondents' Br. at 16-19, fails to 
consider mitigation at all in any circumstances where mitigation is not listed as a beneficial use 
and there is no transfer application concurrently filed-which the Cooks' case demonstrates is 
not how the Department normally operates. See Memorandum Decision and Order, CV-42-
2015-2452 (filed December 14, 2015). 
The City has used the correct procedure in this application, i.e., the appropriate 
application, to claim the mitigation credit for the 2,080.8 AF of annual seepage from O 1-181 C. 
Respondents erred by failing to even consider the admitted reality of the mitigation provided by 
Ol-181C by solely looking at face of01-181C where mitigation is not listed as a beneficial use. 
B. The Settlement Agreement restricts certain abilities with regard to 01-181C, but not 
the City's ability to claim, nor the Department's ability to consider, the admitted 
substantial seepage occurring as mitigation. 
"[I]ncidental ground water recharge ... may not be used as the basis for claim of a 
separate or expanded water right." Idaho Code § 42-234(5). Both the Coalition and 
Respondents argue that the 2,080.8 AF that annually seeps into the ESPA from Jensen's Grove is 
merely incidental recharge and therefore cannot be used as mitigation for 27-12261. See 
Coalition's Resp. Br. at 21-24; Respondents' Br. at 21. 
The City has already argued that "incidental recharge is for recharge not included 
anywhere on the water right." Petitioner's Opening Br. at 29; see also BLACK'S LAW 
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DICTIONARY 830 (defining incidental as an adjective, meaning "[s]ubordinate to something of 
greater importance; having a minor role"). The Coalition has stipulated that the City's mitigation 
plan and modeling shows that 01-181 C provides sufficient water to the ESPA to mitigate for 27-
12261, but merely challenges whether the City is entitled to claim credit for the seepage, which 
the Coalition categorizes as incidental. 
As previously asserted, as a legal matter, both the Settlement Agreement and the reference 
to seepage losses on the face of O 1-181 C expressly acknowledge the ground water recharge that 
oecurs under Ol-181C. As a factual matter, and in terms of the quantity of the recharge, it is 
anything but incidental. The 2,080.8 AF is more than 678 million gallons of water that seeps 
into the ESPA. It is almost 92% of the annual portion of 01-181 C allocated to Recreation 
Storage (the remainder is lost to evaporation). It is more than 72% of Ol-181C's total water. 
The sheer volume of water and the context of that quantity in relation to O 1-181 C he lies the 
conclusion that the City's proposed mitigation is merely "incidental." The movement of such a 
large amount of water was never minor or just of subordinate importance to the City. 
It is for that reason that the Settlement Agreement deals extensively with the issue of 
mitigation, delving into the minutiae of various circumstances to specify the City's rights. The 
Settlement Agreement does not categorically deny mitigation. Instead, the Settlement Agreement 
treats the issue of mitigation \vith a scalpel rather than a cleaver. 
In attempting to interpret the Settlement Agreement, both the Coalition and Respondents 
accentuate what is arguably their best fact: that ground water recharge was included on the dmft 
approval for 72385, but was excluded from the final approval. See Coalition's Resp. Br. at 18; 
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Respondents' Br. at 22. However, these documents are parol evidence, meaning it is only 
helpful to interpret the O 1-181 C if the texi: of the water right is found to be ambiguous. See 
Respondents' Br. at 22 ("If a court finds the language of a contract ambiguous, parol evidence 
can be reviewed to ascertain intent behind the contract") ( citing Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 
23, 27,966 P.2d 23, 27 (1998)). Yet, Respondents only present this argument for consideration 
in the event the Court concludes Ol-181C is ambiguous, without any argument or analysis on the 
issue of ambiguity. Respondents· Br. at 22. Further, the Coalition does not even categorize this 
fact as parol evidence, and encourages the Court to consider it to determine the parties' 
intentions in the Settlement Agreement. Coalition's Resp. Br. at 18. First and foremost, this 
parol evidence should not be considered by the Court because 01-181C is not ambiguous. 
Even if the Court were to find O 1-18 l C or the Settlement Agreement ambiguous, this 
evidence is not as helpful as it seems. Respondents contend that the evidenee shows ''that 
recharge was expressly rejected as an authorized use for Ol-181C." Respondents' Br. at 22. 
However, the record docs not disclose the procedure upon which the Department addressed the 
Coalition's letter concerning the draft approval that included recharge. See Coalition's Resp. Br. 
at 21 ("The Department apparently agreed with the Coalition and removed the 'recharge' use 
without further discussion in the record" (emphasis added)). But there is no record of a formal 
adjudication of the issue, but merely the letter and the comparative differences between the draft 
approval and the final approval. In fact, it is equally probable that the Department determined 
that with the limitations c-0ntained in the Settlemem Agreement, ground water recharge should 
not have been explicitly listed on the face of the water right because it could be interpreted to 
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authorize recharge by the City for mitigation without limitation. The safer route for the 
Department, which it followed, was to not include it as an express beneficial use, but to simply 
incorporate the Settlement Agreement and its provisions to dictate when the recharge water could 
be claimed as mitigation. The competing inferences highlight why the law is to first look at the 
plain language of the document being interpreted before moving on to parol evidence. 
Finally, it bears repeating that the majority of the record in this case was submitted by the 
City. The City elicited testimony from its witnesses at the hearing before the Department, while 
the Coalition chose not to do so. So if this Court does consider parol evidence, most of the parol 
evidence supports the City's position that the Settlement Agreement was never meant to totally 
prevent the City's ability to claim the 2,080.8 AF of annual seepage as mitigation for other water 
rights. See Petitioner's Opening Br. at 24-25. As a result, the Settlement Agreement and, if it is 
considered ambiguous, the parol evidence related to the Settlement Agreement show that the 
seepage into the ESPA from Jensen's Grove under Ol-181C was never completely given up by 
the City, and therefore may be claimed as mitigation for 27-12261. 
III. 01-18IC'S SEEPAGE MITIGATES FOR 27-12261, REGARDLESS 
OF THE STATUS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
The City unequivocally believes that the Settlement Agreement is a part of Ol-181C that 
describes certain "limitations and conditions" on the water right's use that constitute elements of 
Ol-181C. However, the Respondents' failure to consider the Settlement Agreement is only one 
error committed in this case. Ultimately, whether the Settlement Agreement is an element of O I-
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18IC or not affects the Coalition's arguments much more than the City's, as Respondents should 
have considered the reality of 0I-181C's 2,080.8 AF of seepage as mitigation for 27-12261. 
A. As the Coalition appears to have argued, the Settlement Agreement possibly fails as a 
contract. 
The Coalition's brief raises two alternative reasons why the Settlement Agreement may 
fail as a contract. Since there is no severability clause in the Settlement Agreement and no 
apparent intention that it be severable, if one provision is void for either reason, the entire 
contract will fail. First, because the Settlement Agreement may "be contrary to the law requiring 
a transfer--thus causing the Settlement Agreement to foil." Coalition's Resp. Br. at 15 (italics 
added). Second, as has become increasingly apparent (though limited by the brevity of the 
record created by the Coalition on its behalf), the Coalition and the City may have never had a 
meeting of the minds, in which case no bargain was created and no contract formed. 
1. According to the Coalition's argument at least one of the provisions of the 
Settlement Agrgement violates Idaho law and, since it is not severable, the entire 
contract possibly fails. 
With regard to severability of a contract, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that, in 
the absence of a severability clause: 
[ w ]hether a contract is entire or severable depends on the intention of 
the parties which is to be ascertained and determined, when the contract is 
unambiguous, from the subject matter of the agreement and the language 
used therein, taking the agreement as a whole and not its separate parts 
without regard to one another .... 
The test chiefly relied upon is whether the parties have apportioned the 
consideration on the one side to the different covenants on the other. If the 
consideration is apportioned, so that for each covenant there is a 
corresponding consideration, the contract is severable. If, on the other 
hand, the consideration is not apportioned, and the same consideration 
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supports all the covenants and agreements, the contract is entire. A 
contract is entire when by its terms, nature, and purpose, it contemplates 
and intends that each and all of its parts and the consideration shall be 
common to each other and interdependent. On the other hand, it is the 
general rule that a severable contract is one which in its nature and 
purpose is susceptible of division and apportionment.' 
Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417,419,529 P.2d 1289, 1291 (1974) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). If a contract is entire, it "is indivisible. [ and] must stand or fall in its entirety." 
A;forgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506,514,201 P.2d 976,980 (1948). 
Here, the Settlement Agreement has no severability clause. See Ex. 4. The consideration 
provided by the Coalition (the resolution of its protest) is not apportioned, but supports all of the 
City's covenants, which became conditions of01-181C. See, e.g., Ex. 4 at 3 (paragraph 3 of the 
Settlement Agreement, providing that "[i]n the event [the Department] does not approve the 
Transfer of the Water Right with the above Conditions, the Coalition reserves all rights to protest 
the application"). The Settlement Agreement is "entire," because "it contemplates and intends 
that each and all of its parts and the consideration shall be common to each other and 
interdependent." Vance, 96 Idaho at 419,529 P.2d at 1291. The Coalition and the City intended 
the Settlement Agreement to be an all-or-nothing agreement that resolved the Coalition's protest 
only if it was incorporated in its entirety in the Department's approval and the associated partial 
decree. 
The language of the Settlement Agreement allows the City to employ 01-181C as 
mitigation if it will "file the appropriate application for permit and/or transfer." Ex. 4 at 3 
(paragraph l .e of the Settlement Agreement). The use of "and/or" in this clause permits the City 
PE1TII01\"ER'S REPLY BRIEF-PAGE 31 
000198
to claim mitigation credit for 01-18IC by filing (a) an appropriate application for permit, (b) an 
appropriate transfer, or ( c) both. Id. 
If the Court accepts the Coalition's argument (which the City disputes), that the only 
mechanism in Idaho to claim mitigation is to file a transfer, to any degree, then option (a) from 
the preceding sentence is unlawful. In the Coalition's words, the Settlement Agreement may "be 
contrary to the law requiring a transfer - thus causing the Settlement Agreement to fail." 
Coalition's Resp. Br. at 15 (citing AED, Inc. v. KDC lnvs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159,167,307 P.3d 
176, 184 (2013) ("a contract [that] cannot be performed without violating applicable law is 
illegal and void"). Therefore, because the Settlement Agreement is entire, the failure of one 
section causes the whole contract to fail, see lvforgan, 68 Idaho 506, 201 P.2d 976, and a 
contested case regarding O 1-181 C should reconvene as a protested application. 
2. Given the divergent expressions of intent on the part of the Citv and the Coalition 
in entering into the Settlement Agreement, it appears the Settlement Agreement 
was never formed. 
For a contract to be formed, "there must be a meeting of the minds," which "must occur 
on all material terms to rhe contract.'' Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831, 103 
P.3d 440, 444 (2004). At least based on the arguments in this proceeding involving 27-12261, 
there was never a meeting of the minds between the Coalition and the City as to at least a portion 
of the Settlement Agreement, which is entire. See Section III.A.1, supra. The testimony of 
Mayor Reese demonstrates what the City believed rhe bargain to be with regard to claiming 
credit for the mitigation provided by Ol-181C. Tr., p. 38, 1. 5-p. 40, 1. 19. Despite presenting no 
evidence, the Coalition has argued strongly that, in essence, it never shared Mayor Reese's 
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understanding. As demonstrated by the adversarial proceeding and this litigation, the City's 
ability to claim mitigation credit for the 2,080.8 AF of seepage is material to both the City and 
the Coalition. Again, because the Settlement Agreement is entire, the failure of one section 
causes the whole contract to fail. See Morgan, 68 Idaho 506, 201 P.2d 976. 
B. Even if the Settlement Agreement is not a part of 01-181 C, the City is still entitled to 
claim 01-181C's seepage as mitigation for 27-12261. 
The effect of the complete failure of the Settlement Agreement is more profound on the 
Coalition than on the City. Before the Director's Final Order, the Coalition centered its 
argument on the Settlement Agreement and objected to the City's ability to file 27-12261 without 
the Coalition's consent, as it claimed was required by the Settlement Agreement. While that 
argument has understandably evolved, given the course of this adversarial proceeding and 
litigation, the Coalition continues to argue the substance of the Settlement Agreement, which puts 
limits and conditions on the City's use of01-181C. 
While the City is not required by the Settlement Agreement to obtain the Coalition's 
permission before filing 27-12261, see Ex. 4 at 3 (paragraph I.e.), if the Settlement Agreement 
were void for either of the above-described reasons, the realities of the use of O 1-181 C should 
still have been considered by the Respondents and the City should have been allowed to claim 
credit for O 1-181 C. See Section II.A., supra. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
By the terms of the approval and the partial decree, the Settlement Agreement imposes 
"conditions and limitations" on the City's use of O 1-181 C, and therefore constitutes an element 
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of O 1-J 81 C. The language of the approval and the partial decree do more than provide notice of 
the Settlement Agreement; by subjecting Ol-181C to the "conditions and limitations" of the 
Settlement Agreement, the approval and partial decree incorporated the Settlement Agreement. 
When considering mitigation for a new water right permit, the circumstances of reality, 
and not just the black-and-white of the face of a water right must be considered-as 
demonstrated by the Department's common practice of allowing non-use or limited use of one 
water right to provide mitigation for a new water right permit. In this case, neither the Coalition 
nor the Respondents argue against the City's voluntary limitation of use of its Blackfoot River 
water rights being applied as mitigation for 27-12261, despite "mitigation" not being listed as a 
beneficial use on any of those water rights. 
The City is allowed to claim credit for the mitigation provided by the annual seepage of 
2,080.8 AF under 01-181C. The Final Order was made in violation of statutory provisions; in 
excess of the statutory authority of the Department; without support of substantial evidence; and 
arbitrarily, capriciously, and as an abuse of discretion. The errors have violated the City's 
substantial right in the proper adjudication of this matter by the application of correct legal 
standards. 
Where, as here, "there is no indication in the record that further findings of fact could be 
made from the paucity of evidence that would affect the outcome of this case," remand to the 
Department is unnecessary. Bonner Gen. Hosp. v. Bonner Cnty., 133 Idaho 7, 11, 981 P.2d 242, 
246 (1999); see also I.C. § 67-5279(3). The Coalition has only ever made a legal argument in 
this case, which can be answered by this Court upon the record already established because 
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contract interpretation is a matter of law. This Court should issue an order approving the 
issuance of a permit for 27-12261 because there are no legal impediments to using ground water 
recharge under 01-181C to mitigate for 27-12261. 
Dated this ~-day of March, 2016. 
Robert L. Harris, Esq. l 
HOLDE'.',;, KID\VELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The Director's Order Addressing Exceptions and Denying Application for Permit entered 
on September 22, 2015, is affirmed. 
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District Judge 
JUDGMENT • l -
S:\ORDERS\Administrative Appeals\Bingham County 2015-1687\Judgmentdocx 
000205
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the JUDGMEMT 
was mailed on April 06, 2016, with sufficient first-class postage 
to the following: 
IDWR AND GARY SPACKMAN IN HIS 
Represented by: 
GARRICK L BAXTER 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO - IDWR 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0098 
Phone: 208-287-4800 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
BURLEY IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
MILNER IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY 
Represented by: 
JOHN K SIMPSON 
1010 W JEFFERSON ST STE 102 
PO BOX 2139 
BOISE, ID 83701-2139 
Phone: 208-336-0700 
CITY OF BLACKFOOT 
Represented by: 
LUKE H MARCHANT 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
1000 RIVERWALK DR STE 200 
PO BOX 50130 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405 
Phone: 208-523-0620 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
BURLEY IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
MILNER IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY 
Represented by: 
PAULL ARRINGTON 
195 RIVER VISTA PL STE 204 
TWIN FALLS, ID 83301-3029 
Phone: 208-733-0700 
CITY OF BLACKFOOT 
Represented by: 
RAWLINGS, D ANDREW 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
1000 RIVERWALK DR STE 200 
ORDER 
Page 1 4/06/16 FILE COPY FOR 80046 
PO BOX 50130 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405 
Phone: 208-523-0620 
CITY OF BLACKFOOT 
Represented by: 
ROBERT L HARRIS 
1000 RIVERWALK DR, STE 200 
PO BOX 50130 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405-0130 
Phone: 208-523-0620 
CITY OF BLACKFOOT 
Represented by: 
SANDOW, GARRETT H 
220 N MERIDIAN 
BLACKFOOT, ID 83221 
Phone: 208-785-9300 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
BURLEY IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
MILNER IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY 
Represented by: 
TRAVIS L THOMPSON 
195 RIVER VISTA PL STE 204 
TWIN FALLS, ID 83301-3029 
Phone: 208-733-0700 
AMERICAN FALLS RESERVOIR 
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
Represented by: 
W KENT FLETCHER 
1200 OVERLAND AVE 
PO BOX 248 
BURLEY, ID 83318-0248 
Phone: 208-678-3250 
DIRECTOR OF IDWR 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0098 
000206
District Court - SABA 
Fifth Judicial District 
In Re: Administrative Appeals 
County of Twin Falls - State of Idaho 
APR - 6 2016 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his official capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES 
Respondents, 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, AMERICAN 
FALLS RESERVOIR DISTRICT #2, 
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY and 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY, 
Intervenors. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This case originated when the City of Blackfoot ("City") filed a Petition seeking judicial 
review of a final order of the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR" or 
"Department"). The order under review is the Director's Order Addressing Exceptions and 
Denying Application for Permit entered on September 22, 2015 (''Final Order"). The Final 
Order denies application for permit number 27-12261 filed by the City. The City asserts the 
Final Order is contrary to law and asks this Court to issue an order approving the issuance of a 
permit pursuant to its application. 
B. Course of proceedings and statement of facts. 
This matter concerns an application to appropriate water filed by the City. The 
application seeks 9. 71 cfs of ground water for the irrigation of 524.2 acres in Bingham County. 1 
R., pp.92-105. The City seeks the appropriation for two purposes. Id. at 93. First, it currently 
operates a pump station that diverts water from the Blackfoot River for delivery to irrigators east 
ofl-15. Id.; Ex.I, p.l; Tr.,pp.9-10. Due to cost, the City desires to develop anew right to 
deliver ground water to those irrigators instead of surface water. R., p.98; Ex. I, p. l. Second, the 
City presently holds water right 27-7577, which permits it to divert ground water for delivery to 
irrigators west ofl-15. Ex.105. To supplement alleged deficiencies with that right, the City 
desires to develop a new right to deliver additional ground water to those irrigators. R., p.93; 
Ex.l, p.l. 
To compensate potential injury resulting from the appropriation, the City proposes 
mitigation. Ex.I, pp.2-3. It seeks 1,066 afa of mitigation credit resulting from ground water 
recharge under water right O 1-181 C. Id. That right permits the City to divert 2,466.80 afa from 
the Snake River for, among other things, recreation storage at Jensen Grove. Ex.I 06. Jensen 
Grove is a recreation area owned by the City which includes a 73-acre reservoir. The reservoir is 
1 The City's original application was filed on September 12, 2013. R., pp.1-27. The City subsequently submitted 
two amended applications. Id. at pp.28-58; 92-105. 
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filled with water from the Snake River under water right O 1-181 C. Ex. I 06. The City describes 
the reservoir operation and alleged recharge as follows: 
During the irrigation season, water is continually delivered to the reservoir to 
maintain its water level. As described in the water right, I, 100 acre-feet remain in 
the reservoir for recreation storage, 980.9 acre-feet seep into the aquifer, and 186 
acre-feet are lost to evaporation. Once delivery of water to Jensen Grove ceases 
at the end of the irrigation season, the remaining water in the reservoir sinks into 
the aquifer, adding an additional recharge of 1, 100 acre-feet under water right O 1-
181 C .... As the water right owner of 01-181C, the applicant proposes to use a 
portion of this recharge as mitigation for the new application. 
Ex. I p.2. The City seeks an additional mitigation credit of 6.2 afa resulting from the proposed 
non-use of certain Blackfoot River water rights. Id. at 3. 
The City's application was protested by the Coalition.2 R., pp.66-68. Among other 
things, the Coalition asserts the City failed to establish the new appropriation will not reduce the 
quantity of water under existing rights. Id. An administrative hearing was held before the 
Department on April 21, 2015. Tr., p.l. Department employee James Cefalo acted as hearing 
officer. Id. at 5. On May 15, 2015, he issued his Preliminary Order. R., pp.200-219. He found 
that the proposed appropriation constitutes a consumptive use of water and, without mitigation, 
will reduce the quantity of water under existing rights. Id. at 207. In evaluating the proposed 
mitigation, he determined that water right O 1-181 C does not authorize the City to use water for 
recharge. ld. Notwithstanding, he approved the City's application on the condition that it 
successfully pursue a transfer to add recharge as an authorized purpose of use under the right. 
Id. at 213-214. 
The City filed exceptions to the Preliminary Order. Id. at 220-245. It challenged the 
hearing officer's conditional of approval of its application and his requirement that it pursue a 
transfer of water right O 1-181 C. Id. On September 22, 2015, the Director issued his Final 
Order. Id. at 271-277. Like the hearing officer, the Director found that water right 01-181C 
does not authorize the City to use water for recharge. Id. at 272-273. He agreed that a transfer 
would be required to authorize such use. Id. However, the Director disagreed with the 
conditional approval of the application. Id. at 273. Given the uncertainty and complications 
2 The term "Coalition" refers collectively to the A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, American Falls 
Reservoir District #2, Minidoka Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company and Twin 
Falls Canal Company. 
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associated with a potential transfer, the Director determined that the better approach "is to deny 
the application, without prejudice, for failure to submit sufficient information for the Department 
to consider the City's mitigation plan." Id. The Director therefore rejected the City's 
application, and suggested it could refile in conjunction with the pursuit of a transfer of water 
right 01-181C. Id. at 274. 
On October 16, 2015, the City filed the instant Petition, asserting that the Director's 
Final Order is contrary to law. The case was reassigned by the clerk of the court to this Court on 
October 26, 2015. On November 16, 2015, the Court entered an Order permitting Coalition 
members to appear as intervenors. The parties subsequently briefed the issues raised on judicial 
review. A hearing on the Petition was held before the Court on March 10, 2015. The parties did 
not request the opportunity to submit additional briefing and the Court does not require any. 
Therefore, this matter is deemed fully submitted for decision on the next business day or March 
11, 2015. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judicial review of a final decision of the director ofIDWR is governed by the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act ("IDAP A"). Under IDAP A, the court reviews an appeal from an 
agency decision based upon the record created before the agency. J.C.§ 67-5277. The court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on 
questions of fact. I.C. § 67-5279(1). The court shall affirm the agency decision unless it finds 
that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) 
made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. J.C. § 67-5279(3). Further, the 
petitioner must show that one of its substantial rights has been prejudiced. LC. § 67-5279( 4). 
Even if the evidence in the record is conflicting, the Court shall not overturn an agency's 
decision that is based on substantial competent evidence in the record. Barron v. IDWR, 135 
Idaho 414,417, 18 P.3d 219, 222 (2001). The Petitioner bears the burden of documenting and 
proving that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's decision. 
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An application for permit to appropriate water is evaluated against the criteria set forth in 
Idaho Code§ 42-203A. One criterion is whether the proposed appropriation "will reduce the 
quantity of water under existing water rights." LC. § 42-203A(5). If so, the Department may 
reject the application. Id. However, an application that may otherwise be rejected because of 
injury to another water right "may be approved upon conditions which will mitigate losses of 
water to the holder of an existing water right, as determined by the director." ID APA 
37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. The Director held that the appropriation proposed by the City constitutes a 
consumptive use of water. R., 273. Without mitigation it will reduce the quantity of water 
available under existing water rights. Id. The City contends it presented adequate mitigation to 
compensate for the consumptive use and asserts that the Director improperly rejected its 
application. This Court disagrees. For the reasons set forth herein, the Director's Final Order is 
affirmed. 
A. The Director's determination that water right 01-181C does not authorize the City 
to use water for recharge is affirmed. 
Ground water recharge constitutes the lion's share of mitigation proposed by the City. It 
asserts recharge is authorized under water right O 1-181 C. After reviewing the Partial Decree for 
water right O 1-181 C, the Director held that recharge is not an authorized purpose of use under 
the right. R., pp.272. This Court agrees. The same rules of interpretation applicable to contracts 
apply to the interpretation of a water right decree. A & B Irr. Dist. v. Spackman, 153 Idaho 500, 
523,284 P.3d 225,248 (2012). If a decree's terms are clear and unambiguous, the decree's 
meaning and legal effect are questions oflaw to be determined from the plain meaning of its own 
words. Cf, Sky Cannon Properties, LLC v. The Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, 155 Idaho 604, 
606, 315 P.3d 792, 794 (2013). A decree is ambiguous ifit is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretations. Cf, Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,308, 160 P.3d 743, 
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747 (2007). Whether a decree is ambiguous is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises 
free review. Id. 
i. Recharge is not an authorized use under the purpose of use element of the 
Partial Decree. 
The plain language of the Partial Decree sets forth the uses authorized thereunder. 
Ex. l 06. The purpose of use element unambiguously provides that water may be diverted for: (1) 
irrigation storage, (2) irrigation from storage, (3) diversion to storage, (4) recreation storage, and 
(5) irrigation. Id. Notwithstanding, the City asserts it is also authorized to use water for recharge 
under the right. It relies on the other provisions element of the Partial Decree, which provides in 
part: 
The diversion and use of water under transfer 72385 is subject to additional 
conditions and limitations contained in a settlement agreement-IDWR transfer of 
water right, transfer no. 72385, date June 2006, including any properly executed 
amendments thereto, entered into by and between the New Sweden Irrigation 
District, the City of Blackfoot, A&B Irrigation District, American Falls Reservoir 
District #2, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, Minidoka 
Irrigation District, Twin Falls Canal Company, and North Side Canal Company. 
The settlement agreement has been recorded in Bingham County (Instrument No. 
575897) and Bonneville County (Instrument No. 1249899) and is enforceable by 
the parties thereto. 
Id. The City asserts that the referenced settlement agreement acknowledges its ability to use 
water for recharge. Further, that the other provisions element, by way of reference to that 
agreement, authorizes recharge as an additional purpose of use under the right. 
The City's argument is untenable. Water rights are defined by elements. I.C. § 42-
1411(2).3 One defining element is purpose of use. I.C. § 42-1411(2)(f). In a general stream 
adjudication, the court must decree each purpose of use authorized under a state-based claim. 
I.C. §§ 42-141 land 1412. The adjudication statutes require those uses be set forth in the purpose 
of use element of the decree. Id. The City's argument that the other provisions element may 
3 See also e.g., Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 105 Idaho 98, 101,666 P.2d 188, 191 (1983) (providing, 
"[a] water right is defined, not in terms of metes and bounds as in other real property, but in terms of priority, 
amount, season of use, purpose of use, point of diversion and place of use"). 
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authorize additional uses of water not identified in the purpose of use element is inconsistent 
with Idaho law. Id. 
The other provisions element of a Partial Decree serves several purposes. It may set 
forth conditions on the exercise of a water right. LC. § 14-1411 (2)(i). It may also contain 
remarks to define, clarify or administer a right. LC.§ 14-1411(2)G). It may not, however, 
enlarge another defining element of a water right. For instance, the other provisions element 
cannot authorize the use of a larger quantity of water than that set forth in the quantity element of 
a decree. This is because the adjudication statutes specially require the authorized quantity to be 
set forth in the quantity element of a decree. LC. § 14-1411 (2)( c ). Under the same rationale, it 
cannot enlarge the purpose of use element of a water right by authorizing additional uses of 
water not identified therein. LC.§ 14-1411(2). 
The other provisions element relied upon by the City recognizes this and contradicts its 
position. It begins, "[t]he diversion and use of water under transfer 72385 is subject to 
additional conditions and limitations contained in a settlement agreement." Ex. I 06 ( emphasis 
added). It is appropriate for the other provisions element of a partial decree to contain 
"additional conditions and limitations" on the exercise of a right. LC. § § 14-1411 (2)(i) and G). 
However, it is the City's position that the other provisions element of its Decree does far more 
than that. It argues it fundamentally changes how water under the right may be used. It argues it 
expands the right to authorize a use of water not identified under the purpose of use element. 
What the City argues is not an additional condition and limitation. It is an impermissible 
expansion of the purpose of use element of the water right. 
There is no ambiguity in the purpose of use element of the Partial Decree issued for 
water right 01-181 C. It authorizes the City to divert water for five purposes of use. Recharge is 
not one of them. The City argues that recharge was not included in the purpose of use element 
because it would have been too burdensome to list all of the conditions on its ability to use water 
for that purpose.4 The Court does not follow the argument. It is not too burdensome to place the 
term "recharge" under the purpose of use element. This is simply done. 5 If there are numerous 
4 The City alleges these conditions are set forth in the settlement agreement. 
5 
In fact, the Draft Approval of Transfer 72385 prepared by the Department specifically included ground water 
recharge as a purpose of use and referred to the settlement agreement. Ex. 103. Ultimately, the final transfer still 
referred to the settlement agreement but omitted recharge as a purpose of use. Ex. 105. 
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conditions on the exercise of that use, those conditions may be set forth in the other provisions 
element of the right. That is the purpose of that element. LC. §§ 14-1411(2)(i) and (i). 
Therefore, if the City believed water right 01-181 C authorized it to divert water for recharge, it is 
not burdensome to identify "recharge" under the purpose of use element - it is necessary. 6 
Further scrutiny of the Decree reinforces that recharge is not an authorized purpose of 
use. An examination of the period of use element reveals the absence of any identified period of 
year wherein the City is authorized to use water for recharge. The adjudication statutes require a 
decree to include the period of the year when water may be used for each authorized purpose of 
use. LC. § 42-1411 (2)(g). Likewise, the Decree fails to identify the quantity of water which 
may be used by the City for recharge. 7 For the reasons set forth herein, the City's argument that 
it is authorized to use water for recharge is inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous 
language of its Partial Decree. 
ii. This proceeding is not the proper time or place to raise the argument that 
recharge is an authorized purpose of use. 
If the City believed recharge should be authorized under water right O 1-181 C, this 
proceeding is not the proper time or place to raise that argument. Some history is relevant here. 
Water right Ol-18IC was acquired by the City in 2005 to fill and maintain the reservoir at Jensen 
Grove. Ex.5. It was purchased from the New Sweden Irrigation District, which used the right 
for irrigation purposes. Id. To change the nature of use to accommodate Jensen Grove, the City 
filed an application for transfer with the Department. Ex. 6. In addition to irrigation, it sought to 
6 In interpreting whether the Decree issued for water right O 1-181 C authorizes recharge, the Director relied upon the 
plain language of the purpose of use element. R., p.2 72. He did not engage in an interpretation of the settlement 
agreement referenced the other provisions element. Id. The City argues that the Director erred in this respect. For 
the reasons set forth herein he did not. 
7 Under the quantity element, the Decree authorizes the diversion of980.80 afa for "seepage losses." Ex.106. The 
City appears to argue that 980.80 afa is therefore the quantity of water it is authorized to use for recharge purposes. 
This Court disagrees. The seepage loss was quantified by the Director, and approved by this Court, to justify a total 
authorized diversion of water under the right that exceeds the capacity of the reservoir. In this respect it is similar to 
the Director's recognition of conveyance loss when quantifying certain irrigation rights. However, seepage loss 
does not automatically equate to authorized recharge. Here, since recharge is not an authorized purpose of use under 
the right, neither the Director nor the Court was required to evaluate whether all of the water that is attributed to 
seepage losses for purposes of quantifying the right indeed acts to, and/or should be authorized as, recharge ground 
water. 
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add "recreation," "storage" and "recharge" as authorized uses under the right. Id. at 1 and 4. 
The Coalition initially protested the transfer, but ultimately withdrew that protest pursuant to a 
settlement agreement.8 Ex. 4, p.2. On February 14, 2007, the Director approved the City's 
transfer for the following purposes of use: 
Beneficial Use From To 
Diversion to Storage 04/01 to 10/31 
Irrigation 04/01 to 10/31 
Irrigation Storage O 1/0 I to 12/31 
Irrigation from Storage 04/01 to I 0/31 









Ex. I 05., p.2. Notably, he did not approve the City's request to add recharge as an authorized 
purpose of use. Id. In fact, recharge was deliberately withheld from the approved transfer. 
Ex.8; Ex. I 03. If the City believed the Director erred in this respect, it was required to timely 
exhaust its administrative remedies and, if necessary, seek judicial review. LC. §§ 67-5271, et 
seq. It did neither. 
Then, on May 29, 2009, the SRBA District Court entered a Partial Decree for the right 
in the Snake River Basin Adjudication. Ex. I 06. When the Director issued his recommendation 
for the right, he did not recommend a recharge purpose of use. Amended Director's Report, 
Twin Falls County Case No. 39576, subcase no. 01-181 C (April 16, 2007). If the City believed 
it was authorized to divert water for recharge, it had a duty to timely object to the Director's 
recommendation and present evidence to rebut the same in the SRBA. LC. § 42-1411 ( 5). It did 
not. The SRBA District Court proceeded to enter a Partial Decree for the right consistent with 
the Director's recommendation. Ex.106. The uses of water authorized under the Decree are 
ascertainable from a simple reading of the purpose of use element. They did not include 
recharge. If the City believed the Court erred in failing to identify recharge as an authorized 
purpose of use, it was required to timely appeal. I.AR. 14. It is inappropriate to now argue, in 
the context of this judicial review proceeding, that the Partial Decree issued for 01-181C 
authorizes a use of water not identified in the purpose of use element of that Decree. 
8 This is the settlement agreement reference in the other provisions element of the Partial Decree. 
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B. The Director's determination that the City must pursue a transfer if it desires to 
divert water for recharge is affirmed. 
In his Final Order, the Director held that "if the City wants to use Right O 1-181 C as 
mitigation through ground water recharge, it must file a transfer." R., p.272. The Director is 
correct. Idaho Code § 42-222(1) requires that any person who desires to make a change to the 
nature of use of a water right shall make application to the Department for approval of such 
change. Therefore, if the City desires to add recharge as an authorized purpose of use under O 1-
181 C, it must follow the transfer requirements set forth in Idaho Code § 42-222. 
The City argues that the Director has previously approved mitigation for new 
appropriations in the context of an appropriation proceeding, without requiring the applicant to 
undergo a separate transfer proceeding. It cites to application for permit number 3 5-14402 in the 
name of Karl and Jeffrey Cook and application for permit number 35-14240 in the name of 
Lance and/or Lisa Funk Partnership, among others. The cases cited are distinguishable. The 
mitigation proposed in those cases consisted of the non-use of existing water rights. A transfer is 
not required under Idaho Code § 42-222 to effectuate the non-use of an existing right. Using his 
authority under IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv., the Director can approve such non-use to mitigate 
losses and memorialize it as a condition of approval of an application for permit. Here, the City 
does not propose the non-use of water right O 1-181 C. Rather, it proposes using the right for the 
additional purpose of recharge in order to mitigate for a new appropriation. To do so, Idaho law 
requires the City to file a transfer application with the Department to add recharge as an 
authorized purpose of use under that right. LC. § 42-222. 
A transfer application is necessary to ensure the additional purpose of use satisfies the 
criteria set forth in Idaho Code§ 42-222. When the City transferred the 01-181C right for use at 
Jensen Grove, among other things, the Director approved a storage volume greatly exceeding the 
reservoir's capacity of 1100 AF. The transfer authorized storage of 2466.80 AFY, or over twice 
the reservoir's capacity. The excess volume recognized the extensive seepage loss due to the 
permeable nature of the reservoir bed. As a general matter, extensive carriage and/or seepage 
loss can be a basis for the disapproval of a transfer or placing conditions on the transfer so as to 
reduce carriage or seepage loss. Despite extensive seepage loss, the City's transfer was 
approved, in part due to the non-consumptive nature of the transfer and the benefits that would 
accrue to the ESPA and the Snake River. Ex. I 02. To now use those same considerations as the 
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basis to support a new consumptive use without going through a transfer proceeding potentially 
undermines the very considerations that supported the transfer in the first place. A transfer is 
therefore necessary so that the Director may reevaluate the entire right taking into account the 
additional purpose to ensure that the criteria set forth in Idaho Code§ 42-222 are still being met. 
As it now stands, if the City's position is to be accepted that the transfer already approved 
recharge for mitigation, a quantity determination for such a purpose has never been made. As 
such, would the City be authorized to use the entire non-consumptive portion of the right as 
recharge to support mitigation or some lesser quantity? Attempting to address the issue in the 
context of the proceedings for a new groundwater right doesn't resolve the issue of how much 
water is authorized for recharge under the O 1-181 C water right. 
In its briefing, the City recognizes there are limitations on the ability to claim recharge as 
the basis for a new or expanded water right. These limitations are set forth in Idaho Code § 42-
234( 5). The City argues that the recharge it alleges is not subject to the limitations of Idaho 
Code§ 42-234(5). The Director did not reach this issue in his Final Order. He was careful not 
to prejudge any legal issues that may arise in the context of a potential transfer proceeding. R., 
p.273. The Court affirms the Director in this respect. Whether a transfer of water right O 1-181 C 
implicates Idaho Code § 42-234(5) is an issue appropriately raised in the context of a transfer 
proceeding. As a result, the Court does not address the issue here. 
C. The Director's determination to reject the City's application is affirmed. 
The Director has the authority to reject an application to appropriate water where the 
appropriation "will reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights." J.C. § 42-203A(5). 
He did so here, finding that the City's application "will reduce the amount of water available to 
satisfy water rights from sources connected to the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer." R., p.273. The 
Director's finding is supported by the record. It is undisputed that the proposed appropriation 
constitutes a consumptive use of water, and as discussed above, the mitigation proposed by the 
City to offset that use is not legally viable at present. Since the Director did not abuse his 
discretion or act contrary to law in rejecting the City's application, his Final Order must be 
affirmed. 
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Therefore, based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Director's Order 
Addressing Exceptions and Denying Application/or Permit entered on September 22, 2015 is 
hereby affirmed. 
Dated Arv:-\ Co 1 20\ lt 
--:...:::: 
District Judge 
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MILNER IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY 
Represented by: 
TRAVIS L THOMPSON 
195 RIVER VISTA PL STE 204 
TWIN FALLS, ID 83301-3029 
Phone: 208-733-0700 
AMERICAN FALLS RESERVOIR 
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
Represented by: 
W KENT FLETCHER 
1200 OVERLAND AVE 
PO BOX 248 
BURLEY, ID 83318-0248 
Phone: 208-678-3250 
DIRECTOR OF IDWR 
PO BOX 83720 
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Garrett H. Sandow, ISB #5215 
220 N. Meridian 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
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Email: gsandowlaw@aol.com 
Robert L. Harris, !SB #7018 
D. Andrew Rawlings, !SB #9569 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208)523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com 
arawlings@holdenlegal.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
v. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity as 
Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 
PERMIT NO. 27-12261 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category L.4. - $129.00 
I 
000220
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, GARY SP ACKMAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL 
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER 
RESOURCES, AND THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES; 
THE RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEY, GARRICK L. BAXTER, DEPUTY 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, P.O. BOX 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 73720, TELEPHONE 
(208) 287-4800, GARRICK.BAXTER@IDWR.IDAHO.GOV; 
THE INTERVENORS, THE SURFACE WATER COALITION; 
THE INTERVENORS' ATTORNEYS, BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP, 
195 RIVER VISTA PLACE, SUITE 204, TWIN FALLS, IDAHO 83301-3029, 
TELEPHONE (208) 733-0700, PLA@IDAHOWATERS.COM, AND W. KENT 
FLETCHER, P.O. BOX 248, BURLEY, IDAHO 83318, TELEPHONE (208) 
678-3250, WKF@PMT.ORG; AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The City of Blackfoot, by and through its above-listed counsel of record, appeal against 
the above-named respondents, Gary Spackman, in his official capacity as the Director of 
the Idaho Department of Water Reso~ces, and the Idaho Department of Water Resources, 
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order and Judgment, 
both filed April 6, 2016, entered in the above-entitled action by the Honorable Eric J. 
Wildman, District Judge, presiding .. A copy of the judgment or order being appealed is 
attached to this notice. 
2. The Appellant has aright to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or orders 
described in paragraph I, above, are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule I I ( a)( I) 
and 11 (f), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert in 
the appeal (which does not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues) is as follows: 
a. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 
67-5279(3) by failing to consider the Settlement Agreement, ID WR Transfer 
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of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, June 2006, as an element of Water 
Right No. 01-181C. 
b. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 
67-5279(3) by not engaging in contractual interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement, IDWR Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, June 2006. 
c. Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-
5279(3) by concluding that "[n]othing in Transfer No. 72[3]85 [sic] or the 
Partial Decree issued by the Snake River Basin Adjudication indicate Right 
01-181 C can be used for ground water recharge." Final Order at 2. Stated 
another way, whether the City gave away its ability to use Ol-181C to 
mitigate for 27-12261 when it entered into the Settlement Agreement, ID WR 
Transfer of Wa/er Right, Transfer No. 72385, June 2006. 
d. Whether the cDirector erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 
67-5279(3) by concluding that the City must file a transfer ifit wants to use 
01-l 81C for mitigation purposes. Final Order at 2. 
e. Whether the Director erred in a manner described m Idaho Code § 
67-5279(3) by determining that "any recharge to the aquifer achieved by 
diversion and use under Right O 1-181 C, is merely incidental recharge 
[ under Idaho Code § 42-234(5)] and cannot be 'used as a basis for claim of 
a separate or expanded water right."' 
4. There is no order sealing any portion of the record in this case. 
5. The Appellant requests that the transcript of the administrative proceedings held before the 
Idaho Department of Water Resources be made part of the record on appeal. The Appellant 
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currently possesses a copy of the transcript, as it was previously prepared by the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources in conjunction with the District Court's judicial review of 
this action. A copy of the transcript may be obtained from the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources or the City of Blackfoot. In addition, the Appellant requests that a copy of the 
transcript from the hearing on the City of Blackfoot's Petition for Judicial Review, held 
before the District Court on March 10, 2016, also be included. No other transcripts are 
requested. 
6. The Appellant requests that all pleadings and attachments filed in this case along with all 
other documents in the clerk's record automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules be made part of the record. Specifically, the pleadings are as follows: 
a. Notice. ofAppeal and Petition for Judicial Review of Final Agency Record, 
filed Octpber 16, 2015; 
b. Notice ofReassignment, filed October 26, 2015; 
C. Procedural Order Governing Judicial Review of Final Order of Director of 
Idaho Department of Water Resources, filed October 27, 2015; 
d. Surface Water Coalition's Notice of Appearance, filed November 4, 2015; 
e. Notice of Lodging Agency Record and Transcript with the Agency, filed 
November 10, 2015; 
f. Order Treating Appearance as Motion to Intervene and Granting Same, 
filed November 16, 2015; 
g. Order Settling Agency Record and Transcript, filed December 8, 2015; 
h. Notice of Lodging the Settled Agency Record and Transcript with the 
District Court, filed December 8, 2015; 
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. . 
1. Agency's Certificate of Record, filed December 8, 2015; 
j. Petitioner's Opening Brief, filed January 12, 2016; 
k. Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Respondents' Brief, filed 
February 8, 2016; 
L Affidavit of Meghan Carter in Support of Unopposed Motion for Extension 
of Time to File Respondents' Brief, filed February 8, 2016; 
m. Order Granting Motion for E:x1ension of Time, filed February 8, 2016; 
IL Respondent's Brief, filed February 11, 2016; 
o. Surface Water Coalition's Response Brief, filed February 11, 2016; 
p. Petitioner's Reply Brief, filed March 3, 2016; 
q. 
r. 
·Memorandum Decision and Order, filed April 6, 2016; and 
foagment, filed April 6, 2016. 
7. The Appellantrequests.that all of the exhibits included in the agency record be copied and 
sent to the Supreme Court. 
8. 1 certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
i. ".'Jame and Address: Sabrina Vasquez, P.O. Box 2707, Twin Falls, Idaho 
83303-2707. 
b. That the Clerk of the District Court and the Idaho Department of Water Resourees 
have been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's and agency's record has been 
paid. 
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d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and upon the Attorney General pursuant to Section 
67-1401(1), Idaho Code. 
Dated this /}~ day of May, 2016. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1,-efL. Garrett Sandow 
{) · Attorney for the City of Blackfoot 
~ L-. ·. ~ l~-J. _·_ 
Robert L. Harris ·  
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that l served a copy of the following described pleading or document on 
the attorneys and/or individuals listed below, by the method indicated, a true and correct copy 
thereof on this /~~ day of May, 2016. 
Document Served: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Attorneys and/or Individuals Served: 
Director Gary Spackman ( vrMail 
c/o Deborah Gibson, Administrative Assistant 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES 
P.O. Box 83720 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile, (208) 287-6700 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0098 
deborah.gibsoma)idV\T.idaho.gov 
Garrick L. Baxter 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY G!mERAL 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0098 
garrick.baxter@idwr.idaho.gov 
Paul L. Arrington 
BARKER, RQSHOL T & SIMPSON, LLP 
195 River Vista Place, Suite 204 
TV\in Falls, Idaho 83301-3027 
p!a(m.idahowaters.com 
W. Kent Fletcher 
FLETCHER LAW OFFICE 
P.O.Box248 
Burley, Idaho 83318-0248 
wkf@pmt.org 
( ~~ii 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile, (208) 287-6700 
( ) Courthouse Box 
(~! 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( } Facsimile, (208) 735-2444 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( v1"Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile, (208) 878-2548 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Rob~rt L. Harris 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
G:\WPDAT A\RLifd8653-000 City ofB1ackfoot\APPEAL\,).;otice of Appeal vOl.docx 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
Strict Court - SRBA 
Fifth JUdlcial Dlstrtct 
Co In Re: Admlnlstraltve Aooeala 
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GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacit,j-~:-~~~::::-::::-::::-..f:..~~2 
as Director of the Idaho SUPREME 
Department of Water Resources, NO. 4 
and THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
WATER RESOURCES, 
Respondents/Respondents, 
A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
BURLEY IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
MILNER IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
AMERICAN FALLS RESERVOIR 
DISTRICT ~2, MINIDOKA IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT, NORTH SIDE CANAL CO., 
and TWIN FALLS CANAL CO., 
Intervenors/Respondents. 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION 
FOR PERMIT NO. 27-12661 
In the Name of the City of 
Blackfoot. 
Bingham County Case 
No. CV-2015-1687 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on June 22, 2016, 
I lodged a transcript of 72 pages in length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk 




The transcript includes: Oral Arguments on Petition 
for Judicial Review, 3/10/16. 
A PDF copy of the transcript will be e-mailed to 
sctfilings@idcourts.net; jmurphy@idcourts.net; 
rharris@holdenlegal.com; and garrick.baxter@idwr.id.gov. 
ls/Sabrina Vasquez 
Sabrina Vasquez 




ON SEPARATE CD 
Agency Record & Transcript (12/8/15) 
as Lodged with the District Court 
City of Blackfoot v. Gary Spackman, 
et al. 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
000229
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
v. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department 
of Water Resources, and THE IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER 
RESOURCES, 














A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY) 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER ) 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, AMERICAN ) 
FALLS RESERVOIR DISTRICT #2, ) 
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, ) 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY and ) 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY, ) 
) 
Intervenors I Respondents. ) 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION ) 
FOR PERMIT NO. 27-12261 ) 
) 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. ) 
) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE.CV-2015-1687.SC Docket 44207.City ofBlackfoot 
Supreme Court 
Docket No. 44207 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
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I, Julie Murphy, Deputy Clerk of the Court, Fifth Judicial District, State ofldaho, in and 
for the County of Twin Falls, hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record on Appeal was 
compiled under my direction and is a true, correct and complete record of the pleadings and 
documents required by Idaho Appellate Rule 28, and documents requested in the Notice of 
Appeal filed by the City of Blackfoot. 
Signed and sealed this 28th day of June, 2016. 
'<-~ Q\STRtcr 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
V. 
GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity 
as Director of the Idaho Department 
of Water Resources, and THE IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER 
RESOURCES, 














A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY) 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER ) 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, AMERICAN ) 
FALLS RESERVOIR DISTRICT #2, ) 
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, ) 
NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY and ) 
TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY, ) 




IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION ) 
FOR PERMIT NO. 27-12261 ) 
) 
In the name of the City of Blackfoot. ) 
) 
Supreme Court 
Docket No. 44207 
Case No. CV-2015-1687 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF SERVICE 
I, Julie Murphy, Deputy Clerk of the Court, Fifth Judicial District, State of 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE.CV-2015-1687.SC Docket 44207.City of Blackfoot 
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Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, hereby certify that a true and correct 
copy of the Clerk's Record on Appeal was served this day on the following 
parties: 
Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew Rawlings, Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo 
PLLC, 1000 Riverwalk Dr., Suite 200, PO Box 50130, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83405, 
appearing for Petitioner-Appellant, City of Blackfoot. 
Garrick L. Baxter, Deputy Attorney General, Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho, 83720-0098, appearing for Respondents/ 
Respondents, IDWR and Gary Spackman. 
Paul L. Arrington, Travis L. Thompson, and John K. Simpson, Barker 
Rosholt & Simpson LLP, 163 2°d Ave W, PO Box 63, Twin Falls, Idaho, 
83301-0063, appearing for lntervenors / Respondents, A&B Irrigation District, 
Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company 
and Twin Falls Cana\ Company. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE WAS ALSO SERVED ON: 
Garrett H. Sandow, 220 N. Meridian, Blackfoot, Idaho, 83221, appearing for 
Petitioner-Appellant, City of Blackfoot 
W. Kent Fletcher, Fletcher Law Office, 1200 Overland Ave., PO Box 248, 
Burley, Idaho, 83318-0248, appearing for Intervenors / Respondents, Minidoka 
Irrigation District and American Falls Reservoir District #2. 
Signed and sealed this 28th day of June, 2016. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVl(TCV-2015-1687.SC Docket 44207.City ofBlackfoot 
